DecembPT 21; 1916 
LAND & WATER 
pensive than the offensive then yon have definitely 
estabhshed a pcMmancnt superiority of the offensive over 
the defensive" and the result is only a question of time. 
Now if this tactical method has produced such a result, 
and if it has at last unlopked the door of the extremely - 
strong modern defensive, the ultimate strategic effect of 
many such tactical operations is no longer in doubt. 
But here we come to the second question. Has this 
new method, now brought to such a high pitch of per- 
fection, and increasing in perfection every time it is tried , 
anything in its nature specially advantageous to the 
Western Allies ? Anything, that is, not quite as open to 
the enemy as to themselves ? If the enemy, choosing for 
the moment to stand on the defensive in the west is neces- 
sarily suffering from the advantage of a new tactical 
method discovered by his opponent, it may be only a 
temporary matter, for he will only ha\e to repeat the 
lesson taught him by that opponent when or if he chooses 
to take the offensive in his turn. 
We have had many examples of this sort of question 
in the course of the war, since it became what it still is 
and must remain to the end, a siege war: that is, since 
the first battle of Ypres. It was the Western Allies who 
learnt from the enemy most of the new methods of trench 
warfare and the supreme importance of observation and 
intensive heavy artillery work. A memorandum cap- 
tured from the enemy and dealing with the simultaneous 
attack, French and British, at Loos and in Champagne 
last year, shows that the enemy in his turn learnt from 
the Western Allies and determined, when he should 
undertake some great offensive, to make it continuous 
and not to attempt to break through in one stroke as the 
Allies had done. That lesson which he had learnt we 
saw practised at Verdun. The Western Allies in their 
turn have learnt once more, have applied the lesson, 
and have produced this new tactical method. But 
what great guarantee is that for the future since, as it 
may be presumed, the enemy can, when he undertakes 
the" offensive, do exactly the same thing ? 
The answer to this question would seem to be that the 
new tactical method is not only a method discovered and 
effected by the genius of the Allied command in the West, 
but also— as is generally the case with new tactical 
ihethods — one suited to the temperament of those who 
have evolved it. Without going too much into the 
future it is true to say that every war has shown the 
final victor to be the one who in the course of the war has 
discovered a tactical method suited either to his tempera- 
iient or to his numerical or economic position, 
There are manv features about this new tactical method 
which make it of more value to the Allies than a copy or 
even an attempted improvement upon it would make it 
to the enemy. 
Let us see what those features are. 
A , in, the first place, it depends upon a local superiority 
•' at any rate of heavy pieces with their mimitionment 
and of air work. In air work the Western Allies now 
have a marked superiority. Xo one can prophesy that 
■they will permanently retain it, for the enemy's strain in 
the way of man-power arid therefore of general equipment 
affects this lesser branch of equipment less than i^ .does 
the greater branches of artillery and shell making. But, 
at any rate, they have shown throughout the whole of 
this long summer and right throughout this winter 
continued superiority in the air which has not been 
shaken. The production of hea\y pieces and of their 
mimitionment is a field in which they have and must 
retain their superiority. No shuffling of the cards in 
the Central Empires, no proclamations and no heroics 
can alter that fact. The West has passed him in the 
race for material and is increasing the distance every day. 
Nothing can alter the curves except some political 
change with which these notes are not concerned ; for 
they deal only with the military aspect of the campaign, 
supposing its political factors to be constant. 
The tactical method here described is one which the 
West should be able to apply upon broader and broader 
fronts or upon a larger and larger number of selected 
sectors. The enemy is not in a position to do this. He 
is unable so to act, not only because he cannot make big 
guns and munition them as fast as the West now can, 
but also because he has not the men for a very broad 
front of ne\s- offensive or separate attacks upon many 
sectors. 
But there are other equally important points which 
seem to give this new tactical method special advantages 
to the Western Allies. For instance, it requires great 
initiative and individual intelUgence combined with 
exactitude. Now it is an error to suppose that the 
Cicrman regimental commands lack initiative — an error 
too often repeated. It would be a still greater error to 
belic\e that the ("icrman system does not encourage 
initiative in the lower command. It encourages it 
highly. But there is this about the German system that 
it cither— in the field of command— insists upon exact 
co-ordination or upon initiative and does not combine 
the two. In those things where exact co-ordination 
has to be achieved it depends much less upon the in- 
telligence of the subordinate than upon routine. While 
for all non-commissioned ranks and still more for the 
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