November 16, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
discovered a weak spot from which the Germans had with- 
drawn too many men and had struck with corresponding 
effect. That was certainly the interpretation put upon 
the affair by most competent and instructed observers 
who wrote o"f it in the iirst few days after it happened. 
But we now know what the German units were in front 
of the French, for the interrogations have been fully 
co-ordinated, and all the intelligence we are likely to ha\'e 
upon the matter has come in. 
On the left near the quarries of Haudromont and about 
half-way to Thiaumont, the French had in front of them 
the 13th Division of Reserve, or, at any rate, units drawn 
from every one of its regiments, which are the 13th, the 
3qth, and the 57th, being the first division of the 7th 
Reserve Corps. Next, up to the Thiaumont Farm itself 
came the 25th division of reserve ; that is, the i68th, 
the 83rd, and the iiSth regiment. From the Farm of 
Thiaumont to Fleury were discovered two regiments of 
the 34th division of reserve, the 67th and the 30th. On 
the left or eastward again from Fleury in the wood above 
Vaux, called the Wood of Capitre, men were taken from 
the 7th and 154th regiments, which belong to the gth 
division of the 5th Active Corps. Further eastward again 
were present iinits from the 67th, the 130th and 364th 
regiments, which between them make up the 33rd German 
Division of Reserve. Lastly, on the extreme left or 
east (the French right), in front of what was once the 
battery of Damloup overlooking the plain from the crest 
of the hill, were men from all the units of the 50th division, 
to wit, the 39th, 53rd, and 158th regiments. 
You have here apparently no less than six divisions 
and 17 regiments ! But the French attacked with only 
three divisions, a fourth division being kept in reserve. 
How can such a disproportion be accounted for, and 
how can such results have followed ? 
Here is another point. It was at least assumed that if 
there had not been discovered a weak patch in the German 
line due to a withdrawal of men, there was at any rate a 
local weakness due to the withdrawal of artillery. We 
know that the artillery on the Somme has been largely 
reinforced and we know that a good many of the heavy 
guns have come from the Verdun sector. But when the 
French success had been achieved, within a very few 
hours an intensive counter-bombardment by the Germans 
began to be delivered over the conquered belt of terri- 
tory, and this bombardment has been renewed twice 
since that date, especially increasing in severity in the 
last two days of last week. 
The solution of the riddle is not easy to find. The 
facts may mean that the units in front of the French, 
though numerous, were badly depleted, and there is 
something to support this in the fact that men were 
captured from individual battalions ; that is, the men 
captured from such and such a regiment would only 
belong to one battahon of that regiment. It may (and 
this is more probable) mean that the superiority in long 
range fire now in the hands of the Western Alhes, com- 
pelled a very deep formation in front of Verdun as upon 
the Somme. In this fashion the second and third bat- 
talions in reserve would be a long way behind the front, 
and the breaking in of the front may have been dii'e to 
this formation imposed upon the enemy by the superiority 
of the French fire. It may mean some local break- 
down in moral or some local negligence in observation. I 
do not pretend to offer a solution, but merely to point out 
the interesting and puzzHng point that we now know the 
German front to have given way where it was not appar- 
rently weak in units nor even apparently seriously weak- 
ened in gun power. The thing is no more than an 
incident, though it may prove when we know more of the 
facts an illuminating one. H. Belloc 
Mr. Belloc has received a large amount of correspond- 
ence on his analysis of German Reserves. The letters 
are too numerous to answer separately. He has pre- 
pared an article dealing with the points raised by his cor- 
respondents, but owing to pressure on our space it has had 
to be postponed until next week. 
Mr. Wilson and the War 
By Arthur Pollen 
TO quote an old repartee, Mr. Wilson, emerging 
from a condition of suspended animation, has 
reappeared upon the international stage after 
keeping Europe in a state of animated suspense. 
It cannot be questioned that Mr. Wilson now stands, as 
he never stood before, as the embodiment of the American 
idea. His triumph is emphatically a personal triumph. 
Four years ago, two sections of the cleft RepubHcan party 
polled a million and a quarter voters more than he. . This 
year the united Republicans have polled nearly half a 
million fewer in a very greatly increased electorate. 
Normally, the Repubhcans must be regarded as the more 
numerous party. They are far more wealthy, and wealth 
is the final factor in organising for the best electoral 
result's. They had an admirable candidate in Mr. Hughes 
— a man of the loftiest character and with an excellent 
record as an independent, high-spirited and reforming 
statesman. He was supported by Colonel Roosevelt, 
unquestionably the most commanding personality the 
I 'nited States has produced since Lincoln. Mr. Wilson 
had no extraneous aids to popularity. Mr. Bryan, it is 
true, who left him on the Lusitania issue, gave him his best 
support in the M'est. But against this not inconsiderable 
asset must be set the opposition of the extremists of the 
Irish section — in ordinary times a considerable proportion 
of the Democratic vote — and the united efforts of all the 
pro-German sections. There was nothing in the political 
programmes of either party to arouse either enthusiasm 
or opposition over specific issues, such as the silver 
question or a tariff. It seems clear, indeed, that in the 
ordinary sense of the word, party issues hardly counted. 
On the outstanding question of the day, the European 
War, America was practically united. Neither side was 
for intervention, and both were strenuous for the 
maintenance of neutrality — so long as neutrality could be 
observed. Mr. Wilson came in for much criticism, in 
the matters both of Mexico and the submarine contro- 
versy. But it was a criticism directed more at method 
than at policy. If the European issue, so far as the 
conduct of the campaign goes, helped either side, it pro- 
bably helped Mr. Wilson only, and simply because the 
German agents went to such trouble, and expense to urge 
those of German descent to vote for Mr. Hughes. But 
neither the Repubhcan party nor any authorised lieu- 
tenant sought or encouraged such support, and it seems 
exceedingly doubtful whether, in fact, he got it. Indeed, 
it is not improbable that the so-called German-Americans, 
at least in some places, resented this imputation on their 
patriotism, and showed it by voting against the party 
which they usually support. But, broadly speaking, 
none of these factors seem to have been decisive, and the 
result must be looked upon, beyond everything else, as a 
personal triumph for the President. 
If this is the right view of the facts, the explanation is 
not difficult to see. In spite of the American gibe at the 
contrast between the vigour of his notes and the absence 
of his actions. — first shaking his fist at Germany and then 
his finger— the fact remains that Mr. Wilson's attitude 
throughout has been in exact consonance with average 
American sentiment. That sentiment is founded upon 
the oldest of all American traditions ; the complete 
aloofness of the States from the quarrels and concerns of 
Europe. The cataclysmic character of the present war 
has produced two parties new to American politics — one 
pledged to peace at any price, the other urging American 
intervention to maintain the high standard of Christian 
civilisation. In neither party was there more than a 
small minority. In the summer of 1915 Mr. Bryan led 
the first of these, and Mr. Wilson was able to part with him 
without any loss, moral or political. The case of the 
second party he met by a statement, astonishing enough 
to us, that the orieins of the Euronean War were still 
