January 25, 1917 LAND & WATER 
Rail Power versus Sea Power 
By Harold Cox 
I'; 
IN the issue for January nth of Messrs. Constable's 
well-informed and suggestive magazine The Kcxv 
Europe, there is printed a map (by Messrs. Con- 
stable's courtesy it is reproduced here) which 
perhaps more than any other single document yet pub- 
lished brings into clear light the final issue between 
England and Germany 
The map defines the German Empire, with its Austrian, 
Balkan and Turkish dependencies, stretching right across 
Asia Minor to Bagdad and including in its embrace 
iMesopotamia and Si^Tia and a lai-ge slice of Arabia. 
But that is not all. It shows a great black line 
representing a railway sj^stem which only requires the 
completion of a few links to bring Berlin into direct 
communication not only with Bagdad and the Persian 
GvM, but wi h Damascus, Jerusalem and Port Said, 
with IS'ecMna Mecca and the outposts of Aden. If 
peace were concluded, leavmg Germany in control of this 
great arterial railway, it is no exaggeration to say that 
the British Empire would be doomed. 
Our Empire is, and always has been, a sea Empire. 
It had its origin in the sea-faring instincts of the English 
people and in the resulting sea commerce of the British 
Isles. English captains sailed the sea in search of 
adventure or in search of gain, and planted the English 
flag and the English name on the coasts of every continent. 
Erom these maritime beginnings the whole Empire was 
developed ; by maritime connections it is still held 
together. From the point of view of the British Empire 
the sea does not separate, it unites. Long stretches of 
land — mountain and marsh and desert — that can only 
be crossed wath difficulty separate India from continental 
Europe ; the open sea joins India to England. 
South Africa is an equally striking example of the way 
in which the land can separate and the sea can unite. 
The same consideration applies to all our African pos- 
sessions ; they are all approached from the sea, and at 
present there is no other method of approach. In the 
case of Canada and Newfoundland, Australia and New 
Zealand, the West Indian Islands and British Guiana, 
Mauritius and Ceylon and Hongkong, no question of 
rivalry between the land and the sea arises ; the sea is 
the only link. Thus the British Empire is essentially 
a sea Empire, and it is because Englishmen lip.ve always 
known this in their hearts, even when they had half 
forgotten it in their heads, that we have ever placed in 
the forefront of our poHcy the necessity for maintaining 
a supreme navy. 
We knew that as long as we commanded the sea our 
island home was secure, and that the sea roads of our 
Empire could be protected. And knowing this wc were 
able deliberately to reject the continental ideal of great 
armies because we realized that our command of the sea 
would give us time to make the necessary military pre- 
oarations if ever we should be compelled to join in a 
great land war. By this policy we not only husbanded 
our financial resources, but what is even niore important 
wc secured the acquiescence of most of our neighbours 
in our sea dominion. Had we aspired — as Germany 
aspires— to rule on land as well as on sea, it is certain 
that the present European grouping of Powers could 
never have been called into being to oppose Germany s 
ambitions. Indeed, it is probable that there would 
instead have been formed a league of European nations 
to destroy the British Empire. 
But to-day we arc forced to take accomat of the fact 
that sea power is faced with a dangerous rival — rail 
power. This fact was beginning to be visible long before 
the war. Our mails to India, to Australasia, and to the 
Far East, have for years been sent by the rail route 
from Calais to Brindisi instead of the sea route through 
the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean. There has 
been a gain of a clear week, both outwards and home- 
'wards. If peace had been continued it is certain that 
there would have been further developments of rail 
competition with sea carnage. Projects had long been 
discussed for a railway to India, cither through Russia, 
or across Asia ]\Iinor and Persia, and as soon as these 
projects had been completed there would have been a 
further development of railway conununication via 
Burma, Siam and Singapore, with a steamboat scr\'ice 
to Port Darwin bringing Sydney and Melbourne within 
three weeks' journey of London. But it is the war 
itself that has conclusively demonstrated the superiority 
of rail power over sea power in certain geographical 
conditions. 
We have seen month by month during the war how 
the Germans, with their well-planned system of railways, 
arc able to move their armies first to one front and then 
to the other. Those armies with all their equipment 
move in perfect security. They need no escort, they 
fear no submarines. The railway truck which is to 
carry the munitions can be loaded up in the very factory 
where the munitions are made, and vnW run right 
through without further handling to the front 
where the munitions are wanted. In a few days, with 
a minimum of handling, guns and shells can be sent from 
Essen to Riga or from Essen to Roumania or to Con- 
stantinople, to the Trentino or to the Somme. Mean- 
while, our own munitions have to be placed on rail in 
tlie factory, transferred from truck to ship at some Eng- 
lish port, thence to be carried to a port in France or 
Egypt, in Greece or East Africa or the Persian Gulf, as 
the case may be. There the goods have to be got on 
shore by the best methods locally available, with much 
expenditure of time and labour, and with ^eat risk 
of loss. These are facts which form a very serious offset 
to the advantages which our sea power gives lis. 
\Miat is the lesson of these facts as applied to the new 
map of Europe and Asia planned hy Germany and 
already partly made by her ? Suppose that Germany 
retains her present conquests, she will then have a clear 
right of way from Berlin through Mesopotamia to Bagdad, 
and through S^Tia to the frontiers of Eg\'pt and to the 
boimdary posts of our military and naval station at 
Aden. The rail power which she now commands over 
the whole of Central Europe and the whole of the Balkans 
will be extended over Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria 
and the coast of Arabia. Is it likely to end even there ? 
The advantage that the German Headquarters Staff now 
possesses in shifting troops from one Eiiropcan front to 
the other will be extended to Asia and to Africa. 
Take first the case of Egypt. In actual mileage 
Cairo is considerably nearer to Berlin by way of Syria 
and Constantinople than it is to London by way of the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic. But normal rail speed 
may be set down as double the normal sea speed. 
Consequent^ if the Germano-Turkish railway system is 
extended to the Eg^'ptian frontier, German troops could 
be sent through for an attack on Egypt in less than hal f 
the time that England could send reinforcements to the 
Egyptian garrison. Nor is that all. ' The German 
troops travelling by rail through German or Germanised 
