December 14, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
scale to produce these results, nor is the nature of the 
ground such as to produce them. 
The enemy's communications do not get worse, they 
get easier as he goes forward. He has now got, for 
instance, two railways across the mountains whereas at 
first he had none. His front does riot get longer, it 
gets shorter. Indeed, it is probable, as we shall see in a 
moment, that the shortening of his line is the main 
object of the whole manoeuvre. He does not exhaust 
himself, therefore, he consolidates himself ; and the 
Roumanians cannot use the factor of unlimited space 
as could the Russians. The whole thing is being played 
out in a restricted field. 
Again, we must not work upon the analogy of inferior 
numbers which retreat before great forces and ultimately 
reduce them. The enemy pressure in Roumania is not 
of numbers, but of shell. The total number of 
enemy forces between the Bukovina and the Danube 
was (just before the fall of Bucharest), only 26 divisions ; 
12 German, 12 Austro-Hungarian, i Bulgarian and i 
Turkish. E\-en now it is but 28 divisions ; one Bul- 
garian and one Turkish ha\'ing apparently crossed over 
from the Dobrudja. There is in front of this force, 
counting the Russian reinforcement with the Roumanian, 
nearly the equivalent in mere numbers of rifles, but for 
now so many weeks nothing sufficient in shell. That is 
the whole aifair. 
The Shortest Line 
Should Falkenhayn desire, as is probable, to establish 
the shortest line consistent with the continued belli- 
gerency of Roumania, he will find that line upon what 
are called " The Lines of the Screth." 
One can see upon the accompanying Map I that 
the enemy's front from the Gulf to the Black Sea, if 
drawn' from the elbow of the Carpathians through 
Focsani (the principally fortified point, for it blocks the 
viaduct) to the Sereth, and so to the mouths of the 
Danube, is pretty well the shortest he can hold consistently 
with having to face a Roumanian force ; even so, his old 
front is extended by over three hundred miles, that 
is, by 40 per cent., but this extension is \-ery much 
shorter than the original addition which was forced upon 
him when Roumania entered ; the whole original ex- 
tension due to the new Roumanian front has been over 
700 miles. If the enemy reduces this by more than 
half he has ser\'ed his own purpose well. 
ThcScretA Lines ••••')S=>^>> 
. The so-called " Lines of the Sereth " were drawn up 
under German supervision and upon the system known 
as that of Schumann : Three detached open lunettes, 
each consistmg of three concentric half circles, were 
constructed tacmg northwards intended to check a Russian 
advance from that direction. Their form is, so to speak, 
a sort of exaggerated lunette. The work co\-ering 
Focsani is the most important, and it will be apparent 
•by the accompanying Sketch II that the alignment was 
traced with the object of holding the shortest gap between 
the mountains and the ob.stacles of the rivers. The three 
works defend a gate only 50 miles wide. Should the 
" lines of the Sereth " be approached the Roumanians will, 
of course, dismantle them — nor are they heavily gunned. 
They each consist of three half circles, one within the 
other. 
The first used to depend upon nothing but small 
quick-firers, and even in the third line there was not, 
1 believe, any piece of over 120— that is, roughly five 
inches— and \'ery few of these. Meanwhile, the lines 
are traced, and the scheme of them ready to hand, the 
whole ground of the sap minutely studied. If the German 
Generals choose to stand upon this short Focsani line, 
the so-called " hnes of the Sereth," they will have a very 
strong continuation of the mountain line on which to 
repose when or if their enemy shall find the power to 
counter-attack. If tliey already know that their enemy 
will not possess that power for some time to come (and 
upon this front their knowledge of such things is, un- 
fortunately, far superior to the counter-knowledge our 
Allies have of the enemy's condition), then there is no 
reason why they should trouble about securing a short 
line or why they should not press upon the open flank still 
exposed to him. But if they do not stop upon the hnes 
of the Sereth we shall know why. It will be because 
they have to economise effort. 
Roumdnian Losses ' 
The last question in connection with the Roumanian 
retirement which is of any interest is the total real loss 
of the Roumanian Army to date. 
The object of all operations is to destroy the army of 
your opponent— not to occupy territory. But if • in 
an advance, you accomplish this by dissolution, you may 
ultimately secure nearly the same effect as if you had 
accomplished it by one capture or by one blow. The 
enemy was not able to claim any considerable numljers of 
men or guns (beyond his own losses) during the retirement, 
or before it, save at Turturkai. He there annihilated 
the equivalent of two chvisions and took all the guns of 
at least one division. The total losses inflicted by the 
Roumanians in the earlier part of the fighting, including 
the destruction of the nth Bavarian Division in the ' 
Vulcan Pass, were an equivalent. In the Dobrudja, and 
during the rapid retirement across Wallachia, the Rou- 
manian loss was small. 
But the other day, just north of Bucharest, there was 
delivered apparently a very serious enemy blow. The 
troops retiring between Bucharest and the mountains 
either jammed or delayed too long or attempted a re- 
sistance which was beyond their power. At any rate, 
the enemy claims 70,000 living men upon the field, 
wounded and unwounded, and a great number of guns. 
How many exactly we do not know, but counting others 
captured before, he makes a total of 184. These numbers 
have not been contradicted, and an enemy statement 
uncontradicted should be accepted. 
WTiat the proportion of other losses indicated 
by this loss of prisoners may be we cannot judge, 
but it is clear that the Roumanian Army, which 
had not severely suffered up to that moment, 
lost, north of Bucharest, the equivalent of five 
divisions at least and probably more, say a quarter 
of her present active forces. That is very serious. 
If the further advance of the enemy results in 
similar blows in the near future, it will mean the 
reduction of the national forces to a dangerous limit. 
We must remember that we are dealing with a total 
mobilisable force which is at most perhaps not the 
equivalent of more than forty divisions, and of this the 
actual organised force is more like half, the remainder 
being necessary for reserve and for drafts. 
And we must remember that, unfortunately, until it 
shall be provided with adequate munitionment, "the Alhed 
army upon the new extended Roumanian front is not 
inflicting corresponding losses upon its opponents. 
