January 4, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
II 
as the Dardanelles enterprise, with the ditterencc that 
in this case it was sought to break the communications 
between Europe and Asia on the Bulgarian side. At 
the outset it produced an appreciable advantage, in that 
it more or less neutralised a large number of enemy 
troops. But its offensive import was not made manifest 
as anticipated. Either because the effectives were not 
sufficient or because political considerations fettered the 
military operations, or even perhaps because there was 
no intention, in the beginning, of pushing right home, 
the army at Salonika remained upon the defensive for an 
entire year and, voluntarily, or involuntarily, abandoned 
the advantage of a surprise attack upon an enemy who 
as yet was not properly entrenched. [ 
Now we come to the Roumanian campaign, and tliis 
is what we find : An army which docs not seem to have 
been of any very serious offensive , importance, and in 
which Russia was represented only by two infantry 
divisions and one cavalry division, advanced ■ in the 
Dobrudja, on the southern bank of the Danube, opposite 
Bulgaria. Another army which seems to have been 
much more considerable, invaded Transylvania through 
all its frontiers, thus marching against Austria-Hungary. 
This twofold operation would have suggested that the 
intention was to make a simultaneous attack upon two 
enemies, the Bulgarians and the Austrians. But two 
circumstances prove that this was not thQ real intention : 
One, that Roumania only declared war upon Austria-Hun- 
gary ; the other, that after the first encounter in the 
Dobrudja the Russo-Roumanian army was obliged to 
give ground to a great depth. We conclude, therefore, 
that Rouinania regarded the Balkan front as merely 
subsidiary, that the mission of the Dobrudja army was 
purely defensive, which explains its relative .weakness in 
effectives, and that the real strategic plan contemplated 
securing the initiative which was to be looked for on the 
Austro-Hungarian enemy front. 
Here arises the fust tjuestion : Was this plan good in 
conception and did it .correspond with the general situa- 
tion ? 
We may be permitted to doubt it. What did the 
general situation prescribe ? We have always said that 
the Eastern and Western Fronts were the principal fronts 
in the w^ar, because it was on them that victory would 
bring the greatest results to the victor and on them that 
defeat would be most perceptible and disastrous for the 
vanquished. But operations are long-dated on these 
two fronts. And therefore we acknowledged that they 
might be advantageously supported by successes on 
fronts which were not immediately decisive, but which 
might be used to relieve the others and perhaps permit 
of a successful turning movement. The Balkans formed 
a front of this nature, and the landing at Salonika was 
regarded as the primmg for a turning movement. 
The enterprise having thus been embarked upon, the 
question that next arose was which enemy the plan of 
campaign ought to regard as the most immediately 
dangerous and, therefore, the one who must be put out of 
action first. In Uie case of the Salocika army, to whom 
the turning movement against the Central Empires was 
assigned, there did not appear to be much doubt on the 
point : the principal enemy was Bulgaria, who was placed 
athwart the movement. Consequently it seems that the 
proper thing to do was to converge against the Bul- 
garians all available forces, and especially the Roumanian 
force which could operate from the north, and at once, 
while the Salonika army was operating from the south. 
Meanwhile, defensive tactics could be adopted on the 
mountainous Transylvanian front, which lent itself to 
fortifications and resistance. As soon as the Bulgarians 
were defeated the operation worJd follow its logical 
course : the turning movement would develop from the 
south northwards, and the forces rendered available 
by the defeat of the Bulgarians would permit of an offen- 
sive being begun upon the Transylvanian front. 
^Vhy was this plan, which seemed to conform to the 
logic of the general situation, rejected in favour of another 
which divided the forces and failed to provide anywhere 
a strength and solidity adequate to the battle fronts ? 
Probably, as so often happens where coalitions are con- 
cerned, itliere was failure of unity of control and political 
considerations perverted the military conception, or 
hampered its realization. 
There may ha\e been exclusively Roumanian interests 
NOTICE 
The tilfb of the aeronautical paper to be 
pubUshed shortly by Land & Water is 
FLYING. 
This paper is in no way connected with 
a recent publication called " Air " issued 
by "The Aeronautical Institute of Great 
Britain." The first number of Flying 
will be published on Wednesday, January 
24th, and it will contain a number 
of articles of exceptional importance. 
which launched the Roumanian troops upon Transylvania, 
while in the general military interest it would have been 
better to think less about the coveted territory and more 
about the enemy whom it was necessary to put out of 
action if definitive occupation of the territory was to be 
secured. What good could an invasion of Transylvania 
do to the Roumanians if, thanks to the Bulgarians, the 
Germans succeeded in maintaining or re-establisliing 
their operations in the Balkans ? 
The definite issue was that Bulgaria maintained her 
position and the Germans consolidated theirs, while the 
Roumanians, faiUng to concentrate against the principal 
enemy, were driven out of half of their territory. 
No doubt other factors must be taken into account to 
explain the Roumanian reverses. Their army was fresh, 
it is true, but on the other hand, its commanders had not 
the skilled craft which comes from experience of war. 
It is. probable, too, that, as other armies have discovered 
by experience, its commissioned ranks of peace times 
were not filled exclusively by men equally suitable for 
war conditions. All the belligerents agree that it is 
extremely difficult to judge by garrison duty of the value 
of the cadres, which is only discovered clearly in the 
succession of duties of active ser\-ice. Reverses are 
required to prove their quality. Battle is the sole arbiter 
of selection. 
Nevertheless, over and above all these defects, it is 
likely that the blunder in strategy played its part. It 
diverted the Roumanian intervention into an unfortunate 
direction. 
It need not be concluded, however, that the result of 
the campaign has been all loss. One beneficial result 
was that it diverted Marshal Falkenhayn's army from 
a more important objective. That army was obliged to 
devote itself to an undertaking which could only result in' 
a \'ictory which may be called regional, that is to say 
over an enemy whose destruction could not have a vital 
influence upon the general result of the war. The 
Roumanian army could not be an essential factor in the 
resistance to the Germanic aggression. Even if it had 
been hit harder than it actually was, the disasters inflicted 
upon it could not have entailed disaster to the great 
armies of the Quadruple Entente. And the losses in 
effectives suffered by the Central Empires because of it 
are definite losses and consequently a diminution of 
strength. That stands to the credit side of Roumania's 
account in the, war. In spite of the check she is an 
appreciable piece in the game. 
A special article upon the brutal treatment of Russian 
prisoners by the Germans, on ivhich wc have received 
'particular inforinaiion, will appear next week. 
Meticulous attention to detail is the keynote of Their 
Lives, by Violet Hunt (Stanley Paul and Co., 6s.), the lives 
being those of the three daughters of Henry Radmall, artist, 
and of Victoria his wife — who, by the way, is the essence of 
Victorian propriety at its coldest. The petty squabbles of 
these three girls, their dislikes and discords, are etched in 
deeply and bitterly, and in tlie only approacli to real feeling 
that any of them" display — the scene between Christina and 
her sister on the eve of Christina's marriage— the gift of 
expression of feeling is absent from both girls. Brilliantly 
clever, this study of unlikeable people may rank with the 
temperance lecturer's " horrible example." as a story of how 
not to bring up children. - 
