December 7, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
31 
the Russian movement upon which I shall touch presently. 
Withdrawal from Titu involved the evacuation ot 
Targovichtca. The main roads east of that place, how- 
ever, and more particularly the important road to 
Ploesti are readily defensible. In the advance from 
Titu the enemy claimed the capture of further 8,000 
prisoners, and a quantity of military material vaguely 
described as " immeasurable." The only item definitely 
stated was thirteen locomotives and certain other roll- 
ing stock. This unquestionably was a useful capture. 
It is very commonly assumed that when railways fall 
into the hands of the Germans they are seized as going 
concerns, lock, stock, and barrel. That very rarely 
hap[)ens. So far the seizures of rolling stock in Roumania 
have been limited. The chief present use of the railways 
to the enemy is as roads. 
It was a much more decided advantage for Delmensingen 
to be joined by the German and Austrian troops under 
von Morgan who had marched down from Campolung. 
From Pitechti the German advance had been opposed 
only by the Roumanian rearguards. 
Now we come to the more consequential feature of the 
enemy scheme — the advance upon Bucharest from the 
south. Upon the success or failure of this the whole 
plan manifestly turned. Any decisive check to the 
southern advance would leave the northern column in a 
perilous position, and the more perilous the nearer it 
had pushed towards the capital. From Giurgevo 
Mackensen's main force had meanwhile advanced as far 
as Comanes, which as will be seen by reference to the 
sketch is on the railway and the Niaslov a mile or two from 
the confluence of that watercourse with the Arges. 
The advance seems to have taken place along the rail- 
way with the inain road simultaneously, and another part 
of the force occupied Calgurarini. Coincidently a 
covering column advanced from Draganechti toward 
Mihalechti and a second covering column was thrown 
out along the road towards Lake Gretalor. 
The prudence which, from the first intelligence of it 
had led the Roumanian commana to conclude that the 
real danger lay in the threat from across the Danube, 
and not to hesitate in view of it to abandon Craiova, 
and to secure Olenitza, now made itself felt. The Russian 
reinforcements which had arrived — what they were we 
do not yet know, but they were probably appreciable — 
were thrown on to this left wing. The object of the 
thrust from the south was on the face of it to force the 
Roumanians to evacuate Bucharest, and this was also 
'ju the face of it the crucial phase of the battle. It began 
here on Friday last. On the news which came through 
on Sunday the enemy had met with a check. A counter- 
attack dislodged him from both Comanes and Gostinari. 
On the following day the Russians, attacking the 
column which had advanced to Mihalechti, defeated it, 
and drove it back. At Draganechti a stand appears to 
have been attempted by a division of Turks, but un- 
successfully. This was a significant success, because it 
threatened both to outflank the enemy's main column, and 
to cut one of his most essential communications. On 
Monday night's news from Petrograd the fighting was still 
going on between Bucharest and Alessandra, which would 
seem to imply that the wedge driven into the enemy 
front at that time still held. 
Mackensen's position in face of a move that threatened 
to cut him olf from the German forces to the north 
must have been grave. To get out of it he seems to 
have hit upon a bold expedient. Receiving reinforce- 
ments, probably from across the Danube at Rustchuk, 
and probably also the last of his available reserves, he 
renewed and pressed forward this original attack, retook 
Comanes, and pushing on as far as the Arges, captured 
Gradichtea. That village is on the south bank of the 
river at the point where the stream is crossed by the 
railway. 
As it then stood it was a remarkable situation. Though 
such a method of illustration lies open to the objection 
that it really misrepresents the distribution of forces, 
ind con\'eys tlie impression of a uniformity which rarely 
or never exists, in fact, the position is very roughly indi- 
cated on the sketch by the dotted line. 
An advance of the Russians to Alessandra must 
plainly have brought about the total ruin of Mackensen's 
enterprise, for he would then have been cooped up 
in a narrow strip of country along the Danube, and left 
dependent entirely on the outlet at Giurgevo. In the 
circumstances, finding himself in eftcct outfiankcd by the 
defeat of his left wmg, he appears, after securing his 
right by the capture of Gradichtea, to have faced about 
to the north-west. This perhaps is the meaning of that 
statement that a body ot Roumanians attacked him in 
the rear, but were themsch'es compelled to retire. 
As to the latter part of that statement it is peculiar 
that it should have been made even if true. There 
have, however, been sc\eral peculiarities of that sort 
lately in the Petrograd communiques. In one or two 
instances they could never have been sent out from any 
headquarters. The explanation may lie in the fact that 
these wireless messages have to pass across Europe. 
This greatly reduces both the value and reliabihty 
of the news, and coupled with the notable intensification 
of enemy propaganda in every form, affords legitimate 
ground tor suspicion. 
So far, however, as the news available up to Tuesday 
enables us to go, the battle was at that time by no means 
decided either to the north-west of Bucharest or to the 
south of the city. The mihtary advantage resulting 
from the advance of the northern enemy column re- 
mained uncertain. As compared to what it was on the 
preceding Friday, when his forces were deployed along 
the line of the Niaslov, the position of Mackensen had up 
to Monday not substantially improved. Further, in 
face of the disposition shown in some quarters in this 
coimtry to take a Roumanian and Russian defeat for 
granted, it is as well also to remember that the mere 
circumstance of a great battle having been entered into 
indicates that in the opinion, at any rate of the Russian 
and Roumanian staffs, the issue was an open one. Had 
it not been Bucharest must have been evacuated without 
a battle. And it ought to be noted that the Roumanian 
and Russian dispositions and movements had been 
marked up to the time of writing by consistent soundness. 
The Russo-Roumanian Offensive 
Though on a great scale the Russo-RoumaniaiT attack 
need only for the present be touched upon briefly. The 
enemy campaign in Roumania is governed by three im- 
perative necessities. The first is food supplies and the 
collection of provisions ; the second, the transport of 
munitions ; the third, the making good of losses and 
wastage. 
As regards the first it is pretty certain that the invading 
force has to live chiefly upon the country. The com- 
munications available do not for a moment permit the 
provisioning of such a force from bases in Central Europe 
and the moving of masses of munitions along the same 
routes at the same time. The limitation is at once a 
handicap and a risk. 
As regards the second we have, at any rate for the time 
being, to suppose sufficiency, both of munitions and of 
the means of transport, presuming always that the lines 
are kept clear of provision traffic. But the draft upon 
the enemy's stocks of shell must be serious, and anxiety 
to make that draft good as soon as possible has un- 
questionably dictated the recent Compulsory Labour 
measure. 
The third necessity is in all likelihood the gravest of 
the three. 
The Russian counter-offensive through the passes of 
the Eastern Carpathians and the defiles from Moldavia 
does not affect the first necessity. It does, however, 
aifect and very directly and very largely the other two. 
In face of this onset neither the munitions nor the men 
that might otherwise be sent into Roumania can be sent 
there. The concentration against Roumania in each of 
these respects is checked. So far as men are concerned, 
the tendency is to draw them from the most proximate 
theatres of hostilities, and the nearest theatres are 
Hungary and the Dobrudja. Neither can now be drawn 
upon except possibly to a very restricted extent. What- 
ever else may be questionable, the very heavy total of 
the enemy's losses in the Roumanian campaign is not, 
and unless those losses can be made good, and that 
rapidly, even the occupation of Bucharest can lead to 
nothing very definite. Concurrently the drain is lowering 
the enemy's vitaUtv on other fronts. 
