4. 
LAND & WATER 
Kovcmbc^r 30, ifjit) 
The Roumanian Retreat 
By Hilaire Belloc 
EVERYTHING in the Roumanian situation points 
clearly to one thing : And that is lack of muni- 
tionment 
The real interest of the moment therefore 
lies in th^s : Wliether this lack of munitionment is tem- 
porary and due merely to some check in transport, or 
permanent. 
Let me give the reasons that point to this conclusion. 
Wlien the Roumanian Government decided upon war, 
Transylvania was invaded. Immediately afterwards the 
Austro-German concentration forced our Ally back into 
the mountain chain, and cither on to or over the crest 
of it. But once positions were taken up in the passes 
they were everywhere held with success. The enemy 
had the advantage in the caUbre of his pieces and their 
number, but it is clear that there was sufficient munition- 
ment upon the Roumanian side to keep the positions 
laid down. 
On the Dobrudja Mackensen compelled a retreat, but 
it was followed by a rally (presumably due to the. arrival 
of fresh munitionment) and Mackensen was defeated and 
thrown back further from the Cernavoda Bridge and 
lailwav, which was his goal. 
For" nearly two months this general situation was 
maintained. Then later, suddenly it began to cliange. 
It did not begin to change from an unexpected pressure 
of men. We know the force of the Austro-Germans and 
Bulgarians in the Dobrudja. Mackensen in the Dobrudja 
had no cpnsiderable reinforcement. We are compelled to 
look for the change to some other factor. 
The first sign of that change is the impossibility of 
keeping the line across the Dobrudja. ' Our Allies are 
not defeated in a set action. They are not broken. Very 
few prisoners are taken by the enemy and hardly any 
guns. None the less, the Roumanians and Russians and 
the Serbians there make a sudden retreat, and uncover 
the railway to Constanza, abandon that important town 
itself, and the Cernavoda bridge, which was the key of all. 
They are not lacking in men. 
The move betrays shortage of munitionment. 
They press their retreat of set purpose, keeping out of 
contact, although they have suffered no disintegration, 
and they continue it until they get to broken country 
where the rifle again has a chance against the gun. 
Immediately afterwards, on the other front, the Car- 
pathians, you get a series of events of exactly the same 
kind which surely points quite as clearly to this lack of 
munitionment. 
The positions in most of the passes had been held. 
In the Vulcan Pass there had even been a serious ad- 
vance. But suddenly, with no appreciable loss in guns 
and with no great loss of men killed in that particular held, 
or of prisoners, the Roumanian force in the Vulcan Pass, 
linding in front of it not more than two enemy divisions, 
and those divisions dependent upon very difftcult road 
trafftc, begins to retire. It retires voluntarily, but with 
the utmost rapidity. It uncovers the railway hne to 
Craiova and Craiova itself. It falls back until it reaches 
the valley of the Alt. It crosses the Alt and falls back 
still further. 
If evidence so strong were not sufficient, we have had 
in the last week-end a further proof that is as nearly 
convincing as anything can be short of the actual testi- 
mony of eye-witnesses. 
My readers will remember the analysis which appeared 
here some weeks ago of the conditions under which the 
Danube could be crossed. I said then (and I repeat it 
here), that the force possessed of a superior number of 
guns of high calibre could cross at any place it chose, 
but the venture would be extremely perilous from the 
fact that the army crossing would be exposed, long after 
it reached the further bank, and was still confined to a 
narrow road between the marshes, still more upon its 
attempt at deployment beyond, to the wea'ier but 
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