February 8, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
wastage and recruitment, the former proceeding at a 
rate three and four times the latter, the enemy have 
reached a point in which they sec repairs possible for no 
more than the approaching spring and part of the 
approaching summer. As against tliis their opponents 
can keep the ring at tension indeiinitely and have, for a 
similar rate of monthly wastage, more than double the 
amount of monthly recruitment, while the Allied material 
supply is, upon one section of the ring, the ^^"estern, 
increasing the tension more and more with every day of 
production that passes. In the nature of things, the 
moment when the ring can no longer hold is approaching. 
But there is to this aspect of the matter — a purely 
Continental one — one profound modification. Allusion 
to it has latterly been l^lade continually in these columns. 
It is the nature of the Allied communications. It is 
because the communications of the Allies are maritime 
that the enemy finds one chance left upon which to gamble. 
JIaritime communications are always perilous, always 
cumbersome and slo\\', always exceedingly expensive in 
men and material. To-day these drawbacks are far 
greater than they were in the past for three reasons ; 
The necessity of maritime communication is greater than 
e\er before : their length is greater than ever before ; 
their peril is greater than ever before. 
Uirst. — Upon those maritime, cominunications the 
material superiority of the West depends, and the 
material existence of the East. The balance of the 
steel we need must come from oversea, and the supply 
of material needed by the Eastern Allies must, for the 
great bulk of it — not for mere balance — come from over 
sea, and that not only as steel or other raw material, 
bid in the form of the finished product. And not only 
must steel in our case, and finished products in that of 
our Eastern Allies, arrive from oversea, but a certain 
proportion of fuel also must so arrive. Fuel, whether 
supplied from Britain (and that is from one point only 
of the Allied outer ring) or from neutrals, must arrive 
from oversea. Even food must in part — -and the case 
of Britain largely — come by sea. There was never a 
campaign in the history of the war,, not even when 
maritime A"enice and Carthage were fighting for their 
historical position, when the dependeiice upon maritime 
communications was greater. As against this, the Allied 
power at sea does cut off from the enemy a very great 
'percentage of his necessary food, but not enough to 
reduci: him (as he himself once reduced his eneriiy in the 
past) by starvation. We embarrass him very gravely 
indeed, but we do not, bv this action alone, defeat him. 
Secondly, these maritime communications are abnor- 
mally long. They cross the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
They stretch round from Britain through the Straits of 
(Gibraltar and the whole length of the Mediterranean. 
They run again from Britain and from the Atlantic, 
right round through the Arctic Seas to the Northern 
Russian coast. Now great lengthy communications by 
sea have this treble drawback: 
(a) The efficiency of your tonnage is in inverse pro- 
l)ortion to the length of your communications : To supply 
so many tons of material to a distance of 1,000 miles 
ill a given time requires, even in theory, only half the 
tonnage necessary to supply the .same amount of material 
in the same time to a place 2,000 miles distant ; for the 
supply has to be continuous. 
(b) Very lengthy maritime communications involve 
to-day the upkeep of coaling points and further delavs in 
the taking in of coal as well as a further waste of tonnage 
in transporting the coal. 
(c) The longer the line of maritime communications ' 
the greater the peril, because every extra mile of journev ■ 
is an extra mile of danger, and also because the broader i 
the sea the less opportunity of finding the enemy— in 
this case the .submarine. 
Moreover, these maritime communications are to-day 
especially subject to a peril unknown before in the history ;, 
of shipping. This peril is the attack of the submarine, 
reverting to the old barbarous conception of war and 
sacrificing civilian life indiscriminatelv with militarv life. 
The new submarines have not been f ontrolled and domi- 
nated as the first fiight were from two\-earsto 18 months 
ago. These immensely long communications, therefore, 
may he compared to terrestrial communications which 
should be c:verywliere open upon their flanks to cneniv 
attack,, and no more detestable . nnlitary condition 
The War Loan 
A S the war proceeds, aiJd ;the difticulties and 
/% hardships inherent to \-1ctory increase, the 
/ — % resolution of the nation strengthens. To render 
scrAuce to one's country animates milUons of 
men and women to-day, but against this there too often 
arises the paralysing doubt of what use can a single 
person be in this gigantic struggle. It is of course a foolish 
fear. Armies are composed of units ; War 'Loans ^^oji- 
sist of single sovereigns. " -*- 
There is not a living soul to-day too humble to help 
in the financing of the war. The Great War Loan \vhich 
continues open until to-morrow week, is the most splendid 
opportunity that has yet been offered to the whole 
nation to be of help. It is the duty of eveiyone to 
subscribe what they can, whether it be a million pounds 
or less than a hundred shillings. The amount makfis 
no difference so far as the personal obligation is con- 
cerned. There may still be found those who' do not 
rightly understand the nature of the transaction, but 
they can find enlightenment at any Post Olticc or Bank. 
According to the success of this loan will the country's . 
endurance V)e judged by our enemies. Already they 
are comforting themselves with the false belief that the 
people are tiring of the war and will welcome peace on 
almost any terms. This delusion will be shattered, not 
so much by the total amount of the loan as by .the. 
total number of subscribers. Let it be shown to be a ,. 
people's offering to Na\-y and Army to carry on until ■ 
military victory is final and complete. 
As a matter of fact the lending of one's money to 
the country incurs no financial risk and brings in a 
A-ery handsome profit, especially for the smallest holders, 
who have never before been able to obtain such a return 
on their money, as over 5 per cent. One must not, 
however, regard subscribing to this War Loan as a 
mere question of finance or profit, but as a national duty 
which no man or woman wth any abiding sense of 
patriotism can afford to neglect. 
exists. ' There is the full position. The enemy is not,, 
only beaten on the West, but he is in danger of a complcto 
decision against himself upon the West in a very short 1 
time, because he is out-numbered, out-gunned and aut- 
generalled. His permanent superiority upon the East 
does not avail him towards a decision, because the factor 
of space baffles him. His reser\-c for preparing wastage, 
even if he joins no new di\'isions, is exhausted in the course 
of the coming summer. Every effort he makes to meet 
his foes by making new formations is so much borroM'ed 
from, anticipated ujion, the meagre resources of the imme- 
diate future. His one loo])hole is the weak character of 
our lengthy, vitally necessary, and e.xceedingly exposed- 
maritime communications. It is to stake all on that one 
chance that he has just .sacrificed neutrality to the oppor- . 
tunity of attacking tlio.se communications. If he fails 
here he has failed altogether and soon. 
There are those who tell us that he dt-liberateh' desired 
to bring the United States into tiie war in order to em- 
barrass negotiations at the close of it. It ■ may be so. ■ 
There are those who tell us that the sudden determination 
to risk the hostility of the Uniteil States was undertaken 
by the HohenxoUern Dynasty so that, in the crash of 
the newly made and artificial North German natioj^>. 
they should seem to have yielded only to an overwhelming 
combination. It may be so. There are those who. tell 
us that the Prussians will shrink froin the last conse- 
quences of such a policy and will suggest compromises 
with nations still neutral upon the sea. It may be so. 
But all these affirmations and conjectures relate to some- 
thing subsidiary to the main military point, which is 
this ; That by land the enemy is in inuuediate and deadly 
peril. His only issue is a gamble by sea. 
It is not my pro^'incc to discuss wliat his chances upon 
the sea may be. But it is clear that, as part of the 
military problem, the unaided submarine weapon cannot.. 
