8 
LAND & WATER 
Novcipber 23, 1916 
not the equivalent of a division. The hij,'h jno- 
portion of German prisoners is due to tlie fact tiiat 
the small German contingent was put in to stiffen the 
Bulgarians at the dangerous point, the hills in the bond 
of the Cerna, and also the fact that these German units 
(which were Prussian — Pomeranian — in recruitment) 
utterly broke down. They had not behind them that 
superiority of artillery which they take for gr.intid in their 
eastern campaif^ns, and they could not fight witliout it. 
There is a lesson, by the way, which we should do well 
to take to heart from all this. It is that periods of pre- 
^jaration — the so called " lulls ' ' in the Allied offensives — are 
moments for discipline and silence at home : not for news- 
paper , clamour. And another lesson is that — as in all 
sieges — movement is no test. The strength of the 
hammering which precedes a break is the test. 
* * * * * 
• 
It is not without interest in conclusion to tabulate the 
enemy's communiques upon these momentous ten days. 
They need no comment. They speak for themselves ; 
or at least the only comment I will make is to ask the 
reader whether, if he had had only these communiques 
to go upon he could have had the least conception of what 
was happening and what was coming, and whether he 
would not be wise, in the light of such a table, to reserve 
his judgment upon all other German communiques in the 
present stage of the war, when no longer the General 
Staff alone, but the German people as a whole are 
beginning to see how things stand. 
November nth. 
" On the heights north of the Cerna French and Serbian 
troops undertook several attacks which failed with great 
losses to them. Only south of Polog was the enemy able 
to penetrate our advanced positions." 
November iilh. 
>' All enemy attacks were broken, but the enemy succeeded 
in holding the heights, making a salient before our posi- 
tions north-east of the village of Polog." 
November nth. 
" Fierce French attacks on the Monastir Plain were 
resisted imi>erturbably by the Bulgarian troops, among 
wliicli Was tlio (JiTinan I'-niperor's Balkan Kcgiment. 
In the Cerna bend the enemy succeeded in capturing 
sonio heights. 
"In order to avoid pressure on our flanking positions in 
tlie \alley we here withdrew our defence.' 
November i^th. 
" Macedonian Front. — Prepared new positions on the 
Cerna have been occupied. . . The enemy who had 
succeeded in gaining temporary possession of Height 1,212 
north of the village of Cegcl, was driven back I)y our 
counter-attack." 
November ijth. 
" Frencli attacks on the plateau soutli of Monastir and 
against the front held by the Pomeranian Infantry 
Regiment No. 42 on the snow-clad heights on the Cerna 
bend, were ^sanguinarily repulsed. . . . One of these 
heights was captured by the Serbians on November i5tli, 
but Cliief Commander Infantry General von Below, wjio 
was in tlie middle of the fighting, recaptured the position 
at the head of the German rifles which stormed it. His 
Miijesty the Fmperor in recognition of the services of 
this ofticer and his company, appointed the General to be 
chief of this battalion." 
At last you get the plaui and tree statement — sudden, 
brief, and utterly at variance with what went before. 
November igth. 
" The German and Bulgarian troops occupied a position 
north of Monastir, and Monastir was evacuated." 
The Roumanian Situation 
Wc ha\e seen in the detailed analysis of the operations 
against Monastir that their prime characteristic was the, 
refusal, that is, the inability, of the Central Powers to 
bring men or even guns in sufficient numbers to preserve 
their last Ally from local disaster, and e\en from a disaster 
the political consequences of which were particularly to be 
dreaded. 
The general reason that this was the case is, ot course, 
the general embarrassment for men in which the Central 
Emipres now find themselves. It has compelled them to 
the very hazardous experiment of compromising with 
Poland and it has manifested itself clearly upon every 
front. 
But the particular reason was the fact that the enemy 
has chosen to concentrate all the men he can spare for the 
offensive against Roumania. 
He began that offensive, as we know, with an attempt 
to act by his right, and so to cut off the Roumanians from 
their Russian Allies. He failed. His ne.xt effort was to 
conceritrate against the left centre and to threaten a march 
against Bucharest upon a wide front froiri the twin passes 
of the Predeal and the Torzburg. Here he again failed, 
and meanwhile he had so depleted his forces in the Vulcan 
Pass, the furthest to the west, that they suffered a heavy 
defeat at the hands of the Roumanians, the nth 
Bavarian Division being ruined in the retreat. He 
changed his plan for a third time, determined to strike 
where his chances of success were greatest, though where 
the fruits of success would be least. He concentrated 
against the Vulcan Pass again, especially in the matter 
of heavy guns, and has obtained a success, the terms of 
which wore first communicated to us by a despatch issued 
in Berlin upon Saturday the i8th of November, and 
dealing with the fighting of Friday, the day before. In 
this despatch the enemy shows that he has pressed back 
the Roumanian body which closed the road coming from 
the Vulcan Pass down on to the plain and that he has 
sent forward cavalry through the country thus left open 
to the west, so that bodies of mounted troops hare 
reached the main railway 25 miles away, the Rou- 
manians falling backwards to the cast. He has 
reached Fillasi Junction and he is advancing on Craio\a. 
The communiques from the eastern front are so in- 
significant and irregular that nothing but the most 
^'cneral deduction is possible from them. It is a pity, fur 
public opinion in the west tends to exaggerate any reverse 
ujwn that distant field and in the absence of news will 
always think tilings worse than they are. 
As it is the news is sufiiciently gra\c. Of the seven 
separate Roumanian and Russian bodies each defending 
a pass or set of j^asscs, one has suffered a reverse whicii 
has jirobably compelled an exceedingly rapid retreat 
continued for at least four days at a rate of some 15 miles 
a day, and has certainly permitted an equally ra] id 
enemy advance, which has completely uncovered the 
western Romnanian plain and already threaters its 
commercial and ci\ ilian centre at Craio\a. 
V 
; by i£s xHatux ca retreaf 
Onsova 
rmoya 
Let us take this at its full Naluc and see what it implies 
I he enemy suffers from an insufikiency of men But 
he enjoys a preponderance— it may be a crushing pre- 
ponderance—in heavy artillery and its munitionment, 
in aircraft, in all machines. He knew that wh.Mi or if 
he should successfully debouch upon the Roumanian 
Plain he must secure both his Hanks. The country is 
such that the only two obstacles securing his flanks are 
1 10 Carpathians upon the one side and the Danube 111)011 
the other. It is manifestly easier for him to establish 
such a hne where that line is shortest, and it is shortest 
