20 
LAND & WATER 
December 7, 1916 
more than 160 per <<xnt. in quantity and 235 per cent. 
in value ; steel bats 410 pcr i^ent. in quantity and 715 
per cent, in value. 3 lanufactured cotton goods increaesd 
52 per cent, in quantity and about doubled in value. 
The increase in the e.'c port of various explosives, for manu- 
facture of thu most '4of which new factories had to be 
created, was slower in the first year than that of food- 
stuffs, but the figures for 1916 show they have now 
passed everything else in their rate of gain. For the 
year 1914 but 6,ooo,< )oo dollars worth of explosives 
were shipped to Europe, and for the j'ear 1915, 41,000,000. 
l-or the year ending Juue .joth, 1916, the total amounted 
to 47j,ooo,ooo doUarsi in value, wliich is actually an 
increase of something less than 8,000 per cent, over that 
of the year which prectided the war. 
"Battlefield Shipments " 
The total foreign trade of the United States for the 
year ending June joth, a:gi6, was 6,525,000,000 dollars, 
the increase alone of that year over the one preceding — 
itself practically a " war year "—being greater than the 
total foreign trade of the country ten years ago. 
Roughly speaking, the exports to the Allies have in- 
creased by about a thoutand million dollars, while the 
exports of tlie Allies to tl le United States ha\e fallen to 
about half their former vsHue. Part of this balance has 
been paid in American siicurities held in Europe ; the 
rest by loans and the shipment of gold. The net result 
of it has been to change the position of the United States, 
as regards Europe, from a debtor to a creditor nation, 
and also to accumulate in the former what is probably 
the greatest store of gold any one country has ^ ever 
held. The exports from the port of New York alone 
were nearly 11,000,000 dollars a day for the month of 
September, over a half which represented what are spoken 
of as " battlefield shipments." These figures will pro- 
bably be increased every inonth that the war lasts, as it 
is only since early summer that the new American 
factories which ha\e been built especially to supply the 
needs of the Allied armies began to make their weight 
felt in the export column. 
Government Control in America 
In the greatly increased trade balances ; in the paying 
off of her debt to Europe and the accumulation of gold 
which may be used in internal de\'elopment or in ex- 
tending her foreign trade ; in busy factories and the de- 
crease of unemployment ; in the avoidance of what would 
undoubtedly have been a protracted period of serious if not 
desperate business depression ; in these things we have 
the principal financial, industrial and economic benefits 
which America owes, directly or indirectly, to the Euro- 
pean war. The goods are very much on the shop-window 
side of the country — the East — for all the world to see. 
And before leaving the credit side of the account and 
turning to the debit (to reckon something of the cost 
at which these benefits hav^e been garnered), it would not 
do to overlook what may ultimately prove to be the 
greatest gift the war has thrown at the feeet of America— 
the creation of an industrial organization for the supplying 
of war munitions such as there is hardly the slightest 
chance of there having been created during the next 
half century without such a stimulus. 
One of the most gratifying bits of news — to an 
American abroad — that has come across the Atlantic is 
the announcement that not only does the War Depart- 
ment purpose not to allow this organization to dis- 
integrate at tlic conclusion of the war, but that steps 
are being taken for putting all of the great engineering 
plants of the country under a system of Government 
control in time of peace such as will make it practicable 
to mobiHse their effort in the event of war with the loss 
of the minimum of time. This may very well prove 
the means of avoiding a disastrous defeat, such as it is 
extremely difficult to picture being otherwise avoided 
• in the case of a sudden attack by a strong European 
power or coalition, and on that score alone is undoubted- 
ly worth more than all the other momentarily mojrp 
tangible benefits of the war combined. 
The following very carefully rompilcd lists of so-called 
" war exports " gives the value of the principal .\merican 
products which ha\e been sent to Eurojje solely — up 
to June 30th, 1916 — on account of war demands, they 
would not have been sent had there been no war. (The 
figures are the estimated excess over normal export). 
Dollars. 
Brass and manufactiures of brass . . . . 124,000,000 
Aeroplanes . . . . . . . . . . 6,000,000 
Motor cycles 2,000,000 
Chemicals, drugs medicines, etc. . . . . 78,000,000 
Goods \-ans, pas.senger coaches, etc. . . . . 100,000,000 
Copper pigs, ingots, etc 59,000,000 
Electrical machinery 7,000,000 
Explosives . . . . . . . . . . 408,000,000 
Motor tyres 12,000,000 
Other rubber products 6,000,000 
Steel bars and rods 25,000,000 
Steel rails 6,000,000 
Steel plates . . . . . . . . . . 7,000,000 
Steel billets and ingots . . . . . . 32,000,000 
Fire-arms 12,000,000 
Petrol engines . . 3,000,000 
Steam engines and parts . . . . . . 18,000,000 
Machine tools etc. . . . . . . . . 48,000,000 
Miscellaneous Tools . . . . . . . . 5,000,000 
Nails and Spikes . . 6,000,000 
Tin-plate, etc. 10,000,000 
\\'ire and wire manufactures . , . . 28,000,000 
Miscellaneous manufactures of iron and steel 40,000,000 
^Manufactures of lead . . . . . . 4,000,000 
Leather and skins (raw and manufactured) 60,000,000 
Horses . . . . . . . , . . 60,000,000 
Bacon . . 30,000,000 
I 
$1,189,000,000 
Turning now to the reverse of the shield — the un- 
favourable effects of the war — we find these principally 
in evidence in retarded internal development and the 
generally unsatisfactory state of trade wath practically 
all non-European countries. The total value of the 
principal raw materials of export was less for the year 
ending June 30th, 1916, than for the year immediately 
preceding the war, though their prices had risen greatly 
in the interim. The average value of the exports of 
American agricultural implements for a number of years 
previous to the war was around 30,000,000 dollars a 
year. For the year 19 15 this had fallen to 9,000,000 
dollars, and the following fiscal year did not add enough 
to bring it to half of the former annual a\er^ge. Sewing 
machines have fallen from an annual average of 10,000,000 
dollars to less than half of that amount, and tobacco and 
manufactures of tobacco from 61,000,000 dollars to 
40,000,000 dollars. Practically all other peace-time 
staples have registered similiar decreases. 
America built high hopes in the early months of the 
war upon the opportunity presented her for building 
up a foreign trade in markets in which the belligerent 
countries must needs relax their efforts. I still recall 
how much was written of this aspect of the situation 
in September, October, and December, of 1914, before 
the magnitude of the trade in war supplies had become 
evident to any but a few of the most far seeing. These 
hopes have never been realised, for which fact there are 
several reasons. In the first place, manufacturers — 
dazzled by the big profits on these first carelessly- 
flung about war contracts — went " munition mad " and 
began bending all their energies to satisfying a part of 
the rapidly accumulating demands of the Allies. Most 
of these have probably been warranted — from a financial 
standpoint — in doing as they did, although, as soon as 
the Allies were able to put the placing of their contracts 
on a business basis profits were reduced until they amounted 
to no more for a war contract than for one of similar size at 
home. Other manufacturers would unquestionably ha\e 
been better advised to have turned their attention to 
strengthening their trade footholds in \arious non- 
European countries, where there would have been more 
to show for their efforts after the war. 
One of the reasons then for the disappointing .showing 
made in .American exjwrts to countries outside of Euroj)e 
was the disproportionate amount of energy deflected 
to munition work. Another was the decreased pur- 
chasing ability of all non-European countries as a con- 
sequence of the curtailing of their incomes through llie 
closing or restriction of their European markets. A third 
reason was the unexpected vitality of certain European 
