3° 
LAND & WATER 
December 7, 19 16 
The Battle Round Bucharest 
By Edmund Dane 
Mr. Belloc is absent on the Continent this week, and 
Mr. Edmund Dane, the ^i-ell known military corres- 
pondent has kindly contributed the following article 
IN the communique issued from Berlin on Monday 
evening, and published in the papers here on 
Tuesday morning, a distinction was drawn between 
what is called the battle of the Arges, and the 
lighting to the south of Bucharest, and the claim was 
put forward that this battle had been won on the pre- 
ceding day, Sunday, December ya. 
The distinction thus drawn is fanciful. It represents 
one of those devices for imposing upon common opinion 
which for some time past have increasingly marked the 
enemy's official announcements. 
Very little consideration is needed to dispose of this 
attempt to pick out one part of an action where on 
appearances a success has been scored, and treat it as 
independent. 
The German plan for the attack directed against 
Bucharest was an advance along the railway from 
Pitechti, combined with an advance from the south- 
west and south. The necessity of this plan will be seen 
by a glance at the main roads and railways. 
'There is a great road from Pitechti to Bucharest 
running all the way roughly parallel with the railway, 
There are great roads from Islaz and from Zimintzea 
' a^mpulung 
'Boundivy hetitirm tbe 
Myhlands&PUxin W'Mnm 
^f^ 
meeting at Alessandra. From Alessandra the main 
route goes east to Giurgevo, and at that place strikes 
north, again roughly parallel with the railway. 
Between these great routes from Pitechti to Bucharest 
on the north, and from Islaz through Alessandra and 
Giurgevo on the south, no road exists having any value 
for military purposes. Indeed, the only continuous 
road that does exist, an ordinary cross-country turnpike, 
is that from Bucharest to Slatina. The country besides 
is seamed with numerous streams, and most of the 
country roads run in the same direction from north- 
west to south-cast. Except the Arges and its tribu- 
taries these streams are, in order to avoid complexity, 
not shown on the map. Both the absence of available 
roads together with the large ni.mber of watercourses 
would make the advance of any force across this stretch 
of country far from easy, and the advance of a large 
force next to impracticable. The movement of artillery, 
for example, and particularly of heavy artillery, would be 
out of the question. Relying very largely upon artillery 
the enemy attack was of necessity tied to the routes 
adapted to the transport of guns, and, what is of not 
less importance, to the transport of munitions. 
The reason why Islaz and Zimnitzea were selected as 
the points at which to carry out a crossing of the Danube 
is now evident. Those movements allowed of a strong 
concentration at Alessandra preparatory to an advance 
upon Giurgevo, and the crossing was made at Zimnitzea 
to begin with, because it compelled the evacuation of 
Islaz. 
Dependent Enemy Movements 
Two points should be noticed about this German plait 
The first is that the movement from Pitechti and the movoi 
inent from Giurgevo were dependent one on the other 
Of the two that from Giurgevo was for the Roumanians 
the more serious. The second point is that an enemv 
landing at and advancing from Olenitza would have 
been more serious still. The Germans did not attempt 
it, and the most probable explanation is that at the time 
they had not the force. Without delay the Roumanians 
made the attempt impossible. This omission was a 
weak point in the enemy dispositions. An advance 
from Olenitza would have rendered defence of the route 
from Giurgevo very difficult. 
VVc can now follow the operations from the time when 
the northern German column under the command of 
General von Delmensingen reached Pitechti. 
Their capture of that place, an inconsiderable village 
at the foot of the hills, but of a certain importance as a 
junction of railways, involved the evacuation of Cam- 
polung. Like most other things in this particular 
campaign, the value of Pitechti has been exaggerated. 
The chief value to the enemy, an advantage un4oubtedly 
substantial, was that it enabled him to strike the great 
route to Bucharest. Obviously the Roumanian troops 
who had fought so long and so heroically between 
Campolung and Dragoslavele, could not remain at the 
former place when the railway communication with it 
was immediately menaced. Near Pitechti the Rou- 
manian 1st Army made a temporary stand. It was 
temporary only because its purpose was to enable the 
Campolung force to get out. And that was done. The 
Berlin bulletin which recorded the occupation of Cam- 
polung and announced at the same time that the pursuit 
was being energetically pressed, did not claim the capture 
of more than 1,200 men, and se /en ficl 1 pieces. These ro md 
figures, as regards prisoners, did not, we may depend 
upon it, err on the side of modesty. All they indicaio 
is an action with a rearguard. How the main body of 
the Roumanians at Campolung got away together witj 
most of their guns and baggage is plain enough. Tb ; 
road from Campolung through Targovichtca is a 
military road, and it had been kept open. 
From Pitechti the Roumanians retired upon Titu 
and the action at Pitechti appears to have been fiercely 
contested. According to the Russian version of tha 
matter the Roumanians withdrew only after repeated 
enemy attacks. Repeated attacks imply repeated re- 
pulses. The German version spoke of it as a decisive 
Roumanian defeat, but then the German version always 
takes that line. A glance at the map is enough to show 
that in view of the enemy movements to the south of 
Bucharest the position at Pitechti was far too advanced 
and that provided the troops from Campolung and those 
at Targovichtca were not abandoned, withdi^wal was a 
course consistent with military prudence. ■/ As a fact, 
though it would seem with doubtful success, the Germans 
had triea to get on to the flank of the Pitechti force with 
their cavalry. They had at their disposal a \pry large 
mass of that arm, some seven and a half divisions al- 
together, partly it may be inferred for the purpose of 
collecting provisions, partly because they anticipated 
that their scheme would result in a rapid round up. But 
a relatively light line of troops in a country like that be- 
tween Pitechti and Alessandra would suffice to head off 
these incursions. Decidedly the best course for the 
Roumanians was to fall back steadily upon the northern 
defences of Bucharest. That course was adopted. It 
was all the more advisable because of the counter-offensive 
that had been begun in the Prahova valley, as part of 
