LAiND & WATER 
December 14, 191G 
Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish Reserves 
The Great War can only be expressed as a Junction 
of Two Factors : Munitionment and Effectives. 
Since the whole war — one cannot rep>eat it too often — 
is a function of these two factors, effectives and munition- 
ment, let us complete as far as possible this week the study 
of the enemy's effectives. 
Munitionment and its connection with man-power 
I dealt with in general tenns last week. 
* Unfortunately it is only possible to deal witli it in 
general terms. From the nature of the subject no one 
must discuss, even when he knows them (w hich I do not) , 
the .statistics of the .\lUed munitionment ; and an exact 
estimate of the enemy rate of munitionment, rale of gun 
production, and rate of gun \wistage is not obtainable. 
One can only establish the general but very important 
conclusion that munitionment, including the production of 
guns in excess of wastage, gives the \Vestern Powers an 
increasing superiority over the Central enemy but leaves 
that Central enemy permanently superior, and very largely 
superior, to our Eastern .Allies, who can only be ])rovidcd, 
and that hardly suHicienlly, over thousands of miles of 
water oaniago and land transport, the latter imperfectly 
developed, and the former paying its toll to the 
submarine. 
In the second factor, that of enemy effectivi-, we have 
already gone thoroughly into the remaining German reserve 
of man-power. The German statistics are for \arious 
reasons obtainable within a closer margin of error than 
those of any other enemy belligerent, and we have found 
that there was some two months ago somewhat over a 
million of available man-power for effective use in sight 
between this and some date late in next sammer, say 
about the ist of August, which is the very earliest at 
which we can suppose any men of 1919 Class to be 
coming in.* 
We have further seen that behind this million, or rather 
more, there were some 600,000 men who had been passed 
as fit and of military age but kept back for the indis- 
pensable needs of the country and of the support not only 
of its civilian population but of its army. 
With regard to the other enemy belligerents, that is, 
the Austro-Hungarian, the Bulgarian and the Turkish, I 
attempted recently no more than a very rough estimate. 
I ha\-e since then had access to much more detailed 
evidence, which I am permitted to put before the reader, 
and I will take the statistical condition of these three 
other belligerent enemies, so far as it is known, in their 
order. 
Austro-Hungarian Situation 
The .Vustro-Hungarian forces organised upon the fight- 
ing line are believed to number 81 J divisions, and this 
force, in the present condition of those divisions, counting 
the field depots, does not touch two milhon men. It is, 
within a certain margin of error, round about one million 
eight hundred and fifty thousand. These divisions were 
distributed towards the end of November apparently as 
follows : 
37 against the Russians : 12 against Roumania ; pro- 
bably two, or the equivalent of two, in Albania and Mon- 
tenegro, and 30 J against the Italians. 
Jieckoning in battalions and by the number of rifles 
in line it is thought that there are some 465 battalions 
against the Russians ; some 394 against the Italians ; 
22 in the \\'estern ])art of the Balkans ; and 140 
in Roumania. These battahons arc not at full 
strength, of course, and one is very far from being 
able simply to multiply the number of battahons by 
a thousand in order to get the number of rifles. The aver- 
a,ge multiple is more like 850. But the multiple varies 
for the chtferent parts of the front, and we are probably 
near the truth if we put some 410,000 or a little more 
against the Russians ; 295,000 or a little more against the 
Italians ; a bare 20,000 in Albania and Montenegro and, 
say, 125,000 against the Roumanians. 
*I havt? received in correspondence, while I was abroad criticism (t o 
whirh I will reply next week) suggesting discrepancy between these 
figures and those of l.ifit -March. There is none if we distinguish 
between acti\e forces and auxiliary. 
Such an estimate would mean for the infantry in action 
a total of 1, 02 1 battalions and something between 850,000 
and 870,000 rifles. The other elements of the divisions 
actually fighting would bring the total up to some 
1,350,000 men. Other elements at the front, not 
included in the organisation of the divisions, corps 
artillery, superior staffs, etc., will take 100,000 or some- 
what more, and the ad\'ance depots are supposed to ha\e 
not much more than 100,000 men present in them. 
(Part of these, by the way, are class 1918, of which I 
shall speak in a moment). Adding these other elements 
and the advance depots, we get something more than 
1,550,000. Upon the communications within the zone 
of the armies we cannot allow much less than 300,000, 
and it is thus that the grand total is reached which we 
began by stating, of something less than two million 
men, the true figure approximating roughly to 1,850,000, 
or a trifle more. 
For the purpose of our study, however, the most in- 
teresting point is the reserve of man-power behind this 
field force. 
The reser\-e of man-power remaining to Austro-Hun- 
gary is built up of exactly the same elements, of course, 
as that remaining to the other fully conscript belligerents 
and in particular the German lunpire. For there are 
three main categories : The numbers now in hospital, 
which may be released for some sort of duty between this 
and say next .August ; the rejected men, who may still 
be called upon (including the most that can concei\- 
ably be spared from munitions, mining, internal com- 
munications, etc.), and thirdly the younger classes. The 
hospital releases are estimated at about a quarter of a 
million. It is of course nothing but an estimate because 
you are here dealing with two uncertainties. First, the 
cfiiciency of the hospital ser\ice next year, and secondly 
the rate of returns from human material, which is distinct- 
ly lower than that upon which the old ax'eragcs were 
built. To which uncertain factors might be added a 
third always present in hospital returns, the difference 
between the gross number who arc called " cured " and 
the net number which can really return to full actixe 
service. Allowing for a considerable margin of error, 
certainly more than 10 per cent., and perhaps 15 per 
cent., we say in round numbers 250,000 for the hospital 
returns. 
The second category, even if the combing out of the re- ' 
jected men be of the most severe sort, would not yield 
more than 200,000. 
We come lastly to the young classes, and it is here that 
the profound exhaustion of Austria-Hungary is most 
apparent. 
In Austria-Hungary, alone of all the beUigerent Powers 
based upon conscript yearly classes, class igi8 has already 
largely appeared at the front. An Austrian class pro- 
vides normally some 340,000 to 360,000 lads. But these- 
very young classes, as we know, do not provide anji;hing 
like the normal. Great numbers have to be sent back 
because they are not mature, and called up later, but at 
any rate Class '18 has, it is believed, not provided so 
far, more than 220,000 lads. 
Now lit is not certain what precise proportion of these have 
been already taken from the main depots, but it is fairly 
certain that less than a half and more than a third have 
been so taken. We have several indications to guide us, 
one of which can be quoted : The ratio of prisoners. In 
certain recent large hauls of prisoners upon the Italian 
front, the figures of which I have before me. Class '16 
and Class '17 are represented in almost exactly equal 
numbers. Class '18 provides 40 per cent, of either of the 
other two older classes, and that would correspond to the 
general judgment of more than a third and less than a 
half of these lads having been taken from the main depots. 
If half had been taken there would be some 110,000 of 
them in the main depots. It is safer to say a third and 
to regard nearly 150,000 of Class '18 as being now in 
training in the main depots. 
If we add all the three categories together, the hospital 
releases, the men combed out or borrowed at a pinch from 
the quasi-civilian occupations and the proportion oi 
Class '18 in the depots, we get a total of 600,000 men. and 
that is probably the rough general figure of the available 
