JNovember 23, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
Country tn 
Znemy //^ 
CzerntAxtz, 
upon the extreme western end of the Roumanian State 
where he has achieved this new success. We need not 
doubt tlie main facts as he has presented them. 
Tlie only doubtful point about the enemy's despatch 
is the number of prisoners mentioned. W'e may readily 
accept 26 field pieces as the total number of captures 
made in 18 days of continual fighting in the Roumanian 
mountains, and even the total of over 180 officers. The 
only obvious false point is the claim to 20,000 valid 
prisoners. This is exactly on a par with the enemy's 
policy for many luonths past, especially in front of Verdun 
where he claimed as many prisoners as he could possibly 
in the confusion of a retirement c,et his opponent's 
command to believe. 20,000 valid prisoners of the line do 
not tally with 200 officers or less than 30 guns. 
But the enemy's object in thiis striking upon the extreme 
west after he had failed in the north and the centre is 
more than merely to reach the extreme end of the plain, 
and to establish a position across it. It would seem to be 
especially his immediate object to recover the navigation 
of the Danube. 
If we look at the whole Roumanian field of operations 
we shall see at what an extremity he has struck this last 
blow, at what a distance from his co-operating force in 
the Dobrudja, and even from the capital which is his 
political objective. But what it does secure, or threaten 
to secure, is either the loss or the retirement of the 
Roumanian force holding Orsova and with it the loss of 
the I^oumanian hold upon the Danube. 
At the point called The Iron (iates, immediately below 
Orsova, the Danube is not navigable save by a narrow 
canal constructed between the rocks here that obstruct 
the channel and the further shore. And the Roumanians 
in possession of Orsova prevented all supply of munition- 
ment from reaching the Bulgarians by the easy Danube 
route. They also prevented the transport of troops 
b}' the river and of food. Everything was thrown upon 
the railway which runs from Belgrade through Xish. 
The handicap was severe and the opening of the Iron 
Gates was a subsidiary objective worth attaining. 
So much for what may be called the " normal " 
strategics of the situation. But it may well be that a 
quite abnormal factor is present which puts an end to all 
such speculation and lea\-cs us in the dark as to the 
future. It may be that the reverse was due not only to 
inferiority in heavy pieces, but to a general exhaustion 
in munitionment. 
If that be so all calculation of distances and numbers, 
all " normal " strategic study loses its value. A force 
which has failed in munitionment is no longer an army, 
and if this is what governs the situation in western 
Roumania for the moment, we have no power to 
estimate the situation. We can only await events. 
THE SOMME FRONT 
The characteristic of the operations upon the Somme 
front since the lieavy blow dealt by the British forces 
last week has been the continued advance upon cither 
side of the Ancre. 
The main interest of analysing both such a stroke as 
this delivered by Sir Douglas Haig upon the left, and the 
very heavy defeat suffered last week by the Germans 
massed counter-attack against the French upon the right 
would be, if evidence were available, the plotting of the 
enemy's movements behind his lines. The .^metaphor 
used by a I'^rench commander and so frequently quoted 
of " holding the enemy by the ears and shaking him from 
side to side ' ' is certainly the general picture of the situa- 
tion. He has been forced back on to a crescent where 
his communications along and behind which are under 
continual fire, and he is in the presence of a superior 
offensive which can compel him to concentrate where 
it wills. But concentration can only be expressed in 
terms of time, and the more difficult your lateral 
communications the more the factor of time comes in. 
A violent blow threatening his positions upon the 
right of the crescent compels him to concentration there. 
A corresponding blow delivered upon the left of the 
crescent calls for another concentration more than 20 
miles away as the crow flies, and anything from 30 to 40 
miles by the roads he must use under continual and oh- 
served fire. Such concentration is, of course, in the main 
effected upon its own sector, but there is also necessarily a 
borrowing from the part which is supposed to be least im- 
perilled towards the part which is most. And that 
borrowing means a greater or less interval of time during 
which the men and the guns in movement are out of 
■action. When it can be discovered from which sector 
the borrowing has taken place an opportunity is at once 
VII -■;-'^--.:. r'^-""lt^ ? ' ^. ^. 
3 4^ S" 
''-'■' Tiiisteux 
'Serreife— ■-,., <);■ 
Beouxno'nf ,AwJ' % 
Homel®"- Bi 
at20metres 
given for renewed attack, and when a long prepared 
attack comes with the effect of surprise, superiority 
in the air will almost always permit that party which 
possesses it to discover whence the reinforcement is 
Iseing borrowed, and where the new weak patch will 
consequently appear. The question of direct observation 
is also of great value in this movement. 
Beaucourt itself lies down on the water level and up 
north from it runs the ravine of a little stream which 
falls into the Ancre at Beaucourt itself. To the east and 
to the west of this little stream the higher ground lies 
fairly flat in fields which vary from 80 to 100 feet above 
the Ancre. Those to the east have apparently been in the 
possession of the British forces since the occupation of 
Beaucourt and of Beaumont Hamel. They give full 
observation of Grandcomt, but not of very much beyond, 
up the valley. But ij or when the Hill, marked on the 
military mops 123 (which lies to the east of this little 
stream and is marked with a X on the above Map 
VII) shall be held a very important point of observa- 
tion is obtained. From this hill 123 you look right 
down upon Miraumont and what is more important, 
right down upon and behind the enemy's gun posi- 
tions beyond the Ancre, which have hitherto been 
hidden by the broken high lands of Pys and the fields 
to the west of that village. It will be of special interest 
to watch in the despatches for the fortunes of the ad- 
vance in regard to this point, hill 123*, for though only 
observation upon the spot can correct such suggestions, 
it is fairly evident that the occupation of this 
hill jeopardises all the gun positions hitherto established 
by the enemy opposite Miraumont upon the southern side 
of the little Ancre, and it is these guri positions which 
check advance beyond Le Sars and therefore further full 
observation of the Bucquois valley. H. Belloc 
* It is hill 127 in Uie civilian maps, which have a different datum Unej 
