January 25, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
in which Fundeni stands, crossing the Rimnik river by a 
bridge called the Mora bridge. Thence one goes on by a 
very indifferent earth road to Garlesci and Crangeni. 
The latter tiny hamlet stands just on the edge of the 
great marsh ; Garlesci, which is not ninch bigger, is a 
little further in on to the dry land. When we add the 
fact that the whole district is an absolutely fiat plain 
about 70 feet above the sea with no accidents except the 
bluff banks of the Sereth, and also the fact that thei'e is 
very little wood or cover of any kind in sight, and that 
the whole is to-day deep in snow but the rivers not 
frozen, we have before us the topographical elements of 
the problem which has been set to the enemy in his 
attempt to cross at this point. 
The enemy reached the Putna-Sereth line, and was 
' held up there, on the Sunday and the Monday, the 7th 
and 8th of January. His efforts to force it have so far 
occupied some seventeen days. It is remarkable that 
he concentrated upon this vulnerable point of Fundeni 
what he regards as his best troops, the Prussian regiments 
from the original Prussian districts of Brandenburg and 
of the old Mark. With these forces and with his pre- 
poAkrance of heavy artillery he came to a line roughly 
indicated by the crosses upon Sketch III. 
He did indeed lose in the midst of this period for a 
moment the hamlet of Garlesci, but he recovered it 
again rapidly, by the bringing up of reinforcements, and 
he stood upon this line of crosses for some days while 
bringing up still more troops and making a heavy head 
of shell. 
Meanwhile the Russians, appreciating the importance 
of the Fundeni loop, put out two considerable rearguards 
or advanced posts. (One may look at it either way. They 
were the rearguards of the retreat, they were the ad- 
vanced posts of the defence). The one group was round 
and in Nanesci, the other at the hamlet of Crangeni. 
The latter still holds ; but the former was forced back in 
the course of last Friday and during Saturday morning. 
It lost so little in men (and nothing in guns) that we 
might almost regard it as a voluntary retirement "had 
not the Russians themselves told us they had yielded 
ground. We may take it that the Austro-German line 
now stands north Of the Rimnik somewhat after the line 
of large dots on Sketch Map III. ^ 
The alignment thus formed is not, it will be apparent, 
yet able to make full use of the loop of the Sereth. 
The value of a narrow loop such as this to ah assailant 
trying to cross a river obstacle is, of course, that such a 
loop is a salient, and that small salients are very difficult 
to liold against converging fire from either side. But the 
one side of this salient is in the present case marshy 
ground and further protected by the Russian advanced 
posts at Crangeni. The latter are in danger of isolation 
from their main body and may not be able to hold. 
Should Crangeni be abandoned everything really depends 
upon the condition of the marshy district on the right 
bank of the Sereth below the mouth of the Rimnik. 
We do not know how far it is frozen and practicable at 
the present moment, nor what the opportunities are for 
throwing a causeway across it if it is not practicable. 
If either from the frost or in any other fashion the passage 
of this marshy belt is practicable and the eastern half 
of the loop below the mouth of the, Rimnik is reached, 
it is clear that the district of Fundeni within the loop 
will be lost and that the Sereth will be' crossed. Where 
a loop is as narrow as that there is no reason why works 
.with sufficient time for their preparation, crossing the 
neck, should not afford just as good an obstacle as the 
river itself. But there again we cannot decide on the 
value of such works until we know the condition of the 
marshes on the north of the Sereth— that is, on the left 
bank. For if these be practicable at the present moment 
it would be extremely difficult to form a defensive Hne 
behind Fundeni which would hold. 
We are, after this examination, in a. position to under- 
stand why the enemj' has chosen Fundeni for his chief 
effort ; why he has massed there his best troops, and 
what he hopes to gain from his attack at this point. And 
we are also in a position to affirm once more that such 
an effort, so directed and using such picked regiments, 
clearly pro\-es that he is both unwilling and unable to 
abandon his Roumanian adventure — late as the season 
is getting to be, and necessary as it is for him to make 
preparations for the offensive to vvlilcli he is condemned' 
at some other unknown sector of his many fronts. 
THE THREATENED OFFENSIVE 
A good deal of ink has been wasted in the last few days 
in discussing the point mhere the enemy will make that 
hew offensive, which is absolutely imposed upon him 
by the straits in which he finds himself. 
One would have thought that by this time everyone 
knew that enemy concentrations are only discovered upon 
our side by the Intelligence Department of the various 
commands, and that their first and most elementary duty 
is to conceal the knowledge they have acquired. Is there 
really anyone left so simple as to believe that the Germans 
provide news agencies and neutral journalists with infor- 
mation upon their movements, begging them to pubhsh 
the same ? The plain truth is that no one except the small 
handful of professional soldiers* whose t>usiness it is to 
collect and collate all available evidence and to keep it 
secret has the least idea of where the last cnemj'' concen- 
tration may be taking place. They may attempt an 
offensive upon any part whatsoever of three thousand 
miles of front, and when one lias said that one has said 
all that any mere student of the campaign can possibly 
say upon the situation, so far as locality is concerned. 
^Vhat we do know- is that an offensive is necessary to 
them, simply because the energy accumulating against 
them in the West threatens their destruction. They 
tniist, if they possibly can, be the first to attack, even 
though they have not the .weight sufficient for any liope 
of decision left. 
Of the numerous points upon which the enemy can 
choose to concentrate, there is one that particularly 
concerns opii-.ion in this country : it is the coast of the 
North Sea. For among the many forms which the last 
effort of the enemy is able to take, one may be a raid 
upon these islands. 
What the opportunities are for such a raid, even upon 
a small scale, I am quite incompetent to discuss. It is a 
matter falling wholly within the province of those who 
have studied the naval side of war, of which I know 
nothing. But that (if it were thought feasible) the 
enemy would be tempted as a military polic5^ to some 
such raid when he has grown really desperate and finds 
himself at the end of his tether, is a military thesis which 
has been several times put forward in these columns. 
The nearer an exhausted military machine gets to im- 
pending and calculable disaster, the more is it not only 
condemned to such offensives, but the more it tends to 
aim at a political effect. And that is right ; because 
when you know that you cannot win on the purely 
strategic side, you have only the political side on which 
to gamble. Such an effort would, if it failed to reach 
these shores at all, be no more than one disaster, like 
any other disaster which in the actual number of men 
sacrificed, would not be compai'able to the sacrifice 
already made in Roumania without result. While if 
it succeeded in landing and maintaining a force for a 
sufficient time to do some serious damage, the political 
effect would be altogether out of proportion to an\?thing 
else that could be achieved by the dwindling resources at 
the enemy's disposal. H. Belloc 
Of all the many good enterprises on behalf of our gallant 
fighting-men now before the public, there is not one which 
appeals with more peculiar force than the Lord Roberts 
Memorial Workshops. It is well known that " Bobs 
Bahadur " from his earliest days did everything in his power 
to improve the life and surroundings of the private soldier, 
and his method was always to appeal to the better self and 
to provide facilities which would enable a man to cultivate 
and develop self-esteem. This scheme is run on the same 
principle and is therefore a most fitting memorial to the 
great General. Money is badly wanted to place on a sound 
financial basis workshops where a man, however grievously 
maimed, can yet with industry secure a livelihood which 
with his pension will place him above all thought of charity. 
The svstem is already working well on a small scale, but 
requires to be largely extended. Lord Cheylesmore is at 
the liead of it, a fact that in itself is eloquent testimony to its 
practical wisdom: contributions sliould be forwarded to him at 
" The I,ord Roberts Memorial Worksliops Ikadquarters, 
122, Brompton Road, S.W " 
