December 14, 1916 
LAiND & WATER 
Austro-Hungarian man-power behind theanniesup to the 
middle of next summer. 
I think, however, we should be wise to remember that 
tliis figure can be slightly augmented, though only at the 
cost of taking exceedingly bad material. The Austro- 
Hungarian Government has. if I am not mistaken, warned 
Class '19 some months ago and will begin to call it up 
next month or at the very latest in February. 
It is an extreme step. It means that boys 17 years of 
age will be under training, and it is impossible that such 
material sjiould seriously add to the strength of any army. 
Still, it will to some extent add to the paper strength 
before the first of next autumn, and we must further 
remember that the balance of Class '18, which has had 
to be rejected for immaturity, will provide a certain 
mnnber of recruits— but not 100,000 at the very most — 
between this and tlie middle of next summer. 
1 have insisted thus upon the extreme point to which 
Austria has been driven in calling the very youngest 
classes, because this policy creates a gulf between the paper 
strength and fhe real strength of recrviitment. And while 
I am warning the reader against taking 600,000 as an 
absolute maxinnim, I beheve the equivalent in value will 
be much less than such a figure drawn from the mature 
classes. 
Contrast, for instance,. the difference between Austria- 
Hungary and France in this matter. If F'rance had 
chosen to anticipate the future in this appalling manner, 
her nominal reserve would be far greater than it is at the 
moment. She has not been compelled so to anticipate, 
and even Germany is less exhausted than Austria-Hun- 
gary, judged by this test of the call of classes. 
Roughly speaking, Austria has been compelled to call 
nearly one class ahead of Germany and Germany fully 
one class ahead of France. 
If we ask why Austria Hun.gary is thus the most 
exhausted of the principal belligerents — the answer lies 
in the very large number of prisoners which that Power 
has lost to the Allies. How large that number is (without 
giving details, which it is the policy of the Allies to conceal) , 
may be judged from the fact that the total number of 
prisoners in the hands of the Allies is not now so very 
far short of the total number in the hands of the enemy. 
I gave the proportion some time ago as something like 
16 to 22. I believe that the true proportion now is 
more like 18 to 22 and that, by the way, is surely sufficient 
answer for the people who believe that in some my- 
sterious way the indispensable men exempted for civilian 
occupation can be replaced in the enemy's countries by 
prisoners of war. He has hardly any better oppor- 
tunities than we have for relieving the strain by the use 
of ]>risoners' labour. 
Well, of this very large number of prisoners held by 
the Allies immensely the greater part, nearly five-sixths, 
are subjects of the Dual Monarchy. 
To sum up : 
Austria has, within the zone of the armies and on 
communications behind them, something less than two 
million men. She certainly sees some 600,000 men 
behind these for drafts between this and saj' next August. 
"And this number will probably be augmented by con- 
siderable portions of Class iqit) and the call of lads 
hitherto rejected from Class 1918. But these further 
elements are of slight military value, as are indeed a great 
portion of the original 600,000 as well. 
Bulgaria 
The position of Bulgaria in the matter of reserves is 
peculiar. Though she has suft'ered in proportion far less 
than any of the great belligerent Powers, her reserves 
are, in proportion to theirs, astonishingly small. They 
are perhaps not much more in sight at the moment 
than 100,000 men. They are probably less. 
The reason is this : When Bulgaria entered the war 
her (iovemment was convinced that the enemy advance 
into Serbia (which Avas only made possible by Bulgarian 
aid) would result in an early peace. 
It is not easy for us in the west to put ourselves in the 
shoes of people who came to such a conclusion, but the 
effect of the Austro-German advance over Poland had 
been very great all over the Balkan Peninsula and 
geographical distance, though logically it ought not to 
aflect military judgment, as a fact docs so, particularly 
in the case of a somew h«t isolated and ex-centric people. 
At any rate, Bulgaria mobilised right away every 
available man, including what was then her youngest 
available class, 1016. She produced a force of 790,000 
men. That force has not suffered severely. Its losses 
are probably still under 100,000, perhaps only go,ooo, and 
the proportion of prisoners among these is not large. We 
are dealing here, then, with an army which is very strong 
in proportion to the total population, which is almost 
intact, but which has verj' little reserve power behind it 
to make up losses when once it shall begin to lose heavily. 
Bulgaria has not yet put up against us any of her 
youngest classes however. i()i7 is expected some time 
in the next two months, 1918 in the spring or early 
summer, but that reserve is a very small one. The very 
youngest classes would perhaps yield at first not more 
than 32,000 men each, and there are under the primiti\e 
agricultural conditions of that State very few men indeed 
necessarily exempted for the support of the nation or 
the army. 
Forces on the Macedonian Front 
Tt is interesting to note in this direction how the 
Salonika expedition has thoroughly immobilised the great 
mass of the Bulgarian army. 
So dense has been this Bulgarian concentration to meet 
the Salonika offensive that I belic\e not more than three 
Bulgarian dixisions, say 6b battalions, could be spared 
for the north against Rouniauia, at anj' rate until quite 
lately. 
Ihe great mass of the complete national force which 
Bulgaria mobilised in the first moments of the war has 
thus been drawn southward and held there. 
Turkey 
The last of the three belligerent powers we are con- 
sidering, the Turkish Empire, is that upon which we have 
the least accurate information and the one upon which 
our estimates of reserve must be the most vague and un- 
satisfactory. 
Last September some fifty divisions had been identified, 
but they were clearly at that moment in the most un- 
equal condition. Nine battalions was regarded as full 
strength for the infantry of each division, but the 
battalions were themselves constantly and almost 
universally below strength, often not more than 700 
rifles ; still more the divisions themselves had so 
dwindled as to be little more than brigades or perhaps had 
never been fully formed. Between September and the 
present date the Turkish organisation appears to have 
passed through a change the exact opposite of that we 
have seen in the German Empire. In the German Empire, 
as we know, the number of divisions has been rapidly 
increased at the expense of their individual strength ; 
regiments being brought liere and there from older 
divisions to form new ones. With the Turkish forces 
this autumn and early winter it would seem upon the 
contrary that eight divisions have been suppressed, their 
elements being used to strengthen the more depleted 
divisions remaining, so that though the numbering of the 
divisions still goes up to 50 (and indeed the 50th have 
been identified in Macedonia) yet the actual number of 
divisions now in existence is only 42. Of these nearly 
one half, 22 divisions, would appear to be against the 
Russians from Mesopotamia to the Black Sea. Six 
divisions, but these very far from complete, will acount 
for the forces in Arabia, including the Egyptian front ; 
five are believed to be in Anatolia, in Thrace and in the 
neighbourhood of the capital — a home force which is, 
perhaps, also something of a police force ; a bare two 
were spared for Galicia when the Austrians broke down 
last summer, and I believe their remnants are still on 
that front. Two full divisions were in the Dobrudja, 
one of which has crossed to the other side of the Danube 
recently ; and lastly there is that division on the Mace- 
donian front opposite the English, in all forty-two divi- 
sions as I have said. These forces may muster somewhat 
over 300,000 rifles and a comi)lcte total in all the zones 
of all the armies of somewhat more than 600,000 men, % 
say 625,000. 
NoAv what is there in rcserA-e— I mean what is there 
