November 23, igij 
LAND & WATER 
rather less than 2,000 feet above the sea.) Beyond this 
ridge is the district and town of Fiorina, and beyond this 
piece of open country again the Plain of Monastir, which 
runs like a sort of corridor between two mountain masses, 
the western (which I have marked A) rising to some 
4,000 or 5,000 feet above the plain ; the eastern (which 
1 have marked B) rising to some 2,000 feet above the plain, 
or rather more in its highest summits. This latter is 
bounded by the great bend of the river Cerna or " Black 
River," the upper waters of which sweep southward 
and eastward round this mountain mass, and then run 
northward to join the Vardar. 
Upon this second day of this main north-western 
offensive, Friday, September 15th, the Serbian infantry 
striking northward from Lake Ostrovo, gained a signal 
victory. They captured the ridge in front of Fiorina, 
throwing the Bulgarians back beyond it towards that 
town. On the i6th, the Saturday, they were coming down 
the further slopes of the range and reaching on the right 
centre the defensive Hne of the 'river Brod. 
They had taken numerous prisoners and no less than 
32 field pieces and heavy guns in this single operation 
of 48 hours. 
The Bulgarians checked the adt'ancc upon the river 
Brod, but failed to stand there, and two days later, at 
10 o'clock in the morning of Monday the i8th of Sep- 
tember, the French and Serbians entered Fiorina. . By 
the next day, Tuesday, the remaining resistance in a 
few of the northern houses of the town had been cleared, 
and on the same day the right wing of the Serbians 
began to attack the slopes of the great mountain of 
Kaymakchalan. 
It was a most formidable position. The flat but 
escarped summit was defended by art as well as by nature 
and strongly occupied by the enemy. But before sunset 
of that day, Tuesday the 19th, the peak was held by our 
Allies. The Bulgarians had been thrown back to a 
somewhat lower shoulder towards the north which they 
continued to hold for nearly a week. The last counter- 
attack of the Bulgarians to recover the peak of Kay- 
makchalan was delivered exactly a week later, upon 
Tuesday the 26th of September. It failed, and they 
abandoned the mountain. 
The German bulletins issued during these critical days 
are worthy of remark. Two whole days after the Serbians 
had seized and firmly held the crest of Kaymakfchalan, 
Berlin issued a communique which described all the 
Serbian attacks on the mountain as being repulsed, and 
ivhich commented on the Franco-Serbian advance on the 
plain and the occupation of Fiorina with the phrases : 
' Victorious Bulgarian attacks " ; " Bulgarian cavalry 
ittacked and pursued the fleeing enemy," etc. It was 
lot until the first of October that Berlin admitted the 
OSS of Kaymakchalan summit and (at least by its silence) 
;he occupation of the whole ridge and of Fiorina itself— 
successes which had fallen to the Allied armies more than 
:en days before. 
It was known by the Aljied Higher Command through 
prolonged and detailed air reconnaissance that a strong 
entrencked position had been prepared closing the mouth 
of the Monastir Plain and running from the Cerna on the 
east and the mountainous hills behind it to the corres- 
ponding mountainous mass upon the west, and passing 
in front of Kenali village, from which central point the 
lines may be named. But it was perhaps hoped that the 
disarray of the Bulgarian retreat would render the 
enemy unable to hold this line permanently. 
A fortnight was occupied in repairing the road and 
the railway from Salonika, bringing up heavy guns, and 
accumulating a head of shell. At the same time the 
Serbians on the right came down from Kaymakchalan to 
the Cerna. On the 6th and 7th of the month they were 
attempting to obtain a footing upon the further bank ; 
but they had obtained no more than a precarious bridge- 
head subject to repeated and heavy counter-attacks, 
when the French, operating from Fiorina, believed their 
accumulation of munitions, etc., to be now sufftcierit for 
a decisive blow against the Kenali lines. 
Before stating the fortunes of that attempt, we must 
note in some detail the nature of the defensive organ- 
isation upon which the enemy liad retired and to which 
he had gi\-cn many months of preparatory ■work. 
Jl/iUs 
a. s A- £■ 
The reader will note (upon the accompanying sketch 
Map III) first on the left a western mass of mountains 
to which allusion has frequently been made, and the 
difficulties of which as a ground of manceuvre are 
almost insuperable. The enemy could rightly regard 
them as a complete security for his right flank. Across 
the plain from these mountains to the Cerna he had 
drawn an exceedingly strong line of entrenchment passing 
in front of the village of Lujetz, cutting the main Monastir 
road a little further on, a little furthcer still the Monastir 
railway near Kenali Station : thence passing in front of 
Kenali village and so reaching the Cerna where his 
defences were continued beyond the stream by two 
ridges upon the two spurs which proiject from the higher 
ground of the eastern mountains that dominate the 
Monastir Plain from within the great bend of the Cerna. 
The western spur may be called " Tl le Tepavtsi Ridge," 
the eastern is known as the Chuke. 
These strong lines across the plai a (which may be 
called the Kenali lines) were the better prepared for 
resistance from the fact that the plain is cut with a num- ■ 
ber of irrigation channels which can easily be turned 
into so many elements of defence. 
It was upon the 14th of October th: it the preparations 
of the French were completed and that , after an intensive 
bombardment, a general attack was lau mched against the 
Kenali lines. 
It failed ; and though partially cont mued throughout 
the next day the 15th, the enemy's defensive position 
was not shaken. 
So ended the first month and the first division of the 
operations. 
The Second Month 
The second alternative plan for reachii Ig the objective 
of Monastir was now determined on an d the effort to 
turn these lines of Kenali, which had prov ed impregnable 
to direct assault, was studied and desigi led. 
To turn them upon the left or west by the high moun- 
tain mass there present was a scheme rej ected by the 
Allied Higher Command as too perilous ; t he alternative 
of attempting to turn them by the ri. jht, that is, 
by pushing across the great bend of th e Cerna and 
