February 8, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
and recalling Mr. Gerraid. He has lor that matter no 
constitutional power to do more. He cannot declare 
war, which must be a formal act of Congress, and he will 
not ask this of the Federal legislature until Germany's 
threats are put into execution. (Tcrmany, too, has taken 
no official notice yet of the recall and dismissal. For 
the moment, then, America is not at War. 
But it would seem that the transition from a diplomatic 
breach to belligerency can only be rapid. Three cases 
of peculiarly heartless sinkings have already occurred. 
The steamships Euphrates, Hausatonic, and Lars Kruse, 
all de\oted, by agreement, to carrying the food which 
America sends for the relief of the starving Belgians, 
have b'jjn sunk. But the case of the Eavestunc appears 
to be crucial. She was sunk without warning, and the 
officers and crew fired upon both while they were taking 
to the boats and while in them. The master and three 
seamen lost their li\es, and one of them was a native of 
]3altimore. It is therefore possible that the name of 
Kichard Wallace may go down to history as the \-ictim 
that brought his great country into the war. This being 
so, it is perhaps not premature to glance briefly at what 
share his country can take. 
The U.S. Navy's Task 
America can do nothing to strengthen the armies of 
tlie Allies on the Western, or on any other front, for a 
very considerable time. Even with such excellent 
material as would certainly volunteer in the United 
States, it would be idle to expect any considerable number 
of trained and equipped units to be ready to fight in 
Europe in less than nine months or a year's time. A few 
divisions miglit be a\-ailable by midsunmier, but not 
more than a few. America possesses a well found and 
a well-trained fleet of battleships ; but she is entirely 
without light fast cruisers, and her destroyers, though 
fast, sea worthy, well armed and admirably led, com- 
manded and manned, are unfortunately not numerous. 
In \\hat the circumstances of the .sea war need most then, 
tlie United States could not help us very greatly— -even if 
they were willing to detach their flotillas from the main 
fleet, 'and send them to this side to join in the war on 
submarines. I say " even if she were willing," because ' 
clearly there arc two objections to her doing so. U5J 
lias shown the Americans that submarines can appear 
without a moment's notice off whatever point of the 
Atlantic coast they choose, and as U boats of the modern 
type are armed witli guns whicli, when imhanipered, 
can do a formidable amount of damage to .seaboard towns, 
it is quite possible that the demand, and forthat matter 
the necessity, for coast protection will be so great, that 
the^ Navy department will not find itself with any 
destroyers to spare for the European theatre. We may, 
indeed, take it for granted, should war between (iermany 
and the I'nited States result, that Germany would be very 
far from limiting her acts of war to sinking cargo boats 
at sight and in the war zone. The Admiralstab is at 
least as alive to our need of destroyers as we are our- 
selves, and will certainly percei\T the importance of 
terrorising the American coast towns into keeping all 
American light craft at home. I^urther, it will be as 
necessary to guard the western ends of the trade routes 
from submarines as our terminals on this side : and we 
must not forget that neither of the latest raiders 
are yet sunk. The Ignited States navy, therefore, may 
easily fmd that all the work her armoured cruisers and' 
destroyers, and indeed battleships, can do, will be found 
for them in American waters. 
The heavy craft, that is the battleships, would no 
doubt be made very welcome by the Grand Fleet. T£ 
tlicre comes a chance of another sea battle, and the 
opportunity has to be seized regardless of risk — if, that 
is to say, the only chance of lighting comes when bad 
light gives the choice of fighting at close range or not 
at all, we must face the fact that the attacking fleet may 
be subjected to very heavy loss! So heavy indeed that 
only a very great numerical superiority would ensure 
such an attack being successful, and therefore justified. 
That our present superiority is substantial and large 
enough to justify attacks \-ery much bolder than tho.se 
to whicii we were necessarily limited, when the margin 
was smaller, is now, it sei-ms, miiversallv admitted. But 
there is nothing lost by being too strong, and the presence 
of Admiral ;\Iayo's very formidable divisions might be 
greeted for more than sentimental reasons. But. for 
many reasons I should doubt this being offered or asked 
for. It is not a snnple thing to conduct naval manoemres 
with squadrons trained to separate systems of signalling, 
and accustomed each to its own e^•olutions only. Aiid 
their help is not necessary. 
Real Value of American Help 
After all, the problem of the day is not to get a fleet ' 
together strong enough to be sure of victory o^■er the 
Germans, should they again come out, for such a tleet 
we belie\-e we possess already. The problem is to prevent 
the German blockade from becoming effective, first by 
finding a means of figliting the submarines, ne.xt, by 
protecting supply shi])s exposed to their attacks ; thirdly, 
by replacing the loss that attack creates. We must note 
first, then, that of America's naval strength, those units 
which would be most useful for our purpose, namely, the 
destroyers, are the least likely to be spared in useful 
numbers, for the excellent reason that they will be wanted 
for the same purpose nearer home, and those that can 
most easil}' be spared are the least suited to assisting our 
immediate needs. For both attack and defence, therefore 
we must rely upon ourselves alone. But there are two 
other kinds of material help in which the United States 
can render services as a belligerent that it was 
impossible she could render as a neutral. She can 
first seize and put upon the ocean some scores of 
German steamers now interned upon the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts and in her other possessions. 
Excluding the monster liners, this step would increase 
the Allied tonnage by between three and four hundred 
thousand tons. It would, in other words, almost 
jnake good the losses suffered in tlie last two months' 
submarine campaign. Next a great national effort might 
be made to push on with the construction of new tonnage. 
.\lready \ery encouraging accounts ha\e reached us of 
the progress mad<^ with the new standardised types, 
and it is said that qinte early in the summer deliveries 
of ships will begin which will add a million tons to 
America's shipping before many months are past. 
America has the vards, the men, the material and, above 
e\-erything, a genius for organising rapid production on a 
gigantic scale. It is not difficult to believe that when the 
stimulus of war adds a new energy to whatever forces 
are driving now very amazing results indeed will follow. 
These two factors, the seizure of interned German ships 
and the production of new American ships, may well 
prove decisi\e, if the U boat campaign, now that it is 
rid of humanitarian scruple, should gain very greatlj' in 
intensity and success. 
.•\nd, iinally, of course, America can relieve the belli- 
gerents of ' a considerable embarrassment in finance. 
Hitherto the negotiations of foreign loans in the ordinary 
course has been E^ltogether forbidden in the American 
markets, on the ground that such proceedings are un- 
neutral. A ^•ery limited amo«nt of borrowing has been 
pernutted for the sake of stcad3ing the exchange, and 
even this has been seriously hampered by the limitations 
that the Federal Reser\'e Board have imposed upon the 
bankers and financial in.stitutions, who were willing 
enough to finance the actual purchases that the .Allies 
are making from .;\merican farmers and manufacturers. 
At the present time, even without the active co-operation 
of the national government, the witlidrawal of all restric- 
tions would be a material help. If Congress thought fit 
to go further and make the national purse available to 
the Allies, all financial difficulties of the war would be 
at an end. 
But it will be noted that, in enumerating these 
possible chrect services that America may render, 1 ha\e 
not mentioned one that will be of direct assistance to 
us in our main business, which after all is fighting. And 
for some months, at any rate, the principal value of the 
breach, between Germany and the Great Neutral nmst 
be the enormous discouragement that it must inflict 
upon the Germans, the enormous satisfaction which the 
other ci\ilised people of the world feel in seeing the 
United States at last making common cause with them. - 
Arthuk Poli-E^ 
