8 
LAND & WATER 
February 8, 1917 
acliicvo its professed ends? Wliat difference in its 
capacity to achie\e th^esc ends will be introduced by 
the abrogation of those limitations of its activities 
that last wceiv's Note defines ? To what extent, should 
America beconi;^ a belli.£(erent, will her active adhesion to 
the Allies' side assist u> in thwarting the new campaign 
or in mitigating its results ? The difliculty in answer- 
ing the hrst of these two questions is obvious, for over 
no phase of the war have both sides thrown a denser 
\eil of mystery. We must limit oiuselves therefore 
to a bare re-statcment,of elements already known. 
The submarine navy, of \\hich (iennany now threatens 
the relentless use, is that laid down by Tirpitz in tlu; 
beginning of iyi5.' He is entitled to the credit of having 
foreseen, sa\r in December. 1014, that Ciermany's 
only chance "of victory lay in undoing the blunder by 
which (ireat Britain had been made a belligerent. It 
•was a blunder that could only be undone by bringing 
(ireat Britain to her knees. He therefore determined 
■to call a new Sea Power into existence to redress the 
balance of the old— the Sea Power that made us invulner- 
able. The submarine campaign of February to October 
' 1915 was undertaken with a small number oi boats, with 
boats of inferior capacity, with otticers and crews of small 
and restricted experience. It was an exi)eriment only. 
It was undertaken so as to evolve the principles and learn 
the elements of a new warfare. The materiel for this 
warfare was forthwith put in hand. A year would ha\e 
to elapse before an\- of its rmits would become 
a\ailable. Certain (pialilics they would ha^■e to possess 
had been made manifest as much by all previous guerres 
dc course as by the e\cnts of the fust four months of war. 
The nearer the submarine could approximate; to the 
cruiser, the better it could do its work. It would have to 
keep the sea for long j)eriods ; it would have to carry 
long range weapons ; it must be able to overhaul mei- 
chant ships ahd'do so rapidly ; it would, if possible, ha\-e 
to Irght the armed merchantman at least on equal, 
preferably on superior terms. Hence the boats laid 
down in the spring of lui^ were designed for a radius 
of action of 10,000 or 12,000 miles, to carry guns el"fecti\e 
at 5,000 or 6,000 yards, to have a surface speed of twenty- 
one knots, and a submerged speed of twelve, to have 
upper works tough enough to stand a few hits by three, 
six or twelve pounders, and to be double shelled and so 
compartmented as to endure a hit or two of even 
greater nature. The contrast between the February- 
October 1915 and th<» March-April 1916 cam])aigns lay 
principally in this, that the first was carried on with the 
odd forty to sixty submarines that Germany had ready 
or completing when the war began, whereas the latter 
was the work of the new boats, specially designed and 
built for the trade war. 
riie difference between the spring and autumn cam- 
T^aigns of 1916 is that, wlttTeas the first, which ended by 
Berlin's surrender to Washington, was carried out by 
such new boats as could be completed in the year, the 
August effort began with tliree months' further supply, 
and to these a six months' further product must now be 
added. It is with these resotirccs, less such boats as we 
ha\-e been able to sink, that Gemiany commences her 
final struggle for safet}-. 
The Enemy s Hopes 
We can safely assume that the number of Cicnnan 
submarines increases steadily month by month. We also 
know that the destrucli\eness of tJie campaign in the 
last live months does not show any ])rogressi\e increase. 
It has maintained approximately the toll of British and 
neutral shipping that I indicated last week. In fact, the 
tonnage taken in January is the lowest since August. 
But we may be deceiving ourselves if we extract consola- 
tion from this fact. For, we are ignorant of two \ital 
matters. We do not know what ta?l we are taking of the 
submarines ; neither do we know what reserve of sub- 
marines—hitherto unemploved — Germany has now in 
hand. The new campaign then ma;y have two new ele- 
ments of danger. It may employ far greater numbers 
as well as employing all on more ruthlass principles. How 
much docs the enemy stand to gain by each of these ? 
Past experiences and, to some extent, tVie nature of things, 
seem to shov<- that the number of successes will not be 
proportioned to an increase in the munbcr of submarines. 
It also seems highly prol)able that, for any gnven means 
of attacking submarjnes, the proportion of those caught 
will increase as the numbers grow. While, then, added 
numbers should undoubtedly lead to the sinking of more 
merchant ships, it is to the last degree improbable that 
they will be proportional. 
Next, what will the Germans gain by sinking at sight ? 
With the earher types of submarine — which either carried 
no guns at all, or only small guns, that had only a low 
surface speed, that were, in fact, submarines in the old 
sense, and not cruisers in the new — freedom to attack 
without warning meant a double advantage. The risk 
of encoimter with a ship more powerful than itself was 
avoided, and in many cases, a victim was secured that 
might otherwise, even if imarmcd, escape altogether. 
If the torpedo was the only weapon, short range and 
an imsusj)fcting victim were almost essential to success. 
But a submarine tjiat can come to the surface seven or 
eight thousand yards from a liner, that can open fire upon 
her and summon her to stop and surrender, that can over- 
haul her if she refuses, and is all the time safe from the 
merchantman's tire from the smallness of the mark that 
she presents, is clearly in a different case altogether. If 
the intended victim is unarmed, in nine cases out of ten 
she gains nothing by sinking at sight — except the 
gratification of killing the people on board. If the ship 
is armed and intends to resist, she can, in any event, 
, only attack from imderwater by waylaying her, and if she 
attempts to overliaul and the merchant fif^hts, no 
new situation is created by the new role. In other 
words, it seems to mc that improvements of the sub- 
marine hav-e really done away with four-fifths of the 
advantages Germany's present role would have con- 
ferred upon her two years ago. It must not be forgotten 
that attack from underwater is limited to attack by 
torpedo — ^by very .much the shortest ranged and least 
efficient of the weapons that the submarine carries. 
Only in one respect does the new role promise the Ger- 
mans a greater success in the direction of their necessity. 
This, be it remembered, being not the destruction of 
neutral and belligerent life, but the sinking of neutral 
and belligerent ships. It may lead to ships being 
attacked further from land than has generally been the 
case hitherto. But unless the submarines congregate 
where the trade routes converge— and that means near 
the land— they run the risk of going day after day with- 
<jut seeing any ships at all. On the whole, then, the 
indications are that in giving up the warning of ships, 
the number of murders will be more greatly increased 
than the number of sinkings. But putting the two 
elements together, a certain gradual, and a possible 
, sudden, increase in the number of submarines at work, 
and the renunciation of all warnings, some increase and 
};ossibly a considerable increase in the losses of merchant- 
mei^ must certainly be expected. 
But whatever the incr(}ase it is emphatically not to 
be expected that it will either become progressive or 
even continue. It is worth repeating that the theorj* of 
defeating the submarine is understood, but that the 
material necessary for putting the theoi-y into effect 
takes time. Yet much of it is nearing completion, and 
first a mitigation, then the defeat of this campaign 
may be expected. There is not the remotest prospect 
of it achieving its purpose, which is to starve- us before 
the western war reaches its predestined end. 
AMERICAN INTERVENTION 
At the time of writing these lines America has had 
no formal proof of any more ov'crt act of war against 
her than this, that having committed many such acts 
in the past, and having promised for a season to desist — • 
but without any apology for her j^rcvious acts, or any 
compensation to atone for their consequences — Germany 
has now categorically declared her intention to def\' 
America's threats and to resume those outrages upon all 
neutrals which for some months she has practised — 
though only occasionally — upon the belligerents, and 
upon such neutrals as Norway and other States who are 
not in a j:>osition to wage war against her. President 
Wilson, faithful to his previously declared intention, has 
therefore limited his action to dismissing Cotml Birnslnrff 
