LAND & WATER 
December 14, icjiG 
The Lines of the Sereth 
By Hilaire Belloc 
THE situation in Roiimania remain? exactly what 
it has been since the sudden drjing np of muni- 
tions led to the great retreat. 
It is a situation in which no dis( ussion of 
niiUtary movements and their effects is of the least value, 
because the two opponents are not comparable. One 
is a fully-equipped armed force able to use all its 
weapons and in particular its artillery. The other 
is a body of men armed with rifles and al.so probably 
with sufficient small arm ammunition. It even possesses 
a nearly full complement of field pieces and an insufficient 
number of heavy guns, but it is not possessed of the 
shell which is the missile weapon of these last. You 
could not di.scu.ss a problem in Chess if Black had no 
pieces. There would be no problem at all. 
The great central point of interest — the question the 
answer to which is all important — can only be stated. 
No one in the M'est has the reply. It is this : " When 
will munitionment appear in a suf'licient quantity to per- 
mit the Russians and Roumanians to check tlic cncmj's 
advance ? " 
What has happened hitherto is as clear as it can be. 
The Roumanian army held its own perfectly on the 
defensive mountain line so long as its stock of shell lasted. 
The last considerable stock was exhausted in the lighting 
south of the Vulcan. It is quite evident that this ex- 
haustion came unexpectedly. In other words, further 
munitionment was expecctd and did not arrive. Had the 
shortage been foreseen the troops at Orso\-a would 
have been recalled : a selection of the remaining stock 
would have been made to defend the Danube line : the 
falling back would have been gradual. The shortage 
certainly came suddenly and very probably unexpectedly. 
The great bulk of the Roumanian Army had no choice but 
to fall back upon Bucharest : not "because Bucharest 
was the capital, but (presumably) because Bucharest 
contained a certain head of shell, and because even the 
insufficient means of transport available could bring that 
shell to the guns if the guns were near to the city : Hence 
the rally in the immediate neighbourhood of the town. 
But the stock— which was no more than pre-war stock 
on the old scale — is soon exhausted, and the Roumanian 
Army must retire again. It is unable (from lack of shell) 
to oppose the crossing the Danube. It is unable to stand 
upon any line. Some observers of the retreat have 
spoken of the line of this or that one of the livers crossing 
the Roumanian plain. This is arguing from the old wars 
and forgetting the conditions of the new. A river is an 
obstacle which may in varying degrees check an enemy's 
attack. It does not protect vou from his shell fire. If 
you are unable to reply to that shell fire it does not 
advantage you unless its width be so great that his 
range is affected. The range of the modern hea\y piece 
forbids any river to be a protection of this kind,' unless 
it is fianked with wide marshes. No great river with 
dry banks has afforded a line of resistance in the pres:nt catn- 
faign. The rivers crossing the Roumanian plain are, 
moreo\-er, insignificant obstacles even at this season, 
until you come to the Sereth. But the Sereth, ancl 
much more, the " Sereth lines " which ru'i from the 
Carpathians to the river and which take their name 
from the river, are at least a serious obstacle : though 
quite incapable of use by the retreating force until or 
unless that force is munitioned. It is far more probable 
that— if they are reached— they will serve as a defe^six-c 
line for the enemy. 
There are certain things we must remember about the 
whole of this retreat and the enemy's pursuit, if we are 
to avoid false analog}-. 
In the first place," we are not dealing with a retreat 
which can " restore the balance " or " produce equili- 
brium," after the fashion of the French retreat in the 
summer of '14 or the great Russian retreat in the summer 
of '15. 
The principle of a retreat " to restore equilibrium " 
is this : As yon retire before your enemy (who is by 
delinition in this case your superior) you lengthen his 
lines of communication so that lie has to leave men upon 
them and thus weaken himself, you make him follow 
you \\-here you choose to go (that is. you detemiine the 
form of the operation) and lastly in certain conditions of 
ground you extend his front. 
Such a retreat tx>fore superior power is indeed the 
onl}' immediate alternative to defeat : but it also offers. 
a chance of ultimate victory. There will come a moment 
when the exhaustion of your enemy's effort may give you 
your opportimity for a counter-stroke. 
Now the retirement through Roumania is not upon a 
SeretA. ^ines arui Donate 
across ^uzna/iian. 
