February i, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
in the reduction of the total carrying power available 
for these island'^ and for all British" and Allied purposes 
in the war. There is no reason to think that the amount 
of daily ilama^e has been at all decreased during the 
present month." 
Never, it seems to ]ne, has the truth of the first two 
sentences in any xmragraph, been so amply and dedsively 
proved by those which followed. We have indeed lost 
sc\erelv bv the refusal to publish exact and accurate 
statistics, if the result is the publication of statements 
s)uh as these. Obser\e what they . arc. The average 
daily loss of British shipping from November till the 
end of January is 12,000 tons, while that of neutral 
shipping is far higher. Neutral shipping then must have 
been going at the rate of, say. 18.000 tons a day ! Tliis 
gives a total of 30,000 tons a day for the last three months. 
In one quarter then, we must have lost two and ihrec 
quarter million tons, and before November the ist, next, 
imless the enemy's activities are stopped altogether, 
we must look forward to losing oyer eight million 
tons more. This is really a very alarming prospect, 
because. a«. a matter of fact, it is doubtful if there is as 
much as twenty million tons of British and Neutral 
shipping available for ovir purposes. By the time a 
third of this has gone, the situation, both of our Allies 
and of ourselves will be desperate. The object of the 
writer is to urge the (iovernment to appoint an official 
Controller of Shipping, who shall see that we not only 
produce more merchant tonnage than we have ever pro- 
duced before — even in times of peace, when the supply 
of labour was ample and of steel practically limitless — but 
to go far beyond it. We are not to be content to produce 
half a million tons of shipping a quarter fortliwitli, but 
are to pass this as soon — and as greatly — as possible. But 
if we are losing over a million tons of British shipping 
a quarter, the substitution of half a million tons will not 
meet the case. And if we are as dependent — as we are 
reminded — on neutral shipping as on our own, and 
neutrals are losing over a million and a lialf tons a quarter, 
it almost looks as if it is not worth while stniggling on 
against fate ! 
l-'ortunately, however, our condition — disagreeable 
enough in all conscience — is hardly so parlous as this writer 
would have us believe. I cannot pretend to any better 
knowledge of the statistics of our shipping losses than 
are available to any other member of the public who has 
taken the trouble to keep the requisite press cuttings 
since the first of August, and has added to the information 
daily given by the papers, such further details of the ton- 
nage of the particular ships as he can gather from Lloyd's 
List. These authorities arc of course incomplete. Not 
all losses are printed daily ; and it is not easy for a layman 
to identify each ship and get its tonnage right. 1 cannot, 
therefore, pretend that my figures are correct — but 1 
guarantee that they are a great deal nearer correct 
than those which I have just quoted. Now, according 
to the results obtained in this perfectly simple and 
straightforward way, I find that the .oss of British merchant 
steamer tonnage engaged in overseas trade — and this, 
of course, is the only tonnage that matters for the pur- 
pose of the argvnnent — was about 4,000 tons a day during 
the months of November and December. So that if the 
losses for January had remained aboiit constant, o\u' loss 
would be not 1,080,000 tons, but 360,000 tons. 
Next, on the daily a\erage of the last three months, 
it would look as if roughly, two neutrals and Allied ships 
were sunk to one British. If the average tonnage of these 
ships were the same as the average British tonnage, the 
total loss of shipping would be 1,080,000 tons for the 
three months, instead of over three milHon and a half. 
I have not succeeded in working out the exact tonnage of 
the neutral and Allied ships. But so far as I have been 
able to go, it is quite clear that they average ver\- * 
much less than do the British ships, so tliat the estimated 
loss of tonnage, other than British, instead of double 
is probably little if at all more than three-quarters of the 
British loss — say 3,000 tons a day and not the portentous 
figure that"jwe first supposed. So far as we can get at 
the facts, then, the rate of loss of all shipping is less 
than three-quarters of what, on Sunday- last, we were 
told, was the rate of loss for British shipping alone ! 
Now I am very far from saying that this loss is not 
exceedingly formidable. I ani, on the contrary, weary 
of reiterating the fact that it is precisely this form 01 
loss and the jiossibility of its increase that is, from the 
point of \-ieu- of the Allies, quite the most serious question 
qf, the day; but precisely because it is the most serious 
question, it is of the very first serious importance that the 
nature and scale of the thing should be clearly and correctly 
•stated. ]f it is not so stated, if the thing is dealt with 
in terms of gross exaggeration, we shall not only entirely 
misrepresent oiu- capacity to carry on the wtir to Allies 
and .Neutrals, but we shall be in danger of embarking 
on chanj?es.of policies and persons because of threats and 
dangers that ha\e mi existence except in somebody's 
imagination. 
« 
Lord Fisher 
Curiously enough, the same writer who multiples the 
merchant shipping losses from 7,000 to 30,000 tons a day, 
implies that all these dangers might be kept away if only 
,we had followed his advice nine months ago, and given 
Lord Fisher the chance and the power of thwarting the 
rise of the enemy's submarine campaign and replacing 
its victims, if such replacement should —in spite of Lord 
Fisher's efforts— have become necessary. He quite 
realizes that the enemy's present effort is a great one. 
Indeed, his first campaign " totally suppressed by Lord 
Fisher" was a mere bagatelle compared, with it. The 
implication seems to be that, as we ha\e failed to employ 
this distinguished seaman to stop the U boats from show- 
ing their noses outside Cuxha\en and Zeebriigge, the 
least we can do is to entrust him no\\- with the rebuilding 
of the merchant fleet M'hich they destroy. If the disease 
were indeed as hopeless as this writer would have ris 
believe ; if the world's shipping were . vanishing at a 
rate that would doom these islands to hopeless famine in 
six months, then, honestly, it would not very much 
matter who was put in charge of the counter-campaign 
or of the shipbuilding programme. If, on the other 
hand, the situation is one that can be dealt with if right 
methods are taken, then the importance of adopting those 
right methods can hardly be exaggerated. Let 
us, on this subject, face the issue perfectly frankly. 
It is quite untrue that Lord Fisher " totally sup- 
pressed " the first German submarine campaign. The 
first submarine campaign did not become formidable until 
a month after Lord Fisher had left office. It was not sup- 
pressed until more than five montlis after that much 
discussed event, is it really necessary to perpetuate the 
fiction that the destruction of the (iermaif submarines in 
July, August and September iqi5, was the sole work of 
Lord Fisher who left office in May of that year ? There 
is really no ground for supposing that tlie anti-submarine 
campaign has lost anything of its efficiency by Lord 
Fisher's withdrawal. Next, it is quite impossible that Lord 
Fisher should be made a dictator oi shipbuilding without, 
at the same time, making him for all practical purposes. 
Lord High Admiral. Lord Fisher is an Admiral of the 
Fleet, a peer of the realm, and one of the most 
forceful and remarkable personalities in this kingdom. 
He is, in addition, consiclerably over sevcntj' years of 
age. He camwt noiv be cast for subordinate parts. And 
no one can be cast for the part of organising the building 
of transport and supply ships except in strict sub- 
ordination to the requirements of the Navy. I think a 
mistake was probably made, on the formation of tlie new 
Government, in not placing Sir Joseph Maclay directly 
under the Board of Admiralty, instead of giving him an 
independent department. But if Lord Fisher took his 
place, it is the Board of Admiralty that would become the 
subordinate department. This is obvious. And it is 
still more obvious that all the Navy, still on the 
active list, would view such a subordination of the 
constituted authorities, both with resentment and alarm. 
Their resentment would be due to no personal dislike or 
distrust of Lord Fisher, but to the spectacle of having a 
naval leadership forced \ipon the Service by public opinion, 
ignorant of naval sentiment in this matter. And they 
would view his appointment with alarm, because 
what the Navy needs to-day is the closest possible co- 
operation of men practically acquainted with the work 
of the units- and implements now employed in war, and 
no officer, however old or distinguished, who is imfamiliar 
with the practical requirements of the sitiiation, can 
possibly take sole cjiarge— without disaster. 
Arthur Pollen 
