LAND & WATER 
January 25, 1917 
Opening of the 1917 Campaign— II 
13 
By Colonel Feyler 
Colonel Feyler, the well-known Swiss military writer, 
reviewed rapidly last tvcek the ■progress of the War 
until the end of 1916. In this concluding article he 
sums up the pros and cons of the 1917 campaign. 
THE question of the immediate future is whether 
the Central Empires will be in a position to 
resume their original intentions and destroy their 
essential enemies, which would secure their con- 
cjuests ; or whether on the contrary, the Allies will be 
able to push their attacks until the Germanic forces are 
destroyed, in which case they would dictate their terms 
uf peace ; or lastly, supposing the present situation w-ere 
preserved for a long time, whether the Central Em- 
pires, who are virtually a beleaguered city, will be able 
to protract their resistance long enough to wrest from 
the exhaustion of their opponents recognition of all or 
part of the territorial results which they have achieved. 
The answer depends entirely upon the remaining re- 
sources employed by the most skilful command, supported 
by the most obstinate determination on the part of 
tire army and the people to endure and win. 
Enquiry into the matter of the remaining resources 
shows that the Allies have a larger margin than the 
Central Empires. The Allies have all their avenues 
open to them the whole world over ; each of the great 
Powers among them can supply its own needs or make them 
good by means of exchange with the others ; and the 
small States among them also provide an appreciable part 
of what is required. The Central Empires are reduced 
to their own exclusive resources, and their two Balkan 
allies exact from them more than they contribute. The 
margin of the Allies warrants extensions, whereas that 
of the Central Empires is impaired by reductions. 
Resources in Personnel 
This difference is especially noticeable in the matter 
of the constitution of the armies. Proportionately 
to populations and despite the losses suffered, the reserve 
man-power of France is in a position to supply the 
diminishing line committed to her with greater ease 
than the reserve man-power of Germany can supply 
the line which she has to hold. The Allies of France arc 
reducing her task, while Germany's task is increased by 
her allies. 
At the present time, without reckoning the colonies, 
any one class of recruits of the Powers of the Quadruple 
Entente comprises twice the n-umber of men in the 
corresponding class of the Central Empire Alliance. 
The situation with regard to the effectives of the 
Gei'man army is that on December 31st, the entire 1917 ■ 
class was at the front, either in the firing line or in the 
depots of units immediately behind the front. No men 
of that class remained in the depots in the interior. In 
order to increase the number of her soldiers Germany 
is obliged to resort to all manner of expedients, compell- 
ing the Poles to form regiments, deporting the Belgians 
so as to release men from the land and the workshops, 
and proclaiming a levy en iriasse in order to utilise for 
war purposes everything it is humanly possible to utilise. 
Whatever losses the Allies may have endured, things 
are not so black with them, thanks always to the more 
advantageous proportion of their fronts. Thus for one 
German on the German front, one Austro-Hungarian on 
the Austrian front and one Bulgarian at the front with 
his army, the Allies will not require more than half a 
F"renchman on the French front, two-thirds of an English- 
man on the English front, and half an Italian and a third 
A a Russian on the ItaUan and Russian fronts. These 
aroportions are not advanced as exact ; the remaining 
['ractions constitute reserves. 
The Mass of Manoeuvre 
Scrutiny of the army formations .shows that after the 
■vastage of i(ji4 and 1015 tlv Cntral Empires were 
able to form three masses of nanceuvre in 1916 and the 
Allies iive. 
The tirst Austro-German mass was exhausted before 
Verdun ; that was demonstrated by the cessation of all 
attacks directly the battle of the Somme began and by 
the necessity of remaining on the defensive during that 
battle. The second was exhausted in the Trentino ; that 
was demonstrated by the cessation of its efforts when the 
defeats in Galicia and Volhynia compelled the sus- 
pension of its operations. The third is in action in 
Roumania and is in process of natural diminution of 
strength. 
Now this last mass was composed for the most part of 
good elements, battahons of infantry and the fourth 
regiments drawn from divisions of four regiments at the 
beginning of the war. The possibility of these drafts 
is now exhausted, or almost exhausted, unless they are 
earned further and taken from the third regiments of 
divisions. But there is a limit to expedients of this kind, 
and the limit is fixed by the minimum force required for 
the stabihty of a front even purely defensive. In this 
connection it must be remembered that Germany has never 
ventured upon appreciable denudation of a front, even 
in periods of greatest calm. In the autumn of 1916, 
when the Eastern fronts, including the Roumanian 
theatre of operations, accounted for seventy-nine German 
divisions, the Western front absorbed a hundred and 
twenty-nine although the Germans were purely on the 
defensive. 
Another thing which must not be lost sight of is the 
losses caused by the operations in these divisions from 
w^hich the Germans w'ould like to draw reserves. I may 
refer on this point to Mr. Hilairc Belloc's always clear 
articles. He has elucidated the whole question. I will 
only recall to mind a few figures based upon the 
admitted German losses on the Somme. 
Before the British front 330 battahons, engaged once, 
lost 45 per cent, of their effectives, or 148,722 men ; 
fourteen divisions, also engaged once, lost 50 per cent, 
of their effectives ; four divisions, engaged twice, lost 
more than 60 per cent, of their initial effectives. Before 
the French front, 326 battalions lost 45 per cent, of their 
effectives, or 139,388 men ; ten divisions, engaged once, 
lost 50 per cent ; three divisions, engaged twice, lost more 
than 60 per cent. Some units were almost annihilated. 
In three weeks, from August 20th to September 7th, 
the i8th Division lost 8,445 men. In one month from 
September 6th to October 9th, the nth Division lost 
8,498 men. In two engagements the 26th regiment of 
the 7th Division lost almost the whole of its effectives, 
2,975 men. 
The repairmg of such wastage as this is possible as 
long as the reserve of men in the interior can make tliem 
good. But it is a contradiction to make them good on 
one side, and on the other to weaken units by excessive 
drafts from regiments and battalions destined to con- 
stitute new masses of manoeuvre. 
So, in 1917 these formations will have to be drawn 
chiefly from the elements which may still be available 
in the interior, that is to say from those raised by the 
expedients referred to above, the Belgian deportations 
and so forth, elements whose quality will necessarily 
be mediocre. 
During the year 1916 the Allies formed five masses of 
mancjeuvre. The first appeared upon the Somme. It effected 
nothing more than a purely local driving back of the 
enemy front, and it suffered heavy losses. It does not 
seem to have been exhausted, however, for the English 
extended their line in order to relieve the French, and in 
spite of this extension of their own front maintained 
army reserves, while the French were forming reserves 
with the help of their imits which had been relieved. 
The second mass was the Italian one which continued 
active after the enemy offensive had been broken in tjie 
Trentino. It was indeed after that withdrawal that 
the Italians won their most notable successes on the Carso. 
The third mass of shock was Brussiloff's army, which 
