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LAND & WATER 
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soiirces of supply, the quality, even moral ; its nio\e- 
ments ; its power to use civilian population, etc. Under 
the conditions of the German Empire the proportion for a 
long time was barely one to three. That is, the strictly 
au.\iliary services, communications, etc., accounted for 
hardly one man out of four, and an army kept to about 
four millions had a little over three millions in line. 
But as the quality' of the men deteriorates, as the 
fronts held become larger and as all the other forms of 
strain (including those due to a blockade) increase, the 
proportion of auxiliaries increases too. The su]jports of a 
thing which is weakening have to be made stronger, and 
the braces of a thing that is under an increasing strain 
demand more material. The German army enormously 
increased its front in the summer of 1916 by taking over 
work hitherto done by the Austrians upon tiie Eastern 
front. By depleting its reserves of man-power (by its 
rapidly using up 1917 class, for instance), it was able 
hlightly to increase the actu^ numbers in line — though 
these have not yet (probably) reached three and a half 
million. But meanwhile the auxiliary forces had to 
increase in far greater proportion. 
The second cause of the discrepancy emphasises the 
first. The German Empire not only needs now to use a 
larger proportion of its men in auxiliary service than 
before, but is also using more men in its auxiliary service 
than it needs. 
Everyone has noted the fantastic figures published by 
the German authorities with regard to discharges from 
hospital. The experience of all the belligerents (now 
conlirmed by the. figures of 29 months) teaches us accu- 
rately enough what numbers will really return to the 
ranks out of a given number of hospital population. The 
Germans have always published a much higher figure 
than this real number. Less than 70 per cent., roughly 
two-thirds at the most, really return to active service, 
and of tl]cse again a certain proportion cannot be used in 
exactly the same way they were being used before. 
But the total number disciiarged as " cured " is very 
much larger than two-thirck. It is well above three- 
quarters and maj' reach hve sixths or more. The differ- 
ence between the two figures consists in men who, though 
they are no longer in need of hospital accommodation or 
convalescent leave, and are as well as ever they w ill be, 
have been rendered by their wounds or sickness unfit for 
anything but the lightest au^nliary work. When all the 
useful places in such light auxihary work are filled, it is 
the normal policy and the pciicy pursued by the Allies 
as a whole — certainly by the French and English — to 
return these men to civilian life. It was always the 
policy in past wars, and it is the policy of common sense. 
For men, permanently weakened or maimed by war, are 
more useful in keeping the general life of the nation going 
than they are in " acting as the fifth wheel of the coach," 
in serxices auxiliary to the array. When you have all 
the hospital attendants you want for the army, for in- 
stance, it is better to let a man who has lost a limb do 
what work he can in a civilian hospital than to keep him 
as a supernumerary in a mihtary hospital. 
F'or several reasons — most of them political — the 
German authorities have pre£ened to keep in uniform 
this margin of useless, or nearly useless men, and to 
return them to so-called " duty." 
This was not done in the war of 1870. It is not a 
national tradition, but a special poHcy. 
The inevitable result is a large and, in the mihtary 
sense, useless increase in the auxiliary services. 
The combination of these two causes gives you that 
discrepancy between the total number of men out of the 
depots, but in uniform, and the number of divisions on 
their present footing. Instead of the proportion of about 
one man in four, which was the working proportion during 
all the earlier and middle part of tl*e war for Germany, 
the proportion now is about ij (or a Uttle more) in 5. 
The increase is from 25 per cent, to 30 per cent., an in- 
crease within the au.xiliary services cil 20 per cent 
III.— The third sort of question I have been asked is 
whether this calculation of reserves will not be modified 
by the Germans calling up men over mihtary age. 
Of course, it is within the power of the Government to 
call up men to any age it likes, and the actual military 
law of Gernnany takes men up to 45. Most conscript 
countries w arn men as liable for service up to that age 
or even later. But the older classes tire not, in the lump. 
material worth having, save, again, in auxiliary service. 
To add to them by an extension of age is simply, in another 
form, to increase the superfluity which was mentit ned 
above in connection with the auxihary services. You 
can put >"our older men to garrisoning occupied districts, 
to prison guards, to clerical and hospiuil \vork and to 
the lighter forms of auxiliary labour. Ihe number you 
can usefully employ in line is insignificant. An increase 
of this sort would affect the paper strength of an army. 
It would not affect its real strength appreciably, and we 
must further remember that nearly e\'ery elderly man 
taken from the civilian ranks under such conditions as 
govern blockaded Germany at the present time, is a man 
taken from employment necessary to civil life. 
State of Germany's Allies 
IV. — The fourth set of questions deals with the other 
members of the enemy alliance, and it is asked, if this be 
the known situation of the German Empire, what is that 
of the Austrian, what of the Turkish and Bulgarians ? 
I ha\e upon the Turkish recruitment no figures as yet 
which are at all reliable. But it is clear that the numbers 
aA-ailable from this field for use by the Central Empires and 
in Europe is so small as to be almost negligible. I believe 
that there ha\e actually been identified the equivalent of no 
more than three or a{ the most four divisions, of which 
only two have appeared in any field remote from the 
old Turkish frontiers. A great to-do was made for the 
sake of neutrals (and to impress the Allies also if possible), 
when the first Turkish contingents appeared upon the 
Galician front against the Russians late last summer ; 
but in all the prolonged fighting between the Mar.shes 
and the Carpathians, which filled the months- of August 
and September (and have been continued with.lcss violence 
through October), the identification of troops opposed to 
the Russians, while showing us the very large increase 
in German divisions which I noted a fortnight ago (from 
three to forty-one), and the drafting of reserves from the 
Austrian depots, shows us an exceedingly small proportion 
of Turkish contingents, and those only in one restricted 
field— if I am not mistaken, under nntfnii,.!- ;,l,.nf. and all 
within ten miles. 
The Bulgarian recruitment is a maiicr ea.'-y to calculate 
because it depends upon well-known figures. 
The existing Bulgarian army has not yet suffered any 
great depletion. It is based upon a population of five 
and half millions. It can count, therefore, upon an 
annual recruitment of less than 40,000. It is not a\ail- 
able for ser\ice outside the boundaries of the State since 
the double engagement to the north against Rouinania 
and to the south against the forces based upon Salonika. 
The numbers a\ailable and the yeariy recruitment avail- 
able are almost exactly three-quarters of the corre- 
sponding Roumanian numbers and recruitment. 
We have also the Austro-Hungarian reserves. 
These we know to be far more severely depleted than 
those of the German Empire, the causes of this being the 
heavy losses in prisoners and wounded and dead during 
the defeats of the eariier part of the war ; the fact that 
the Austrians had to bear the main weight of the Russian 
offensive right up to the end of April 1915 ; the extension 
of front against the Italians e\er since June 1915 ; and 
the last bad breakdown in front of Brussiloff, which has 
alone accounted in the last five and a half months for 
close upon a million men. What Austria now has in 
her depots I have seen no recent figures to guide me, but 
if I suggest more than a quarter of a million and less than 
300,000, I do not think I shall be far wrong. To this 
returns from hospital may add a quarter of a million or 
c\en 300,000— but not more. There are, then, perhaps, 
counting every a\ailable form of recruitment, half a 
million. There may even be 600,000 men on paper 
behind the existing Austrian lines. But in practice 
nothing like that number would be really available, and 
all the younger clas.ses have been incorporated long ago. 
It would be impossible to use 1919 before next summer, 
and Austria called up 1918 long before Germany did. 
v.— The last set cf questions that has been put to me 
deals with the inclusion in the German reserve of man- 
power of men who will be returned to duty iiom hospital ■ 
and conxalescence between this and next summer. I am 
asked why these should have been included in the total 
of German reserve of man-power since they form part of 
