LAND & WATER 
February 8, 1917 
be decisive. The margin between luxury and necessity 
in imports, the ])o\ver of importing ultimately by sub- 
mersibles, the time still required to embarrass the supplies 
of this country at all seriously ; the incapacity to inter- 
fere with direct communications with France ; the 
potential addition of half a million tons of shipping from 
the other side of the Atlantic : the progress of methods for 
dealing with the new submarines— all these factors com- 
bined make it certain that s<'rious military pressure 
upon land (the preparation of which he may hope in 
vain to hasten or impose) will come long before the 
menace upon our maritime communication could be 
really decisive. 
Now there is with regard to the innncdiate and extreme 
peril which the enemy runs upon the Western front, a 
note of warning to be issued. The Press has done so 
little to make opinioa in this pountry seize the general 
situation that the \varying is necessary. 
There is no reason why the enemy should not form a 
considerable striking force to come into action before the 
end of the winter. He can do so, as I have said, by 
anticipating his future revenue in men. He had in his 
depots last December about 600,000 men. -He might 
.■xpect before the middle or end of next summer to get 
another 400,000 from the last of class iqi8 called up 
and from hospital relenscs. It is clear that if he chooses 
to leave hinrself ex}i;uisted of drafts before some date in 
August he can empUjy the human material in the imme- 
diate formation of 3iew divisions, even up to so high a 
number as 25 divisions (possibly) as a maximum. He 
could onlv do ri(j. of course, at the expense of certain ruin 
later on, if his attack fails, an earlier ruin than he would 
otherwise have haxl to face. But he can do so if he 
desires some great political effect early in the year, or 
thinks it will ha of ad\antage to liim. 
What we have to remember is that a new force so 
formed is quite insuihcient for its task. Twenty-five 
new divisions largely eomi^osed of his very worst and last 
material* can never obtain a decision in the West, and 
when they have been j)ounded (or have pounded them- 
selves) to pieces, the counter-attack of the Allies can 
be decisive. 
He knows all this just as well as we do. The danger 
is that opinion in this country might be disturbed by the 
appearance of such new forces in the iield. It is only a 
political danger, but it is one worth forestalling. 
'Last Effort in Neutral Opinion 
My readers will agree with me that it is of especial 
xalue at this moment to study th(; plan upon which the 
enemy was vv(jrking in America up to the week before 
the rupture which has taken place. I think one can show 
that the (ierman agents set aside for affecting opinion 
in the United States had concentrated upon creating the 
following opinion : J'hat the Central Powers could 
maintain a successful defensive for any length of. time ; 
that any military design conceix'cd to that effect — 
such as the Roumanian one — worked within set boundaries 
which were easily reached and maintained : that the 
Allied Governments had already recognised this and were 
beginning to Jiegotiate for peace secret!}', their sole 
remaining difficulty being that of explaining their failure 
to their own subjects. I have before me as I write two 
examples of this from whicii I can illustrate it. 
'J'he first concerns the Roumanian campaign, and its 
significance lies in its date. 
I hose mIio may have read my article of last week in 
these colunms will remember that the main effort io 
force the Carpathians — two actions undertaken simul- 
taneously bj' (ierok on thi; north and Ruiz on the south — 
were delivered upon Saturday, January loth. Each 
ended disastrously for the enemy in the course of Sunday 
the nth. (jcrok was thrown back in the Casinu Valley 
and Ruiz was thrown back from the Canii>irle Ridge. 
It must ha\e been cleai" on the spot after these reverses 
that the decisive stroke, that of turning tiie whole Russo- 
Roumanian line through the mountains, had failed for 
good. Indeed, the certitude of this is pro\ed by the 
fact that a .series of costly frontal actions began innne- 
diatelj' afterwards — the very next day — against the Putna 
"-Sonic liavc t.itked of liis callins out in ("lormany Class 1910. ;' f. 
Tlio bovs who an; y-iolhs of Ihcni — only 17. It would io the pliygiu- 
lc"ii.'iil\;on<litic'iis nf the norili, Iju (jiiiu- lulilc 
and Serelh \u\c acioss the plain, and were carried on 
fruitlessly to the point of exhaustion before Focsaii i, 
before Galatz and lastl}- at Fundeni. 
The news of the breakdown of the Carpathian part of 
tile plan— the attempt to turn the Russo-Rouiuaniau 
right by Cierok and Ruiz — must have been known in 
Berlin by the afternoon, or at the latest by the evening, 
of Sunday the nth. 
Note what followed. Upon Monday the izih Berlin 
sent out an exceptionally long notice to the American 
Press. These long and detailed statements officially 
cou;itersigned by the enemy's command have been fre- 
quently published in the United States dming the course 
of the war, and I have often thouglit it would be in- 
structive if such elaborate German despatches for the 
hifluencing of neutrals were regularly republish'jd in this 
country. This particular effort was of excaptional 
tinphasis and importance, and went into detail \\\k)i\ the 
Carpathian campaign. It described (with perfect justice) 
the magnitude of the task and the great difficulties which 
(jerok and Ruiz had to overcome in lighting their way 
through a hifih and difficult mountain range in the depth 
of winter with only one good road, and dejiL-ndent in most 
places upon mere tracks ; The guns often ha\ing to be 
lowered into the ravines by ropes, and pulled up again 
on the far side ; nearly all the supplies haxing to be 
carried on men's backs, etc., etc. 
We, of course, know (and rejoice in the fact) that 
military efforts of that sort, if they fail in their linal 
purpose, are the worse for the commander who accom- 
plishes them precisely in proportion to their difficulty 
and to his tenacity and endurance. They ai-e immensely 
costly in men. But that is by the way 
The enemy very naturally, and I repeat, \ery justly, 
emphasised the great difficulty of merely getting across 
the ridge, let alone of winning on the other side. 
Now after this legitimate piece of self-praise, which 
might influence neutrals by showing them of what stiitf 
the enemy's armies were comjxised, the note goes on in 
a totally different tone, and says that these movements 
have 11010 been, crowned with success ; that the general 
officers commanding them are now uninterruptedly ■ 
pushing forward down the Moldavian Valleys, are about 
to debouch upon the plain : in a word, that the object 
of this perilous and difficult and very expensive march 
has now been attained. 
That latter part of the Note — and the only really 
signi..*icant part of it, and in any military sense — is a flat 
contradiction of the truth, and it was sent from Berlin to 
America not in the hope that it might turn out true, but 
in the kno-*vledge that it was false. For it was despatched 
a few hours after the receipt of the news that the Car- 
pathian effort had failed. The whole episode is signifi- 
cant, coming as it did during the last efforts to obtain 
American intervention and before the sudden volie- 
facc and challenging of Mr. Wilson that took the form 
of the Note of January 31st. 
The second example is taken Irom the principal one 
of those papers which have hitherto supported the German 
cause in the United States in the West. It is signed by a 
neutral journalist, but the inspiration is so obviously the 
inspiration of the CJernian Government that we may take 
it as part of the general propagancUi of about a fortnight 
ago. Though no date of origin is given upon the tele- 
gram, it clearly proceeds from Europe, and i)resiimably 
from some neutral country whither the (ierman 
authorities could send matter which they desired pub- 
, lished. Moreover, the writer speaks of his having 
accompanied the German ariries in the ])ast. After a 
long but inconclusive series of dark hints about the weak- 
ness here or there of the Alliance, and any amount of 
assertion that he is in toucii with the very best authorities 
and is speaking for them, the author concludes with 
these words : 
"In my opinion though fighting may 'continue, 
the war is \irtually ended no\\'. It is more tli.m likely 
that the terms of peace ari' already under discussion. 
What the diplomats are waiting for now is the swing of 
public opinion. All the Governments (my italics) have 
fed up their people by promises of great victories. They 
cannot now suddenly announce that the thing has failed. 
It can be safely said thai every ^teat Government ui 
Europe (my italics) is ncjw anxiously planning to sa\e 
itself froin its own |h>o]i1c. .\i>| h(in»4 ins;ini' limli of llu' 
