December 7, icjiO- 
LAND & WATER 
An Air-Craft Factory 
Man- Power and Munitionment 
Bv Hilaire Belloc 
THIS great campaign, like all things of the first 
magnittide. is fundamentally simple in structure. 
It is governed by two sets of elements, the one 
certain, the other uncertain. It is (unfortunately) 
by the uncertain that public opmion in this country has 
been largely moved. But the only profitable exercise 
iif the mind under this strain is a calculation of the ccriaiti 
flenients. 
Tile uncertain elements are moral factors (sucn as the 
]H)IJtical relations between the belligerents and neutrals) 
and the element of time. The first of these need not be 
considered here. The second is notoriously that upon 
wliich most debate has tvU^en place, and in spite of the 
utter usclessness of such debate. 
Tlu,' certain elements are the numbers of men and 
women, adults, available for the war and the support of 
the war, to the varifius belligerents ; and the' material 
available. 
11 is upon tin SI' alone that useful debate and useful 
analysis can turn. 
The public discussion of political relations is im- 
prudent. Speculation upon tlie factor of time is futile. 
W'tien a great mass ol (-orrespondence demanded some 
such discussion in the early days of the war, we published 
ii! this paper certain articles pointing out that the time 
lactor was necessarily uncertain, and that all that could 
possibly be predicted was — as is always trie case with 
indett>rminate problems — a series of alternatives. " If 
so and so then one of two things, but if on the contrary 
so and so, then another of two thinf;s." Yet such was 
the ajipctite for sonify sort of decision upon this imdccidable 
nuittcr tliat even a statement of that sort was m-'de the 
basis lor vain athrmalioii ,is to tli(> jirobablc duratifin of 
hostilities. 
The Certain Elements 
1 lannot tell in M'hat ])roportion public opinion has 
now leant towards the other and the only fruitful field 
of such enquiry, the field of statistics that are certain. . 
l-'or now eighteen months these statistics have been 
analysed so far as the enemy man-power was concerned, 
at regular intervals and with increasing accuracy. 
••"or insfance. in March 1915, we did not know to within 
something like jo per cent, margin of (^rror the real 
number of the German military dead. B3' July of the 
saiu:> year we had got oiii" margin of error down to pro- 
bably under 20 per cent. To-day we have got it down 
to something like 5 per cent. When we say that by 
October 25th (the last date up to which I have seen 
ofiicial work carried) 1,500,000 German soldiers of one 
service or another have died since the beginning of the 
war, we are certainlj' not more than 75,000 out one v\ay 
or the other. The reason of this increasing accuracy is 
that time accumulates not only the mass of the evidence 
but the powerof co-ordinating that mass and at the same 
time (in spite of the counter-action of defensive secrecy) 
the methods of obtaining information. And that is why 
the reproach of inaccurate, exaggerated or vague estimate, 
which was rightly attached to such work at the beginning 
of the war, no longer attaches to it. 
Change in Equipment and Munitionment 
But the campaign does not turn upon man-power 
alone. It turns also upon equipment and munitionment. 
It is here very important for the student of war to 
remark the change which has come over the subject of 
his study during the last .generation. It is a fnndaincntal 
change. 
U'ithin the last few years, since the men who are now- 
middle aged were boys, the power to froduce militarv 
equipment and munitions has ceased to be common to all 
civilised men : it has bxome peculiar to certain highly 
industrialised spots, and even among these it varies greatly. 
That is the first great formula. 
Observation until quite lately depended upon men 
riding horses and in all countries many men can ride : 
It depends to day upon the special skill of men in air- 
craft which, again, only specialised men can produce. 
Even as late as the Franco-Prussian War. the railway was 
subsichary to the road and steam transport to horSe 
transport. To-day the railway is vital and the road 
means petrol. 
The howitzer beyond a calibre of 5 inches was a thing 
for slow emplacement. To day it is mobile, but its 
mobility depends upon rare methods and an advanced 
science. Orders and the piitting together of the plan 
depended in the youth of the presctit commandeers ujion 
horsi'men. They depend to-day upon the telephone. 
l'"ighting by night was rare, eccentric, and always in the 
nature of a surprise. It has become almost normal ^ince 
the combatants can command the modern methods of 
illuminatif)n in the battlefield. .V certain measure of cold, 
