January 4, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
13 
of i)ig-iron and steel. If the output ot the minette were 
to be^disturbed, the war would be as good as lost. 
Tliis is the unveiled confession that/without the pos- 
session of Lorraine, the German Empire would have been 
unable to stand tlie industrial strain of the war, since 
Luxembourg yields only a small quantity of inine/te. 
It proves further that withotit Lorraine the gigantic 
and noxious growth of the metallurgic power of Germany 
would have been impossible even in peace time. The 
same secret petition contained this other admission : 
Already to-dav, as the prohibition of the exportation of 
coal made by" the English on May 15th proves it again, 
coal is one of the most decisive means for exerting political 
influence. The industrial neutral States are compelled 
to submit to those of the belligerents who can provide 
their supply of coal. We cannot do it sufficiently at 
present, and we are compelled even to-day to resort to 
the production of Belgian coal in order not to allow our 
neutral neighbours to fall completely under the de- 
^ pendency of England. 
Are not all these facts and words sufficient to demon- 
strate that the possession of the Rhinegold treasure, of 
the iron ore deposits of Lorraine, is vital for Germany ? 
And do not the following figures add to them a crushhig 
strength? Out oi 28,607,000 tons. of iron ore which Ger- 
many extracted from her soil -in 19IJ, 21,135,000 ions 
came from Lorraine. 
In the same year, from the same annexed part of Lor- 
raine, the coal mines yielded an output of 3,200,000 tons. 
The total value of the iron and coal output amounted to 
£4,000,000. The blast furnaces produced 3,800,000 
tons of pig iron, and the output of steel reached 2,300,000 
tons. A comparison of these iigiires with those published by 
France shows that the output of pig iron in Lorraine 
equalled the total output of the whole of France, while 
as to steel Lorraine only produced one-third less than all 
the French steel works together : 
Output of Pig Iro\ and Steel. 
Pig Irox : France in 1911 . . . . 4,000,000 tons 
Lorraine in 1913 . . . . 3,800,000 tons 
Steel : France in 1911 . . . . 3,800,000 tons 
Lorraine in 1913 . . . . 2,300,000 tons 
No wonder that the French industrial world has, since 
the beginning of the war, given a great deal of attention 
and thouglit to the problem of coal and iron in Lorraine. 
The iron deposits, as will be seen from the map 
published on this page, start from Longwy-St. Martin, on 
the border of Belgium, go broadening from west to 
cast in France, advance into Luxembourg to Differdange 
and Redange, then, expanding towards the east in 
annexed Lorraine, turn sharply from north to south, and 
follow down to Noveant on the Moselle river where the 
Rupt de Mad runs into it. In French Lorraine, the 
deposits stretch southwards down to Mars la Tour, and 
send three sharp points towards Ville en Montois, Landres 
and Conflans. 
In 1870, together with their German colleagues, the 
French geologists alleged that only the cropping out 
veins were workable, as at a depth of several hundred 
feet the nature and quality of the iron ore quickly 
deteriorated. It was a mistake, but hardly ever was 
there a more lucky mistake. 
On that mistake the Prussians assigned the limits of 
their annexation, and the treaty of Frankfort wrung from 
France ig iron mines, 16 coal mines and 14 other mineral 
allotments, together with the most important metallurgic 
works of the Moselle valley and the famous de Wendel 
factories w'hich produced not less than a tenth part of 
the total French output. 
But the Briey area was left to France, as Moltke and 
Bismarck had no idea of its invaluable wealth. There 
France established and developed her most iinportant 
metallurgic works, ignoring the danger that threatened 
them in case of a war ; she concentrated on her eastern 
and northern frontiers eight-tenths of her metallurgic 
power ; whereas Germany developed her industrial 
strength far out of reach of a possible enemy. 
Let us repeat once more this fact which we must all 
keep in mind for the time when the Allies impose peace : 
In 1913, the Lorraine mines yielded o%ier 21 million 
ions of iron ore, out of a total German output of 28 
millions. 
The annexation of this mineral wealth was the main 
foundation of that metallurgic power which brought 
about the monstrously unbalanced increase of German 
industry and commerce. Soon Germany developed such 
an ai)petite for iron that she exceeded quickly the enor- 
mous rcser\-es that she became possessed of by her robbery 
of 1870-71. In 1913, she bought abroad 14,019,000 tons 
of iron ore, and meanwhile the bloated German Fafmr 
was looking with greedy covetous eyes on the French 
mines, clo5e at hand, which yielded a yearly output ot 
nearly that amount. 
The resources of the Lorraine iron ore deposits are 
estimated at 3,000 million tons for French Lorraine, and at 
only 2,000 million tons for the Lorraine which we are to call 
German for a very short time more. The total estimates 
for France amount to 7,000 million tons without taking 
into account the deposits that may exist in her colonial 
empire. The total estimates for England, without her 
Dominions and Colonies, reach 3,000 million tons of iron 
ore of the first order, and o\-er 30,000 million tons for her 
total ferriferous resources. 
But if we exclude Lorraine, Germany is very poor in 
iron ore, only 710 million tons being supposed to exist in 
her very own territor3^ 
When Professor Hermann Schumacher, of Bonn, and 
with him the six great German industrial and agricultural 
associations, ask for " an improvement of the Franco- 
German frontier," it is easy to realise what kind of im- 
provement they have in mind. And, fortunately, they 
are very candid and gi\'e themselves away with an 
incredible artlessness. 
" Above all," they say, " we must secure for ourselves 
all the raw material needed for the war industries and 
deprive our enemies of them. Without the iron ore of 
Lorraine, we could not .supply the output of iron and 
steel required for the war. The treaty of Frankfort 
had given us the whole of Lorraine. A mistake was made 
by the geologists whose advice Bismarck sought. We 
know that, since 1880, contrary to Bismarck's anticipa- 
tions, the area of Briey, which is an extension of the 
Longwy area, has become one of the richest parts of 
France. We can now retrieve that mistake, since, from 
the outbreak of war, we have conquered and strongly 
held the second most important raw material in the 
industry of war : coal. Just as we could not prosecute 
the war if we did not possess the rich deposits of the 
Lorraine soil, so we could not secure victory if we had not 
a complete control of the abundant coalfields of Belgium • 
and the North of France. Now that we know what 
ammunition means in a war, we must be convinced of 
the fact that it is indispensable to the life of our people, 
in peace times as well as in war times, to command all 
these resources of warlike and commercial forces." 
These very unlikely " improvements " would bring the 
German industrial power to the level of the United 
States. But (Germany started on the wrong war path ; 
she invaded Belgium and roused the anger of the British ; 
then . . . there was the Marne. Yet, in spite ^of 
hei" \'ictor}', France has been deprived of 90 per cent, 
of 'her iron ore, 68 per cent, of her coal ; 66 per cent, of 
her pig iron ; 76 per cent, of her steel ; and 76 percent, of 
