December 7, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
as 
Arming the Fleet 
Beatty and Jellicoe 
By Arthur Pollen 
IT was the original intention to include in this 
double number of Land & Water as full an 
account as might be possible of the changes that 
have been made in the material and in the arming 
of the fleet. But circumstances have proved too strong 
for the plan. In the first place obligations of secrecy 
have made it impossible to deal with the. subject either 
thoroughly or in any useful informative way. Next, 
the changes in the chief command constitute an event 
so large and far reaching in their consequences, that all 
other naval topics become unimportant when com- 
pared to them. I am not sure indeed that there is not 
in this compulsory supercession of a discussion of naval 
matters by an overwhelming question of personnel, 
something very like a vital lesson in the theory of war. 
At any rate the conjunction seems to me so happy, that 
I have retained in this article the title I had chosen for 
the other. Indeed, if the new commands give to the 
fleet as a whole a wider and more successful sweep, a 
keener edge, a more distant capacity to strike, a better 
co-ordination of all its forces, then indeed we shall be 
re-armed at sea with a fullness and a perfection which all 
the efforts of all the armament firms could not in a century 
equal. 
^ Need of the Hour 
^.nd this of course is the end, which, most of all things 
is now to be desired. Indeed ; at every stage of the war from 
the first day, the ultimate issue has been conditioned 
by sea power. We have delayed that issue again and 
again, through failure to perceive the advantages our sea 
power could give us, were it properly, rightly and re- 
solutely used. We opened with the cardinal blunder of 
not realising that the three departments of war — policy, 
armies and fleets — must be used together from the first 
and to a common end, that end being the employment 
of force for the weakening, confusion and ultimate defeat 
of our enemies. So httle did pohcy and sea power work 
together, that .the whole complexion of the war was 
decided unfavourably to us in the first three days, when 
the Goeben was permitted to pass unchallenged from the 
Atlantic to I he Dardanelles. It was an error |.that re- 
flected disastrously upon the Admiralty, but hardly less 
upon the Foreign Office. Had the departments- been 
working together, having one common purpose in view, 
and both agreed as to the means for achieving it, then the 
sailors in the Mediterranean would surely have been in- 
formed that it was a far greater danger for the Goeben to 
get to Constantinople than to make the port of Pola. 
But they got no guidance and the disaster occurred which 
has changed the whole balance of force in Europe. 
Later the opportunity was given of equalising the 
balance again. In February, 1915, the British and 
French Fleets began the bombardment of the Dardanelles 
forts, and our Allies consented to the action because, 
as they said, should it fail it could always be treated as 
a demonstration. The effort was continued for a 
month. It failed completely, and, having failed 
put the enemy on notice to defend his coasts. Then an 
expeditionary force was sent out too small, too ifl equipped 
for the now hopeless task of conquering the peninsular. 
The purpose of the attack was to help Russia to the con- 
quest of Turkey and to open the seaway from Odessa 
to the Mediccrranean. But the major need of the hour 
was to prevent Turks and Germans from joining hands. 
The method was obvious. In Serbia and IMontcnegro 
we had two isolated and unsupported Allies. Greece, 
bound by treaty to the first, was neutral, but not un- 
friendly. Bulgaria was neutral, but clearly waiting to join 
the enemy. Venizelos was still Prime Minister, and his 
authoriiy would have been used on tiie Allies behalf. It 
was urged, but urged in vain, that, as the French had 
suggested, the Dardanelles adventure should now be 
treated as a demonstration, and Sir Tan Hamilton's force 
sent through Salonika into Serbia. What would have been 
the position in the Balkans had an Anglo-French army of 
a quarter of a miUion passed through Greece to stiffen our 
Ally on the Danube ? It is certain that Bulgaria would not 
have attacked, probable that Greece would have joined, 
indisputable that the road by which munitions could pass 
from Constantinople to Vienna would not have been 
opened. But once more the divorce between policy, 
the use of the fleet, and the employment of the army was 
complete. 
The third, the most obvious, and in some respects the 
most disastrous of all the consequences of running the 
war as if the co-ordination, of which I spoke, were of no 
importance, was the fatal failure to declare a blockade 
from the beginning. In August, 1914, there were no 
neutral interests vested in the supply of food, metal, oil, 
cotton and wool to the Central Powers. A strict blockade 
based, as is our present blockade, upon the two principles 
of " ultimate destination," and a generous rationing of 
the sea board countries, could have been enforced with- 
out any appearance of hardship, and would have been 
accepted without the disturbing protests that ultimately 
arose. But for eight months even the ports of Germany 
were open, and for at least sixteen the imports of essentials 
into that country were virtually unchecked. What our 
omission to prevent the import of cotton Jias cost us is 
beyond calculation. 
Free Naval Action 
Now it is as well to recall these matters at a moment 
when we are making such significant changes in the com- 
mand of the fleet, and are accompanying them by even 
greater changes in the constitution of the Government 
itself. For it is axiomatic that neither Sir John Jellicoe, 
nor yet Sir David Beatty, can do what we all expect of them, 
and what may be well within their powers, unless the 
principles on which naval forces are to be employed are 
agreed upon by all, so that the Government when it 
acts through the army, the navy, and the Foreign Office, 
shall do so consistently and fearlessly, and with single- 
ness of purpose and with certainty of aim. Unless, in 
other words, Sir John Jellicoe's work is so defined that 
it is' impossible for him to be checked or hampered 
by the interference of other departments — and it is 
immaterial whether they are the Foreign Office or the 
Board of Trade — then it is impossible that he should do 
what he has to do, as he should. 
Burden of Command 
So much for the general conditions in which the two 
men, who now control the fleet, must work if they are 
to work successfully. Given these conditions, what briefly 
is the task they are set ? It is a natural instinct to 
congratulate both on attaining such great positions. 
Each has long since been marked out for the office at last 
put upon him. For more than a year these changes have 
been pressed upon the Admiralty. It is even said that 
but for intemperate attacks in Parliament on the First 
Lord's late chief naval adviser, these changes would have 
been made before May last. Then Jutland made changes 
difficult; and the longer they were postponed the more 
delicate the consequential alterations in commands 
became. Now that they have come at last, they have 
been welcomed with an approval that is unanimous. 
But Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty have suc- 
ceeded, not to posts of honour, but to posts of enormous 
labour and cruel responsibility. There is a curious im- 
pression about that the work of the Grand Fleet is over, 
that its command is a sinecure, that there will be no more 
sea fighting, and that it is indeed immaterial whether 
such fighting takes place or not. No more foolish, nor, 
were it to affect the Government, more dangerous illusion 
could prevail. The Grand Fleet is to-day not less, but 
