January ii, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
3' 
LAND & WATER 
OLD SERJEANTS' INN, LONDON, W.C. 
Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 
THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1917 
CONTENTS 
PAGE 
Germany Feeling the Pinch. By Louis Raemaekers i 
Tlie Right Policy. (Leader) \ " 3 
Retreat in Roumania. By Hilaire Belloc 4 
Sea War, 1916. By Arthur Pollen 8 
The People and the Duties of Empire. By The Master 
of Balliol 10 
Inhuman Treatment of Russian Prisoners 12 
Le Soliloque du Deporte (Poem), by Emile 
Cammaerts 13 
Germans in India. By Arthur Gordon 14 
Germany's Policy in the Balkans. By Frank Fox 15 
The New Raemaekers' Exhibition i6 
Books to ]^ead. By Lucian Oldershaw 17 
The Golden Triangle. By Maurice Leblanc 18 
The West End 22 
Kit and Equipment 25 
THE RIGHT POLICY 
ON the eve of the issue of the great Loan which 
proves the resolution of the British Government 
and people to carry the war to a complete 
military victory, we shall do well to grasp why 
a determination of this kind is vital for the future 
security of Europe. 
The only conceivable policy for the Allies in the 
face of the German anxiety for peace is to meet it by 
refusing even to discuss terms, let alone to propose 
terms, until the enemy has suffered a complete military 
defeat. The future is veiled from nxan. Whether the 
enemy will suffer a complete military defeat or not we 
therefore cannot tell. All the known elements in the 
problem point to his certainly suffering such a defeat. 
That is all we can say. But the fixed point from which 
reason can never vary and from which statesmanship 
can only look aside at its peril, is the point that anything 
short of the full military defeat of the Central Empires is 
equivalent to their victory, and that their victory is 
equivalent to the -permanent degradation of our civili- 
. sation. But it means here, in this country, something 
especial, it means the absolutely certain decline of 
England and the British name. 
The reason that even the mention of terms is foolish 
resides simply in this : That when men are under a very 
great strain a check of any sort, moral or material, tends 
to break them down. If, in the last effort of a race 
when a man can just barely carry on, you divert his 
attention even by a second, you risk his collapse. If 
you bring means of rescue to a man hanging by his hand, 
over a height, the most difficult part of your job is getting 
him to stand the strain during the last few moments during 
which the means of rescue are being prepared. The mere 
presence of them reacts nervously against his power to 
endure. Everyone knows this in private cases where 
individuals are concerned. It is none the less true of 
pubUc cases where nations are concerned. 
It is true that the strain is not of this severity in the 
case of the Allies at least, though it is nearly of that 
severity in the case of the enemy. But it is a strain and 
necessarily an increasing strain, and the mere presence 
of "peace talk " frequently endangers men under such a 
strain. It is a consequence and corollary of this obvious 
truth that by refusing so much as to discuss matters with 
our opponent we put him into a very baci way indeedj 
He has made his subjects suffer the sudden prospect of 
rela.xation, and its disappointment. If we confirm that 
disappointment we have given him a mortal shock. 
Now for the reason that terms, however satisfactory — 
sliort of the military defeat of the enemy — have a 
special meaning for Great Britain. Let us suppose the 
impossible in terms so extreme that the enemy would 
not grant a tithe of them in his present state. Let us 
suppose his erection of an independent Poland, including 
the martyred Prussian provinces which have suffered 
more dreadfully than all the rest of that murdered 
kingdom. Let us suppose Danzig PoHsh and Posen 
Polish as well as Galicia, and independent. Let us 
suppose Russia in possession of the issues from the Black 
Sea : the promise of a money indemnity to irestore, so 
far. as they can be restored, the abominable material 
outrages of Belgium and Northern France, and a penalty 
paid for the still more abominable moral outrages 
of murder, torture and rape. Let us suppose great por- 
tions of shipping given up ; the original frontiers of 
France restored and even a scheme of disarmament 
approved. 
What follows ? You are still in the face of Prussia 
controlling sufficient resources in materials and in 
subjects to renew the struggle when she wills. Any 
word of hers that she may give, any pledge un- 
sanctioned by force, we know to be worthless. Such a 
statement seemed exaggerated some years ago. It is now 
common knowledge and no one can deny it. No promise 
that the present methods of promiscuous murder at 
Sea shall cease will be worth the paper it is written 
on at the end of ten years or earlier. No promise of 
disarmament will be worth the. paper it is written on 
unless it be the disarmament of a defeated foe, guaranteed 
by the presence over against ,it of victorious armies ready 
at once to inflict punishment at the first sign of bad faith. 
That Prussia, after such a most unexpected experience 
as she has had, would or would not engage in another 
piece of Continental aggression may be debated by those 
who choose to debate it. 
Supposing her to remain an undefeated, or, at any rate, 
unbroken organism as she is to-day, under the dynasty 
that has wantonly forced this dreadful calamity upon 
Europe, a small part of her energies and material re- 
sources would be sufficient to render impossible the 
traditional life of this countr}^ the security of its supplies, 
and the communications of its Empii"e. That is the plain 
truth and it is a truth that no one can deny. No other 
Power would act as Prussia has acted in this matter of 
sea-murder, but she, if she is not broken and reduced to 
the fear of a policeman outside, will certainly act 
according to her traditions and her vile nature. Only 
when her military caste is defeated, her dynasty taken 
from her, and her power for evil subjected to immediate 
punishment the moment it attempts a new develop- 
ment, will this country be secure. Anything short of 
such a suecess means for the immediate future the 
permanent and increasing peril of sea power and supply. 
That is the whole of the problem. It is one of the 
simplest as it is one of the most awful problems that 
have ever been presented to stat-esmanship, and in its 
simplicity lies our salvation. All that we know as 
Europe begins to fail if Prussia is granted a truce. But 
quite apart from that general trutn. there is the par- 
ticular truth that in this particular ca,se the survival of 
Prussia under its military head, with tailitary resources 
open to it, is the certain doom of these islands, and their 
only prospect of security and pride is 121 the dissolution 
of such a military power. 
From those two simple contrasting issues there is no 
escape. It is life or death for one or t he other. And it 
is Prussia herself that has willed it so. 
