February 15; T917 
LAND & WATER 
From the slope of the spur whicli had just been con- 
quered below summit A, the main road, with tjje ruined 
farm of Baillescourt to the south of it, is rmder direct 
observation and, on the far side of the little river, the 
whole of the ruins of Grandcourt. 
(- It was clear, when this situation had been reached, that 
the enemy must do one of three things : Recover the lost 
ground on the rising fields above Beaucourt ; failing this, 
hang on to Grandcourt until he lost it, at a great cost to 
himself, but presumably at a heavy cost also to his 
opponent ; or, lastly, with the object of economising his 
men, abandon Grandcourt voluntarily. 
The enemy conunand clearly decided for the first ot 
these courses, and an attempt was made to recover the 
ground lost to the British east of Beaucourt, which loss 
had put the position of Grandcourt into such peril. 
Therefore, upon Sunday the 4th and Monday the 5th, no 
less than six counter-attacks were delivered, starting, it 
may be presumed, from the double trench which runs 
down the slope of the hill on to the Ancre. I have no 
authority for saying that the attack was delivered from 
this double trench save the deduction from the despatch 
which speaks of an ad\'ance of 500 yards — a distance 
which exactly' accounted for the pushing of the line up to 
this double trench but not for the capjture of it. 
All these six counter-attacks delivered on these two 
days failed. The British consolidated their new-taken 
positions, and even made a certain number of prisoners. 
It" was upon the Monday night between February 
5th and 6th that the enemy came to the decision to 
abandon Grandcourt as a result of this failure ; and 
before Tuesday morning the main enemy trench running 
in a V-shape up and across the Grandcourt spur from the 
neighbourhood of the Ancre to, as it would appear, the 
neighbourhood of the cemetery, was volvmtarily aban- 
doned by the enemy. That is, he gave up a salient 
trench, if I am not mistaken, of about three-quarters of a 
mile in length. 
On Tuesday, the British forces pushed forward and 
occupied tJiis abandoned trench without opposition, or, 
at any rate, with only slight opposition. The British 
were now right over (irandcourt with direct observation 
everywhere, and it was clear that the place was not in- 
tended to be held. When night fell, that is, the night 
between Tuesday and \\'ednesday, the 6th and 7t]i 
of the month, the German force in the ruins of (Grand- 
court was witlidrawn up the \allcy towards little Mirau- 
mont, and on the Wednesday the British entered the 
place. Upon the same day, and apparently towards the 
evening of that day, or towards the night, that is, in the 
night between the 7th and 8th, Wednesday and Thurs- 
day, Baillescourt Farm was taken, and by the end of the' 
week the whole of the German salient here had been 
flattened out. 
The action creates a new salient, less pronounced, but 
ob\-ionsly lending itselt to attack and formed by the much 
more high and almost level ground which lies cast of Pys 
and hides the old gun positions in the valley of the Ancre 
below. . Further, it gives a full view of Miraumont and, 
on a narrow angle, but a useful one, a view right up the 
\alley of the Upper Ancre to a point north-west of Pys. 
It is clear that if further movement occurs in our 
favour in this region a very great deal will depend 
upon the fate of that hjgh ground at A immediately 
above Baillescourt Farm, which is still in the enemy's 
hands. If that height be taken, several things follow as a 
consequence. 
In the iirst place, all the complex of trenches which 
render the Serre position so formidable will be made a 
sharp and diflicult salient under lire from three sides. 
In the second place, there will, as I have already said, 
be direct vision over a very great extent of country to the 
north, direct observation thus obtained for the first time 
over those gi^eat spaces of roUing land, the heart of which 
is the junction of Achiet le Grand, and the main gun 
positions in which are probably hidden in the valley of 
Puysieux. 
In the third place it will be impossible for the enemy 
to establish concealed positions in the valley of the Upper 
Ancre behind P3's. From the top of this hill one. sees 
everything. Not that it is higher than the ground to the 
north and north-west — it is not ; but that it commands 
all the Ancre valley, and is up on the plateau to the north 
where are discovered open sweeps of rolling ground. 
■ I may be exaggerating the value of direct obser\ation, 
for I say again that only those upon the spot, and only 
those with recent experience, can give the proper e.xtra 
weight to direct obser\'ation from the ground as con- 
trasted with observation from the air. But it is difficult 
to believe that the possession of such a height as that 
across which the so-called " Swan " Trench of the enemy 
runs, would not change all the conditions of this region. 
It is difficult to believe that if this height were held Serre 
would not be in danger on the one hand, and Miraumont 
within the British grasp upon the other. 
J^ut all this is merely a description of one little piece 
of ground and of sundry movements upon it, which do 
not pretend to be decisive even in the smallest local sense 
of that word. The real lesson of all such movements 
is the power of the British in the great concave formed 
by the Somme offensive to act locally almost at will, and 
the information they are gaining of the enemy's power 
of resistance ; such action in its turn being permitted by 
the frost, which is all in our favour. 
This power of action has been further exemplified at 
another point on the further side of the curve, 15,000 
yards away, for the height of ground in front of Sailly 
has also fallen to a local advance. It has been again 
exemplified in a more recent success a.apainst the foot of 
the hill of Serre. 
A German Version of Warlencourt 
There has reached this country through neutral sources 
the (ierman account of the fight on the Butte de Warlen- 
court towards the end of the battle of the Somme, and 
their description, of the forces , which, held that height 
against the Australian attack, with the result. 
When I say " the German account," I do not mean, of 
course, the real view of the (Jerman Higher Command, 
but the account they have put forward for neutrals. 
The first part of this account— as pro\'ided for neutral 
judgment— consists in the statement that the effort under- 
taken had for its objective Bapaun;e. This, of course, 
is perfectly true in the sense that if an attack so late in 
the season had attained unexpected success, Bapaume 
would have been reached. But it is not put in this way. 
The account provided for neutrals makes of Bapaume' a 
particular strategic point, the rcachiftg.o-f which would, 
in some unexplained way, have had immediate and far- 
reaching consequences. 
So put, of course, the statement is nonsense. The main 
object of all these great actions is to.coihp'el a general 
retirement and failing this to exhaust the enemy in a 
greater proportional degree than one is exhausted one- 
self. The reaching of Bapaume would not in itself have 
compelled a general retirement oh' the "enemy's line, but 
it would have been a further extension of liis concave 
front and therefore a further strain upon him. When, 
how, or by action at what spot the point of rupture may 
be provoked can never be stated beforehand. 
The enemy has always, however, tried to play upon 
this rather natural tradition which vaguely associates the 
name of a place with any strategic mo^■ement. In a great 
siege of this Isind any sector upon the siege line is merely 
a sector, whether it has a ruined town behind it or not. 
In a war of movement and with the old • artillery, any 
considerable town a little behind a front was a magazine, 
a fiodal point of communications, and, if it were fortified, 
an opportimity for holding back a larger number of your 
opponents with a smaller nimiber of your own men. 
Bapaume no more means this to-day than Verdun meant 
it. It is simply the name of some ruins. The ridge 
which runs north-westward from Bapaimie has certainly a 
tactical value, for it dominates the whole countrj'. 
Bapaume itself is less important than any one of the 
. railway junctions in its neighbourhood. 
There is, nevertheless, a military value in spreading a 
false impression of- this kind, and that military value 
consists in the compelling of one's enemy for political 
reasons to act in a fashion which purely military 
