LAND & WATER 
February 15,. 1917 
clomeat of surprise in them in the unexpected weight ol 
gun power developed by the enemy at their openini,'. 
This was particularly true of the opening of the Trentino 
offensive. It had been impossible to " observe in the 
mountains the full concentration of heavy artillery that 
had been going on for two months. It was known to be 
in progress, but its scale was not appreciated until the 
intensive hre began. There was a further clement of 
surprise in the exceedingly successful, smooth and rapid 
railway work of the ItaUan General Staff when they 
mo\ed a large army, partly new, from east to west anci 
destroyed the .\ustrian plan last June. 
At the opening of the Sommc there was, upon the 
Allied side, a double element of surprise. First, the enemy 
by his own recent confession, did not appreciate the 
strength of the French concentration to the south of the 
English, and secondly (also according to his own recent 
confession), he did not appreciate what would be the 
weight of the English hre. 
There was surprise, and successful surprise of a sort, 
in the Franco-Serbian move which disengaged Monastir. 
The Allies had been checked in the open plain of the 
Cerna, and the enemy calculated that he could have still 
less success to the east in the mountains beyond the 
river. The French command worked upon the contrary- 
theory. They acted (after their check in the open) upon 
the theory that the mountains to the east, though they 
would have proved an obstacle superior to the trenches 
in the plain in old days would, und-^r modern conditions, 
be more vulnerable, because it was more dihicult to pre- 
pare artificial cover in them and also, perhaps; because 
the effect of field artillery for that hard ground was 
greater. .\t any rate, the mountain belt was cleared and 
the Monastir positions turned by their left. They would 
not have been so turned had not the Germans command- 
ing the Bulgarians overestimated their power of resist- 
ance in the hills 9,nd thus suffered the consequences of a 
surprise. 
A capital example of surprise due to the first appear- 
ance of intensive artillery preparation upon tlie new 
scale was the breaking of the Russian front in Galicia 
upon May ist, 1915, the foundation of the great 
enemy advance through Poland. Here the concen- 
tration of the enemj- was perfectly well known as was his 
point of attack. But what was not allowed for on the 
Allied side was the new weight of fire, which the enemy 
was about to de\-elop. The highly successful stroke of 
Brussiloff a year later in Volhynia contained an element 
of surprise of another sort. So far as we can judge the 
surprise here consisted in the element of time. The 
enemj- did not appreciate how rapidly the new Russian 
armies had proceeded with their equipment. 
^\'e can see then from these examples and from 
numerous other smaller ones in the course of the cam- 
paign, that the element of surprise in war, though it has 
largely changed in quality, remains essentially present ; 
and will certainly be present on one side or other and 
probably upon both in the great shock upon the e\e of 
which we stand. What it will be we cannot say. The 
enemy has prepared one or two sorts of surprises (which 
ha^"e missed fire) in the shape of rumour. He ga\e it out 
that he was concentrating for a \iolation oi Swiss tcrri- 
torj' and later for a \iolation of Dutch territory, but no 
competent person paid any attention to these rumours, 
for they were spread too crudelj'. Surprise will be present 
both upon his side and upon ours, but in what form no 
general observer can predict or even conjecture. 
There is, however, one form of surprise which we know 
that the enemy has it in his jjower to usi-, and it is of 
peculiar importance that we should be on our guard against 
it, for its effect will not be military — the soldiers ha\c 
discounted it long ago — but may, if we are foolish, be 
considerable with ci\ilians and the Allied public at large. 
This form of surprise is the production of unexpected 
numbers in the field. 
We know the number of divisions which the German 
Empire had deployed upon its two fronts when the 
fighting in Roumania was brought to an end by the 
Russian resistance upon the Putna-Sereth line. We also 
know, to within a small margin of error, the number of 
men there were in depots last November — about Ooo.ooo. 
We also know the nmnber of men obtainable (short of 
Polish recruitment) as releases from hospital and by the 
calling up of the \ery youngest recruits a\ailablc. This 
source would, before next August, produce some 400,000 
more, and at a pinch, 200,000 of these might be scraped 
together before March. The losses during the last month 
have been small. For a month before that they have 
been far below the normal with all these di\-i!?ions save the 
dozen or so on the Roumanian front. 
On paper, therefore, there is nothing to prevent the 
enemy from producing 25 or even by special arrange- 
ments, ,;o new divisions, when he reappears for his last 
offensive upon a chosen point. The mere numbers of 
men under training in the depots three months ago are 
the equi\alent of .;o full divisions. Of course, he 
would not use them all up. He must leave a large number 
for drafts. There is also the mechanical difficulty arising 
from the fact that he cannot make a di\-ision in this phase 
of the war out of the worst material alone. He must mix 
the older and better material with the last dregs of re- 
cruitment obtainable. But the point to seize is that 
the enemy may perfectly well, if he chooses, sacrifice the 
future, and to shorten, the war against his own ultimate 
interests perhaps, produce a formidable new force in his 
last offensive. He will do either, because he thinks it 
the best chance out of several desperate chances, or 
because he thinks it will have a certain required effect 
upon his population at liome ; or because he wishes to 
produce a corresponding effect upon general opinion 
among his opponents, or, for all these reasons combined. 
I am not saying that he will produce this large accession 
to the number of his divisions. I am only saying that he 
can do so if he chooses to hypothecate his late summer 
drafts. Or (to use a more accurate metaphor) if he chooses 
to anticipate his remaining income. The two things we 
have tokeepsteadily in mind should he play this card are, 
first, that by no contrivance whatsoever can be restore 
numerical superioritx' to his own side. Secondly, that 
if we allow ourselves to be disturbed or even astonished 
by so simple and feasible a policy on his part, we are 
deliberately weakening ourselves in the struggle. 
I do not know what weight such words as these 
may have. For what they are worth and as a plain 
national duty at this moment I would emphasise them 
as strongly as possible. The malice of some, the 
ignorance of very many more, will play into the 
enemy's hands if upon the production of these con- 
siderable numbers in the near future the enemy succeeds 
in making civilian opinion quarrel with exact military 
calculation. If people go about saying : " The state- 
ment with- regard to the enemy's reserves was 
obviously under-estimated. He has produced enormous 
armies unexpectedly," they will be doing the very worst 
thing possible for the Alliance and for their country. 
The enemy has nothing more than the man-power which 
we ha\'e carefully noted, with exact statistics, for now 
eighteen months, and the resources of which have been 
proved to correspond- with those statistics again and 
again. I only wish I could underline that truth daily 
from the date upon which these words are written to the 
moment when the shock comes. -H. Belloc; 
There is no class who has done better work for the country 
during tlie war than the " Specials." Thcj' are for the most 
l>art busy men getting into years, who have given up 
leisure and sleeping hours after the day's work is over in 
order to tramp the streets and country lanes in all sorts of 
weather. They have been held up to ridicule, chaffed merci- 
lessly and honour has passed them by. But slowly they are 
coming into their own for the service which they have silently 
rendered has been invaluable. .\nd now they are finding 
their way into print. Two Ycarx with lite " Specials " (The 
St. Catherine] 'rcss. is.), is a slight book, but it is ])acked full 
of good stories. It ti-lis of the " Special's " life in the right 
spirit, simply, without brag, ignoring the hardsliips and laying 
stress on the humorous. It also contains excellent advice 
and homely wisdom. We have not space for the 
stories- -the book should be read ; but we may quote the 
following to give some idea of the class of men who compose 
the Special Constabulary, a force which has helped greatly to 
preserve peace and order after dark for over two years: 
" The personnel of our secction of the Force is interesting and varied, 
and inchides stockbrokers, a master carpfnlcr, civil engineers, siir- 
\ cyors, architects, merchants, a chartered accountant, market gardeners, 
.1 builder, artist, barrister, greengrocer, solicitor, butcher, dentist, 
plumber, journali.'^t, city clerks, local .tradesmen, and several who 
would bo described on the 'Charge Sheet ' as of 'independent means.' 
,uul it speaks volumes for the spirit of the I'orce that tljcsc men of 
totally different callings and social position have worked harmoniously 
together for over two years." 
