6 
LAND & WATER 
November 23, 191^' 
capturing the higher ground beyond, from which the Kenali 
lines would be dominated and taken in lever-i , was 
the general plan dt-termined upon. As we have j-o u this 
week it has been crowned with complete success. 
Time was again re(]uired to etiect the necessary con- 
centration, especially of the French artillery from left 
to right upon which the Serbian army and the I'rencli 
contingents upon the right would dejx'nd for their supiiort. 
More than three weeks were taken up in this prepar;iti(jn, 
during which apparent lull the press unfortunately per- 
mitted itself a good deal of ignorant and gloomy com- 
ment, and what is worse, of still more ignorant advice. 
Meanwhile, the all-important work of " holding " the 
Bulgarian left wing a hundred miles away to' the east 
has been steadily fulfilled by the British section of the 
Allied forces. They were gripped by a continual pressure 
which forbade them during this critical interlude, to 
transfer men to their threatened forces in front of 
Monastir. At every sign of such a movement from the 
Stnnna front a vigorous English attack checked it at 
its outset, and so serious was the j)ressure thus containing 
the enemy's left that after one action alone 1,500 enemy 
(lead were counted in front of the British lines, and on 
the ground of onr advance. 
On the west, in front of Monastir, all the end of October 
and the first days of November were taken uj) in the due 
preparation of the coming blow. The bridgeheads secured 
by the Serbians beyond the Cerna at Skochivir and 
Brod were consolidated and advanced, and in the second 
week of November all was ready for the assault. 
It was upon Friday, November loth, that this ultimate 
stage had been reached. 
Upon that da\' the Serbian infantry north of the Cerna 
found itself half of it just in front of Brod, the other 
lialf just in front of Skochivir, and therefore botli parts 
immediately below the twin crests which overlook the 
river. Those crests and trenches upon their reverse side 
were held by the enemy whose line, continued beyond the 
river in the Kenali trenches, was still intact. 
■fcoo ft aiove sed iii>e! 
l900ff-al>ove voter {eyg/: 
% 2Soo_vds:/^miies 
■ ^'<^^^m^ ■ • - 
l^fiUs 
The general nature of the position will be understood 
if we compare it to a sphin.x. The head and shoulders 
of the sphinx ai-e the main height to the north, at (I) 
on the accomp: inying Map IV, the summit of which 
is some 2,500 fe ;t above the Cerna water level and 8 or 9 
miles away fron 1 the e.xtremc southern bend of that ri\er, 
while the two paws of the sphin.v are two lower spurs 
(II) and (III), thrust out from the main mass. The 
Serbians on tl lat Friday morning, November loth, were 
just upon the paws of the sphinx — but no more— and 
until they had mastered the westermost forward-running 
spur \l they 1 lad no positions dominating or outflanking 
the Kenali Xx\ jnches. 
This rough metaphor does not sufficiently explain the 
ground. The; spurs which I have compared to the paws 
of the sphinx , thrust out from the big height behind, were 
themselves 1 .raised at their middles into two separate 
ridges with separate summits. They did not slope 
regularly up. tto the main height on the north. They 
each supported a ridge. That on the left or west, whic 
1 have marked A A A, rose to a thousand feet above the 
Cerna water level. It may con\eniently be called the 
Tepa\tsi Kidge. That on the right or east (known as the 
Chukc Kidge), rises to somethiiig between 500 and a 
1,000 feet. Between the two is a ravine— the Kavine of 
Polog — miming right uj) into the hills. 
Of these two spurs thus thrust forward from the main 
height and forming the mass of hills round which the 
Cerna has to turn in its great looji, that on the right, the 
Chuke, though the lower one,, is rendered the more 
difficult by masses of sharp rocky escarpments — " scars " 
as they are called in the North of England. If this lower 
but more diflicult of the two spurs had not been carried 
no progress could have been made upon its fellow to the 
west, because the broken ground >ipon the Chuke Kidge 
co\'ers such ample opportunities for masking artillery, 
and the more open moor of the western spur would have 
been dominated by such lire. It was the Chuke, there- 
fore, which the Serbians had first to grasp. Only after 
the Chuke rid,ge (111) was in their hands could the 
Tepa\tsi ridge (II) which turned tlie Kenali lines be 
securely held. 
In the morning and afternoon of that iMiday, November 
loth, supported by a considerable mass of Frc-nch artillery 
(the field guns north of the Cerna for the most part, the 
heavy artillery in the coombs and woods to the south), 
carried the Chuke Kidge and came down upon its further 
side. By the evening of the day they were in Polog 
and had already seized a few of the guns abandoned by 
the retreating enemy. 
This mastering of Chuke Ridge was the decisive move, 
and dm-ing the long weeks of the (ierman and Bulgarian 
resistance here, Jlonastir had been safe. We ha\-e seen 
that, as long as the Chukc Kidge (III) was held, its fellow 
ridge to the west (II) could not be carried, and as long 
as this ridge to the west (II) was not carried, the Kenali 
lines, which had proved themselves able to resist frontal 
attack, could not be turned. 
On the Saturday, November nth, the entire Polog 
valley with the remaining guns abandoned in it fell into 
the hands of the Serbians and both slopes of the Chuke 
Ridge were wholly in their power. From that moment 
onwards the development of the situation was naturally 
more rapid. 
On the Sunday, November nth, the Bulgarians, with 
their (ierman contingents, found themselves unable to 
hold on their left. They utterly abandoned ridge III, 
and retreated rapidly behind Iven, maintaining the 
greater part of their forces, of course, upon the western 
ridge (II), which was essential to the holding of the Kenali 
lines, since from its summit one not only overlooked the 
Kenali lines, but took them in reverse. But this western 
ridge (II), now that Chuke (III) had fallen, could not 
hold. The left flank of the Bulgarians and Ciermans 
established upon it was exposed to enemy fire from all 
the positions of the Chukc Ridge at short range, beyond 
the central Polog \allcy. 
During the comsc "of Monday, November 12th, the 
Serbian troops with whom at this point were certain contin- 
gents of French infantry, and which were supported, as they 
had been against the Chuke, by I'rench guns, got north of 
the village of Velyesolo, and" though they had not yet 
mastered the crest of the western spur at A A A were 
standing that night immediately below its highest summit 
(which is somewhat over 1,100 feet above the river). 
The ne.xt day, Monday the 13th, this western or 
Tepavtsi spur was cleared, its summit occupied, and the 
Serbian troops with the French contingents attached to 
them were down upon the further side, just approaching 
the village of Tepavtsi itself in its hollow at the head of a 
long shallow valley running down to the Cerna. The Allies 
were thus in possession of both slopes of the western 
spur (II) and c^ its summit. 
.\t this point it is important to observe the result 
achieved by such a move. From just above Tepavtsi, 
looking down the valley, one has direct observation in 
reverse of the hitherto impregnable entrenchments across 
the plam, which we have called the lines of Kenali ; 
and from the summit of the ridge AAA which now was in 
Allied hands one has direct observation of these lines 
dommatmg them from a full thousand feet ; one also just 
sees them in reverse or, at any rate, enfilades' them ; and 
their nearest flank, where il icposc^ upon tlie Cerna, is within 
