lO 
LAND & WATER 
January 4, 1917 
How then are we to explain the extraordinary difference 
between battle practice and battle results ? In the former 
certain difficulties are artificially created, and methods of 
lire control are employed that can overcome these dilfi- 
cnltie^ successfully. But these methods evidently break 
down when it .comes to the quite different difficulties 
that battle presents. So far we are on indisputable 
ground. \\'hcther tire control can be so improved that 
the difficulties of battle can be overcome, just as the 
difficulties of battle practice have been overcome, is 
another matter. The difference between action and 
battle practice are broadly speaking twofold. First, 
you may have to fight in atmospheric conditions in which 
you woiild not attempt battle practice. AH long range 
gunnery, whether at sea or on land, def>ends for success 
upon range-finding and the observation of fire, and, as at 
sea the observations must be made from a point at which 
the gun is fired, the correction of fire becomes impossible 
if bad fight or mist prevents the emploxTnent of observing 
glasses and range-finders. In the Jutland despatch 
particular attention was directed to the disadvantges 
we were under in the matter of range-finding from these 
causes. It would appear then that those who, for many 
years, had maintained that the standard ser\'icc range- 
finder would be useless in a North Sea battle, have been 
proved to be right. 
The second great difference lies in the totally different 
problems wliich movement creates in battle. In battle 
practice, the only movement of the target is that which 
the towing ship can give to it. Its speed and manceuvring 
power are strictly limited, whereas a 30-knot battle cniiser 
can change speed and direction at will. The smallest 
change of course must alter the range, and the smallest 
miscalculation of speed or course must make accurate 
forecast of range impossible. But the movements of 
the target are only a part of the difficulty. Those that 
arise from the manoeuvres of the firing ship may be still 
greater and more confusing. And so obvious is this 
that, in peace time, it used to be almost an a.\iom that 
to put on helm during an engagement — even for the 
sake of keeping station — should be regarded almost as a 
crime. But the long range torpedo has long since made 
it clear that a firing squadron may have to put on helm. 
It must manceuNTre, that is to say, in self-defence — a thing 
it woidd ne\er have to do in battle practice. And when 
both target ship and firing ship are manceuNTring. it is 
small wonder if methods of fire control, designed pri- 
marily for steady courses by one ship and low speed and 
small turns by 'the other, break down altogether. But 
these contingencies had also been foreseen arid means 
developed for deaUng with them. It is certainly strange 
in view of what has happened in the war. that methods 
of fire control including range-finders and sights and 
instruments for observation, designed for dealing with 
bad light in the North Sea, and instruments for elimina- 
ting the difticulties caused by manoeuvres, should not 
have been insisted on. 
The Only Basis for the OflFensive 
It is germane to our main point to raise this question 
now because it is undoubtedly true that the mainspring 
of all defensive naval ideas is doubt as to the success of 
offensive action, and as the only offensive action that a 
battleship can take is by its guns, it would seem as if 
those who disbelieve in the offensive, have now far too 
much reason for their scepticism. We have now got 
a new Board of .\dmiralty and a new First Lord. We are 
all witness to the fact that war is a vast experiment. 
On sea and on land almost every method of using 
weapons has been revolutionised, and not once but again 
and again. Now, if it is a.xiomatic that sea command 
depends upon absolute superiority, and that absolute 
superiority at sea is conditioned by battle fleets, and 
that battle fleets have no weapons but the gun ; and if there 
is a disbelief in the value of that fleet's offensive because 
the proved performances of the gun are so indifferent — 
does it not seem elementary that a resolute effort should 
,at once be made to find out if science is equal to the task 
of reducing battle conditions to battle-practice conditions ? 
It is at any rate surely not very sanguine to say that 
science might eliminate 25 or even 50 per cent, of these 
obstacles to efficiency. If battle practice gives a rate of 
hitting of one per gun per four minutes and battle that 
of one per gun per three hours, ami if only 25 per cent, 
of the errors could be removed, tljt' rate of hitting in 
battle could be improved by more than eleven hundred 
per cent. And this is a standard which would have en- 
abled Sir David Beatty and Rear Admiral Evan Thomas 
to have destroyed half the German fleet before 6 o'clock. 
The matter is clearly worth investigation. 
I propose to complete the review of the lessons of 19 16 
in our next issue. 
Arthur Pollen 
The Roumanian Campaign 
By Colonel Feyler 
THE inter\-ention of Roumania in the European 
war has not brought about the beneficial results 
which were hoped for from it. It is a profitable 
enquiry to find out why this should have been so. 
E.xperience, in the case of mihtarj' men as. generally, of 
all other men, is the result of their mistakes and their 
enlightenment. And this being so, there are many 
lessons to be learned from the successive enterprises of 
which the Balkans and Turkey in Asia have been the 
venue in the course of the last "two years— the attack on 
the; Dardanelles, the Mesopotamian expedition, the 
landing at Salonika and the inter\ention of Roumania. 
When it becomes possible to study these enterprises in 
the light of official documents we shall probably discover 
that the mistakes originated either in plans which were 
not sufficiently reasoned out, or in plans which were 
felicitous but were carried out by means that were not 
adequate, either because they were not estimated correctly 
or because there was some defect in their combination 
and co-ordination. 
Take the first of these enterprise.^, i^i <..\ample, the 
Dardanelles expedition. Here the idea was certainly a 
good and sound one. Capture of the Straits would have 
di^iosed of the Turks and established the shortest 
j)<)ssible lines o^ communication and the most direct 
connection between the ^\■estern and the Eastern fronts. 
Properly supported by diplomacy it pa\ed the way for a 
convergent attack upon the Central Empires. And, 
further, it had immediate effect uuon German moral. 
inasmuch as it made an end of Germany's hopes for the 
future in the direction of Bagdad. Results so great 
as these were abundant justification for it. 
Thej' were not obtained, and the project had to be 
abandoned. After several months of fruitless effort a 
profit and loss account was taken, and there was no 
alternative but to acknowledge that although the idea 
was quite sound, the difficulties attending its execution 
had not been properly appreciated. 
The offensi\e against the European commvmications 
of the Ottoman army having thus proved aborti\e, two 
frontal attacks upon it were made, one by the Russians 
in Armenia, the other by the British in Mesopotamia. 
Were these two attacks made in accordance with a com- 
mon plan prepared beforehand, or did each army operate 
in its own field with only such means as were deemed 
necessary for its particular mission ? 
It is impossible to answer that question. As a matter 
of fact, the Russian attack, although it had some very 
important restilts, remained a purely local, or regional, 
of>eration, an extension of the gains of 1878 ; it was not 
driven right home. And although the English operation 
was not \\ithout some measure of success, it, too, failed 
to achieve its purpose. \\'hy ? Apparently because of 
inadequate muster of means. The enemy was siot 
estimated at his real worth. A colonial expedition was 
sent out against him, whereas what was needed was an 
operation in scale with the great war. 
The landing at Salonika proceeded from the same idea 
