10 
LAND & WATER 
January 25^1917 
Mr. Wilson and the War 
By Arthur Pollen 
NO thoughtful reader of the public press can fail 
to liave been struck by two remarkable mani- 
festations of opinion during the last few weeks. 
First, there has been a steadily growing appre- 
ciation of the fact that the enemy's attack upon our seii 
supplies is a factor of grave importance. From the 
middle of August until to-day the submarine campaign 
has maintained a consistency in its success that is entirely 
without parallel, and while there liave no doubt been 
occasional very obvious breaches of the undertaking 
given by Germany last May to \\'ashington— and in 
the Mediterranean these breaches have been almost the 
rule since May last— yet on the whole the German sub- 
marine policy has not been conducted as it would have 
Ix^en liad that undertaking not been given. Ships have 
not, as a general rtile. been sunk on sight, and liners, 
both neutral and belligerent, have practicallv been spared 
altogether. It seems to follow then, that even with the 
lorces at present available, the submarine campaign 
could be made more ruthless than it has been. 
\A'c are not to lose sight of the fact that every resolu- 
tion passed by public bodies, in response to the Kaiser's 
appeal to his subjects to harden their resolution to win, 
has included a strong recommendation that tlie sub- 
marine campaign should be pushed to the utmost. And 
while these loud calls that Germany should no longer be 
hand tied in this matter, are being sent up to the higher 
]iowers, the AUied peoples are being informed, from 
twenty different sources in Germany, that large as is 
the present number of submarines at work, many more 
are under construction. The means and methods of 
attack, then, may both be greatly multiplied. If these 
boasts are true — and it is idle to say that they cannot 
be true — then the effort to reduce "us literally to the 
jjosition of a beleagured citj- may be reinforcecl in two 
directions. It may be enhanced by the adding of a new 
terror to the attack by the total disregard of warning. 
All ships hitherto sunk with some regard to saving 
crews, may be sunk on sight, and liners, hitherto generally 
immune, may be included universally as victims. And 
the whole scheme of submarine operations may be ex- 
tended by the multiplication of submarines. 
These inferences, which seem natural and obvious from 
known facts and public statements, have gained in 
cogency by the First Sea Lord's recent statement that 
the submarine menace is of far greater gravity now than 
it has ever been since the war began. On the top of 
what the submarine may do, we have also had a sudden 
and dramatic re\elation of Germany's capacity to get 
raiders on to the ocean and to revive, in the third year 
of the war, the startling performances of the Karlsruhe 
and Emdcn. For the second time, a war ship disguised 
as a neutral trading vessel has passed llirough our patrol 
on to the high seas and, for the first time, a captured 
British prize has been taken back, again through our 
patrol, in triumph to a Gennan harbour. These things 
added to the sustained, though not increasing, toll taken 
by the submarines, have naturally added to the appre- 
ciation of the fact that our command of the Allied sea 
communications is subjected to a very clear qualification. 
Neglect of Naval Counsel 
Next, side by side with this general awakening to a 
most disagreeable development, there has been mani- 
fested a somewhat wide discontent with the spectacle of 
the Allied premiers, foreign ministers, war ininisters and 
the commanders-in-chief conferring together and con- 
certing national and strategic policies, without any 
'Spokesman or represent ati^'c either of the British or any 
other navy taking part in these consultations. S'et frorn 
ihe lirst day of the war until now, no speaker or writer 
rm the Allied side has failed to include as first and fore- 
most of our assets, the sea predominance of Great Britain. 
That tliis country could assert, and defend, and so in- 
variably exercise an almost absolute command of the 
sea, has throughout .seemed to be the one self-evident 
factor in the war. There is not one of the fighting Allies 
that does not either owe its national sustenance, or the 
fuel, or the raw material from which its munitions aie 
derived, to the sea supplies which Great Britain defends. 
And, conversely, the most powerful of all the factors that 
must abbreviate the enemy's capacity to carry on the 
war— namely, the exhaustion of the food supplies of tlic 
Central Powers, is, as obviously, the direct result of the 
blockade eflc<;ti\-ely commenced a little more than a year 
ago. How, then, while the Allies are leaning wholly 
on sea power, and our enemies are being chiefly exhausted 
by it,, are we to explain the fact that when the Allied 
statesmen and soldiers confer together, they ignore naval 
counsel altogether ? 
Premises and Disillusionment 
The explanation seems unquestionably to lie in this. 
We all used to suppose that the great developments in 
sea force that dated from the year 1905— when the main 
armament of the battleship was increased by two and a 
half, when there began that progress in the growth of 
artillery which has culminated during this war in ships 
being sent into action armed with guiis firing projectiles 
exceeding those of the previous decades by three times 
in range, penetration and destructive force ; when the 
turbine opened up the possibilities of a speed develop- 
ment that has given us destroyers, criiisers and battle 
cruisers that can attain nearly forty miles an hour ; when 
torpedoes so grew in speed and endurance as to 
outrange 300 per cent, the biggest guns of the Russians 
and Japanese ; when the submarine developed from 
an ingenious weapon for harbour defence, to a vessel of 
high sea-keeping powers, intensely formidable and effec- 
tive for almost every purpose of sea war, a threat in 
battle, a standing menace to all fleets at sea, and an 
unprecedented scourge to every trader on the ocean- 
all these, we thought seemed destined in 1914 to add 
incalculably to the fighting powers of fleets. It seemed 
inevitable that when sea forces met, the destruction of 
one would be terribly swift and victory come with awe- 
inspiring rapidity. 
The facts of this war have disillusioned us. Such 
actions as there have been were each and all of 
them incredibly prolonged. The fight between Sydncv 
and Emdcn, between Admiral Sturdee's 12-inch gunned 
battle cruisers and von Spec's 8-inch gunned armoured 
cruisers, the pursuit and destruction on the same day of 
Letpzic and Nurnh;rg, unprotected ships witli 4-inch 
guns engaging faster— and in some cases armoured- 
ships, in all cases ships lising weapons the shells of 
which were incalculably more effective, the action of the 
Dogger Bank of January 1015. all of these showed that, 
whatever the superiority in gun-powTr might be, it might 
take anything from one to five hours for a ship to make 
that number of hits which should be the Equivalent of 
the two salvoes that can be fired in a minute and a 
half. Finally, at Jutland, when, to the other troubless 
that imposed such unexpected limits to the employment 
of sea force, there was added the difficulty of bad seeing, 
an unprecedented spectacle was witnessed. The entire 
naval forces of Germany, after being attacked and kept 
m play, \rith perfect ner\'e and masterly skill, for three 
and a half hours, were brought at six "o'clock to within 
12,000 yards of the British Battle Fleet. They were 
kept in contact between twelve thousand yards and nine 
till 7.30. The latter fleet was neariy twice as strong in 
numbers, and as some authorities would have it, four 
times as strong in gun power— so that, had it been possible 
to bring about an effective artiller\' engagement, the 
total destruction of the enemy slio'ukl liave l>cen effected 
in five or ten minutes. Yet "the difticulties of the situa- 
tion were found to be insuperable, and the German fleet 
escaped, damaged indeed but integral. Sir John Jellicoe, 
m his recent statement, as indeed in his disnatch. has 
