14 
LAND & WATER 
January i8, 1917 
Opening of the 1917 Campaign— I 
By Colonel Feyler 
In this and the succeeding article Colonel Feyler, the 
distinguished Swiss Military Critic, makes a very careful 
analysis of the present military positions of the Central 
Empires and of the Allies. 
IF wc are to form a correct idea of the war at the 
beginning of 1917 we must compare the present 
witli the past ; and even then we shall not be sure 
of getting to the truth, for everyone claims his own 
method of comparison. If wo listen to the Germans and 
to the Allies we soon discover that they differ as widely 
on this point as they do on every other. 
" The victory is ours," the Germans say. " The map 
proves it. In August, 1914, our army on peace footing 
occupied our national territory from the Oder on the 
east to the Rhine on the west. When winter came our 
army on a war footing was on the North Sea, on the 
Somme and on the Aisne. Belgium and Northern Franco 
were in our hands, with their rich industrial districts and 
thoir fertile country regions. On the east we had lost 
nothing, except Galicia, and that did not belong to us. 
" Besides, we drove the invader out from there. The 
campaign of 1915 led us from triumph to triumph east- 
ward as the campaign of 1914 had done westward. In 
the winter of that year we had not only reconquered 
(ialicia, but also were masters of Poland, Lithuania and 
Cutuland. 
" We dealt other great- blows. Diverging from our 
eastward course, we pushed down towards the Mediter- 
ranean and beyond. Serbia was conquered, Albania 
occupied, Salonika endangorod. Through our Ottoman 
.\llies we caused disturbance in Egypt, threatened 
Transcaucasia and consolidated our hopes to the south of 
Bagdad. In vain a new enemy, the Italians assailed us : 
wo held them among the Alps and on the Isonzo. 
" Here we are at the end of the 1916 campaign and 
the picture is modified only in insignificant details. We 
have announced our disposal to make peace. Our 
ad\ersaries prefer to continue the war. And yet all their 
efforts to recover what we have won are futile. The 
extent of our retirements can hardly be measured in 
fractions of an inch upon the map, and even then only 
in a few places. When the Roumanian army had the 
impudence to come to the assistance of our enemies, we 
hurled it back into its own territory and recouped our- 
selves for our trouble with the Dobrudja and Wallachia. 
We are holding our fronts firm and unshaken everywhere. 
And we shall continue to do so for another thirty years, 
if our enemies choose to continue to attack for so long." 
What have the Allies to say in reply to this ? 
" The war surprised us when we were not prepared. 
\\e had few machine guns and less heavy artillery ; we 
were short of munitions ; our air service was not so good 
as the enemy's. England had no arms, Russia had not 
enough rifies. 
" Since then these deficiencies have been made good. 
Arsenals and munition works are supplying us with all 
the material required for our ever-growing number of 
effectives. The balance has so far been restored between 
ourselves and our enemies that after having retired before 
them for two years, we stayed their attack in the course; 
of the third and even made counter-attacks. In i()i4 
and 1913 the Central Powers held the offensive every- 
where ; in 1916, they were almost everywhere on the 
defensive. The campaign of 1917 will finally upset the 
balance — in their disfavour." 
* * * * * 
There arc the two views and any one considering tliem 
would be inclined to say that both were right, for both 
have appearances in their favour. It is quite true 
that the German armies are on enemy territory and in 
occupation of important regions of them ; it is equally 
true that in i()i6 the extent of these regions was reduced, 
except, of course, in Roumania. 
But in war appearances count for very little ; to judge 
only by appearances would be to run the risk of making 
grave miscalculations. \\\y<x\. does matter is precisely 
that which one does not see, the realities which each 
belligerent does his best to conceal in order to keep his 
adversary in the uncertainty which is a weakness. Is 
there not a proverb which says that a man forewarned 
is as good as two ? 
A twofold enquiry is desirable to get at these realities : 
(1) To compare the military situation at the end of 1915 with 
that at the end of 1916 in the light of the strategical 
objects and the intentions of tlie belligerents. 
(2)- To ascertain how far the presumable forces of the two sides 
will allow them to rcaUze their strategical objects. 
In 1 914 the Germans grasped the initiative given by 
declaration of war and seized the offensive in the West. 
There was no doubt whatever as to what their intention 
was then. They wanted to destroy the French army 
before Great Britain could bring sufficient forces to its 
assistance, and so to put France out of action after the 
occupation of Paris. There is no doubt that this was the 
intention, not merely because the documentary evidence 
proving it is legion, but because it was of the very essence 
of strategy. The sole object of strategy, when the 
means at its disposal are still intact as the German 
lunpire's were in .\ugust 1914, is to destroy the adversary 
in order to compel his submission to the terms of peace 
desired to be iniposcd upon him. 
This being granted to begin with, can it be denied that 
the intention was not realized ? The French army was 
not destroyed ; • France was not put out of action ; Paiis 
was not occupied ; Great Britain did have time to form 
a relieving army. The intention was not realized despite 
efforts of the very greatest intensity. Three great 
armies tried : the first on the Marne, the second in 
Flanders, the third at Verdun ; the first retreated and 
the other two were shattered on the points which they 
attacked. 
In 1915 the Germans took the initiative in a second 
offensive. In accordance with the principles of strategy 
this ought to have destroyed the Russian army. The 
Germans assuredly hoped to destroy it, and when they 
halted on the Dwina, in the Pinsk marshes and on the 
eastern frontier of Galicia, they thought they had 
destroyed it, if not so completely as to shatter all re- 
sistance — since they were brought to a halt — ^at any 
rate completely enough to secure a long period of un- 
interrupted freedom of movement. And they accord- 
ingly suspended their second offensive in order to under- 
take the third. 
Yet on this occasion, too, their intention was not realized. 
Events proved that. Riga was not taken and the 
Russian army, returning to the charge, recovered her 
lost ground as far as the approaches to Koval and Lem- 
berg and the neck of the wooded Carpathians. 
The third offensive requires some distinctions to be 
made. What was the strategical object in the Balkans 
and in Turkey and Asia ? If it were destructive, there 
were three adversaries at whom it could be directed : 
the Serbians, a secondary force ; the Enghsh, an essential 
force ; and in the Dardanelles and afterwards at Salonika, 
the Allies, an important but not a decisive force. The 
secondary force was the only one destroyed. England 
was left 'unshaken and the Allies at Salonika were not 
attacked. 
But it is more likely that in these regions the strategical 
object was not the destruction of essential military forces, 
but merely the conquest of territory and the gaining of 
economic advantages. That intention was realized. 
To sum lip, at the beginning of the second winter of 
the war, the winter of 1915-1916, the situation from 
the point of view of the strategical objects was as follows : 
In the West the object was missed, since two-thirds of 
the German army were held up before an enemy still 
strong enough to compel the German army itself to assume 
the defensive. 
In the East, the object was supposed to have been 
achieved, but in reality was missed, since the enemy still 
preserved power of resistance and had even made a 
successful counter-offensive on the Sercth ; the German 
