LAND & WATER 
November 16, igi6 
right, but it has already begun to threaten the KenaU 
line. If it can be supported by corresponding successes 
somewhat more to the left, or if it proceed even only upon 
the right another three or four thousand yards, it reaches 
the higher ground from which the Monastir plain can be 
observed and the Kenali line taken in reverse, though at 
a considerable range. 
We see then that the attempt is being made to outflank 
the plain by the mountain. And such a phrase in itself 
is sufficient to indicate the revolution which the strength 
of the modern defensive has produced in the methods 
al war. 
THE ROUMANIAN SITUATION 
The situation of the general enemy offensive against the 
Roumanian forces and the . Russian contingents in 
alUance with tlicm has not developed in the course of the 
past week (up to the time of writing) in any degree 
meriting special description. 
A Russian force has appi^ared upon the viaduct which 
crosses the marshes in continuation of the great Cema 
Voda bridge. It has seized the so-called " Danube station " 
— which is I believe little more than a signalling station- 
a mile or so from the river bank, but it is presumably 
designed by its presence to prevent any attempt on the 
part of the enemy to restore the main bridge across the 
river. 
How far the main bridge has been destroyed is still 
imknown here in the west. Rapid as was the retreat 
and belated as the decision to destroy the bridge ma\- 
have been, it is hardly credible that at least one pair 
of girder ends should not ha\e been dislodged. The work 
may have been more thoroughly done still. But exactly 
what has been done here, or how tlie enemy has dealt 
with it, what temoorary repairs, or " jury bridge " 
has been thrown across, we do not know. 
In the Dobrudja Mackensen has had to fall back again 
towards where the. " waist " of that region gives him his 
shortest line — which is the hne just covering the railway 
from Cerna V'oda to Constanza. He shows here, as every 
detail of the enemy offensive shows, the embarrassment 
for men balancing a superiority in heavy pieces and 
munitionment. In so faUing back he has had U< 
abandon Hirsova, which would have been an excellent 
crossing place could he have cleared the Dobrudja upon 
his flank — for at that point the marshes disappear, the 
stream narrows, and an island in the stream aids such an 
attempt. 
On the Transylvanian front, that is on the mountain 
border, we have had up to the time of writing nothing 
but a repetition of what has now been going on for so 
many weeks. The enemy has tried to re-act in the 
Vulcan pass with no appreciable success. In the Red 
Tower pass he has made a slight advance on the right 
and has been checked (at the moment of writing) on hi> 
left. In the Torzburg he has gained perhaps 1,50(1 
yards at one point ; in the Prcdeal he has been held 
In all the northern passes save the northernmost he i> 
stationary, in the northernmost of all he has slightly 
fallen back. 
There is no new matter as yet here for analysis or 
discussion. 
Weather on the Transylvanian Front 
Apart from these elements of the situation north of 
Bukarest, which are familiar to us all — the reinforcement 
of the Roumanian troops by Russian contingents ; the 
superiority of the enemy in heavy artillery ; the anxiety 
of the enemy in the matter of effectives and his in- 
sufficiency of men for the task — there is another element 
which is now becoming of considerable moment, and that 
is the weather. Only those personally acquainted with 
the region can fulh' appreciate and describe this factor. 
But the evidence even at second-hand illuminates us in 
the West who are watching this distant struggle. 
It seems, in the first place, that rain and snow are 
giaver impediments in these mountains than in most 
ranges of the same height. The three main roads upon 
which the enemy is depending in the Vulcan, Red Tower 
and the Predeal Passes arc, we arc told, excellent. But 
the fourth road, that of the Torzburg, or Pasul Bran, is 
indifferent, and it seems that the mountain tracks which 
alone supplement these highways are almost impassable 
I IT the movement of heavy guns and wagons when thej 
i^et soaked. 
The next point to notice in connection with weathei 
in this region is the effect it has upon the torrent beds. 
These are nearly dry in the summer. The water obstacles 
present are, until the rains come, only the main rivers 
and these, as we know, lead down parallel with the roads 
from the mountains to the plain. "But with the fall of 
the first autumn rains and before the snow comes, the 
transverse torrents swell. These do not perhaps present 
\ ery serious water obstacles sa\'c in their lower coiu-ses 
just before joining the main rivers (though it is there 
1 hat such obstacles are most serious for an army following 
the main roads), but they are of considerable effect in 
ravining the troops and sweeping away temporary 
bridges. 
The autumn rains fell this season somewhat late. 
It was in the last week of October that they iirst came 
with any force and their effect was first fully felt. The 
<;erman Press has noted this and has put it forward in 
( xcuse for the unexpected delay in the offensive opera- 
tions of Falkenhayn. There is no purport in lingering 
upon the motives which chctate such press notices. It is 
enough to note the e\'idence which they afford. Wet 
weather and mist have, of course, a further very great 
effect in diminishing the superiority of heavy artillery, 
ft is an arm dependent upon visibility. And this, com- 
bined with the difficulty of moving heavy pieces upon 
>odden ground, has been a continuous factor in favour of 
the defensive for now three weeks past. Whether the pre- 
\alent opinion that snow and winter conditions will 
bring the offensive to a halt altogether, is right or not, 
no one can tell until those conditions are established — 
a matter now within four weeks. But what one can clearly 
see in this field as well as in the Dobrudja is the in- 
creasing difficulty of the enemy in the matter of effectives. 
There more than in any other sector of the enormous 
fronts can one see upon the surface, as it were, the peril 
which has moved Berhn to its clumsy bid for Polish 
recruitment. 
PUZZLE 01^ DOUAUMONT 
What happened last month upon the critical sector 
of the Verdun front — the north-eastern sector of which 
Douaumont is the centre — presents to-day — with our 
fuller knowledge of it — a very curious problem ; a pro- 
blem which I will not attempt to solve but will merely 
put before the reader. 
If one could answer all the questions it suggests, one 
would have a much increased knowledge of the enemy 
situation in the West : I mean not of his numbers, which 
are fairly well established, but of the rapidity with which 
he can move them, and of his moral. 
The problem or puzzle of this Verdun sector is briefly 
this :— 
After an intensive bombardment not very prolonged, 
a portion of the German line gave way badly. It lost 
prisoners at the rate of one man to the yard (which is as 
though the enemy should lose 30,000 men in a few hours 
general advance on the Sommc front). It lost them in 
an hour or two of lighting— and most of them in the first 
few minutes of that fighting. It lost them at an expense 
to the French of less than half the prisoners they took ; 
and less than 3 per cent, of the French forces engaged 
—and this list includes even the lightest casualties. On 
the top of that the enemy tried five times and very hard 
to recapture what he had lost. It was well worth his 
while to sacrifice men, because the po.sitions he had lost 
were the positions from which he had full observation 
over the ridge down towards the Verdun \alley. More- 
over, so long as the Germans held them they forbade direct 
obser\ation over the German positions on the Woeuvre 
Plain below. 
He not only failed to recapture them, but he volun- 
tarily withdrew from Vaux Fort, another observation 
post over the plain, rather than risk a further great loss of 
prisoners when it was beginning to be surrounded. He 
fell right back to the foot of the hills. Further, he lost 
among the pnsoners all his superior officers who were 
present. 
Now, \vhat does such an episode mean ? At first 
sight It ^\•ould seem to mean that the French had 
