14 
LAND & WATER 
January 25, 1917 
was exhausted and now Idrnis part of the new Kouinaman 
front, to occupy wliich it had to abandon its projected 
attack upon HaHcz. 
The fourth was the Roumanian array, This was ex- 
hausted but not linally destroyed since its cadre still 
exists. A new, smaliei- mass can be formed from the 
forces that still remain. 
The liftl). mass was composed of the reconstituted 
Serbian army. Its strength has been diminished by 
its last successes. 
The campaign of 1917 will be bound up with the 
possibilities of forming new masses of shock. AU the 
foregoing explanation shows how much greater this 
possibility is for the Allies. With regard to the Central 
Empires "it is conceivable that the Turks may still be 
able to supply a few regiments withdrawn from the 
requirements of t!.eir own defence. The Bulgarians 
and the Austriaus are no longer wholly suClicient for 
the operations on their fronts. The Germans have 
at their disposal some balance of troops from Roumania 
who will not be required in the front line in that theatre 
of the war. For the rest they are reduced to expedients. 
The Alhes still have two "normal sources from \yhich 
to draw their masses in reserve : better proportioned 
distribution of their respective units over their fronts, 
and continued supply of recruits from the mother countries 
and their colonies. 
Resources in Material and Command 
Of course the full utilisation of all tiicbc iesuiuiu> 
in personnel is subject to the collocation of the material 
resources and to the organisation of the High Command. 
Examination of the material resources and their dis- 
tribution would require knowledge of numerous and 
detailed statistics which at present are known to no one 
outside the (Jeneral Staffs. What may be asserted, 
however, is that if the employment of these resources 
is as perfected in the Central Empires as it is among 
the Allies and their distribution even easier there be- 
cause of greater facilities of intercommunication, the 
resources themselves, are more limited. 
With equal (jualitics of organisation, the AlHes have 
one superiority over their enemies ; they can last longer 
>vhile yet consuming more freely at such times as a large 
consumption becomes necessary. Their only inferiority — 
N^ich may be largely put right by the adoption of pro- 
per measures — lies in their imperfect communications 
and in the difficulty of haison between the various 
Sectors of their vast converging front. 
\^'lth regard to the quaUties of the command, all the 
measures taken at the end of 1916 showed the intention 
of the Alhes to guard against defects and to improve 
agreement of effort. They all tend to more complete 
unity of control, ft is very difficult to obtain absolute 
unity, desirable though that is in military operations. 
It is very difiicult to suppress entirely the self-love of 
nations and certain individual interests which act like 
forces diverting energy, but these can be reduced to a 
minimum. 
In the case of the Central Empires there is not absolute 
unity of control. It is true that the (iennan Head- 
((uarter Staff took the high hand in undeniable fashion 
and assumed the conduct of the war. But that was be- 
cause her Allies perceived it to be a condition of victory 
imposed by the relati\^3 weakness of three out of four. 
These three bowed to the will of the strongest believing 
that such submission was indispensable to their own success. 
If circumstances underwent a change and their assurance 
of victory were replaced by fear of possible defeat, their 
idea woiild be not to share any longer the risks of the 
strongest among them, which will then become the 
greatest, but to reduce their own risks as much as possible. 
That will be the time to watch the unity of control of thc^ 
Central Empires at work, and to see whether it will 
resist the forces of disruption. Nothing succeeds like 
success, they say. That is true, but it is also true that 
nothing is so unsuccessful as a reverse ! 
The Moral >{alancc 
This piopuMiioii ii_atlb Us naturally to the last point 
tlial we need contemplate, the one which more than 
evci dominates all military operations : the relative 
moral reserve of the two opponents. NN'hich of the two, 
at the beginning of 1917, seems to be the possessor of 
the last moral reserve ? 
It need hardly be said that on the day when the sup- 
position, mentioned above, is seen to be an actual reality, 
the blow would be a heavy one to the Central Empires 
whose peoples and whose armies would perceive that 
cohesion had ceased to reign among those in Irigh places 
because there was no complete confidence in the futiue. 
For confidence in a final victory is the actual moral 
foundation of the activity of tl\e belUgerents. The 
Germans saj' : " You will never compel us to retire ; 
you will get tired of making attacks without any hope 
of success ; the simplest thing is for you to negotiate." 
The Allies say : " You have begun to retire ; you will 
get tired of retreating without any hope of victory ; the 
simplest thing is for you to evacuate our territory and to 
acknowledge that your success is worth nothing." 
The most obstinate in maintaining one of these opposite 
opinions will certainly be the one who feels liimseli 
most able to hold out because of the means at his dis- 
posal. If to these is added mihtary successes his resolu- 
tion will be conlirmed ; if on the contrary he suffers 
reverses he will get over them or will yield to their de- 
pressing influence according io the degree in which his 
remaining means are affected. 
The Roumanian campaign has made this mental 
condition evident. The Germans tried to use their victory 
to convince their adversary of his inferiority. The ad- 
versary replied : " What is the good of talking to me like 
that ? Do you really suggest that you have beaten 
us E^nglish, us French, us Italians, us Russians, because 
you have beaten the Roumanians ? The real truth is 
that you are going to have much more trouble to beat us, 
and we are going 'to have much greater chance to beat 
you because you are weaker after this fight by all tin; 
losses the Roumanians have cost you." 
A Pyrrhic Victory 
The moral effect is thus turned to the disadvantage 
of the victorious Germans. It always happens so when an 
attempt is made to magnify an effect of this kind beyond 
natural limits, when one wants it to go beyond the 
justification that it has in actual fact. Of all the 
victories won in the course of the war by the Germans 
this one over Roumania probably most deserves to be 
styled a Pyrrhic victory. 
Successes and reverses in the future will have to be 
tested by the same criterion. This will involve no change 
in the method followed heretofore. • We must judge, 
not by the sum of the gains realized, but by the residue of 
means available. Where there is a difference from what 
has gone before is the extent of the moral wear and tear 
which beguiles the van-iuishcd into exaggerating the 
effects of a reverse. 
When we put the case like that one point seems to 
become quite clear. The moral wear and tear being 
equal, the means which yet are left to the Allies enable 
them to get over the depression caused by a reverse more 
easily than the Central Empires, and idso to feel more 
firmly consolidated by success. 
If to these considerations we add a few truths taught 
by experience — among them this, that the victim of an 
injustice generally is stronger in his resolution than its 
author ; and this, that a people whose land is invaded 
fight with greater fury to recover it than the despoilers 
do to keep it ; and this third truth, of historic import, 
that of all the animals with which national heraldry 
loves to decorarte itself, the British hon has ever shown 
itself the most obstinate in its pursuit ; and this fourth 
truth, that Christian civilization countenances the en- 
couraging sympathy of Neutrals with outraged people 
who are defending themselves rather than with the 
aggressors who commit the outrages: if wc gather to- 
gether all these moral factors and add them'to the super- 
iority in means and resources left to the Allies, we shall 
vome to this general conclusion, that the campaign of 
If)! 7 is opening under auspices more favoiirah'e io the 
(hantpions 0/ a Europe that desires the dn'elopmevt of 
the democratic rights of nations than to the champions of a 
reactionary Europe thai claims to be reviving a Jdnd of 
Holy Alliance, inspired bv Jehovah- 
