February 22, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
of what was formerly enemy territory in Allied occupa- 
tion. 
So much for the map. Now let us consider the nature 
of the populations affected. 
The core of the war morally is the national feeling of 
the great belligerents. Germany suffers politically wlien 
a true part of German soil is held by Russians. I-iussia, 
when any part of Russia proper is so held, and France, 
when any part of France is so held, as would Britain, if 
any part of Britain were so held. As a political pheno- 
menon, therefore, very great weight indeed attaches to 
the occupation of even so small a belt of French territory 
as that now held by the enemy. Such weight attached 
to the comparatively narrow belt of East Prussia, which 
the Russians were able to hold, that the German autho- 
rities modified all their plans in order to release this little 
corner and drive the invader out. You would have had 
exactly the same phenomenon in Italy had the enemy 
by accident, or as the result of a later successful advance, 
occupied such a town as Vicenza or Verona, or any 
portion of the Venetian Plain. But it is not of such 
moment to the war that what may be called the 
" marshes " of Poland have been the scene of successive 
advances and retirements. It is of immense moment 
to the Pohsh people, of course, and it will ultimately 
have a great effect upon the settlement that the Polish 
people have experienced the abominations of Prussian 
rule extended from the long martyred Prussian pro- 
vinces over those of Warsaw and the rest. But it does 
not immediately affect the nerve, so to speak, of any of the 
principal belligerents. What is occupied, is what has 
long been disputed territory. In France it is otherwise. 
The German occupation of Lille and Valenciennes and 
Rcthel and Mezieres is the touching of a nerve. It is of 
prodigious effect politically upon the war, and of what 
eftect we wilt consider in a moment. 
The chief advantage to the enemy of the situation is 
that no part of his territory proper is administered by an 
opponent or suffers from an opponent's exactions. Even 
Hungary, the most menaced of the group against us, is 
free from actual invasion, while the strips of Austrian 
territory in Italian hands are, even including Gorizia, 
Italian in character. Most important of all, the German 
Empire, which is the life of the great conglomeratioii we 
are lighting (though representing only half its man-power) 
is fighting everywhere upon alien soil. The German 
citizen is able to regard the position' as one of " con- 
quest," although the term properly applies only to a 
settlement, the result of war, and not to an occupation. 
His newspapers are full of details which emphasise this 
state of affairs ; his pride is nourished by anecdotes of 
brutahty or patronage exercised over those whom he 
has been taught to regard as his inferiors. This is all 
very evident and a very great pohtical asset, especially 
in such a country as the modern German Empire, where 
opinion is entirely directed by suggestion and by official 
suggestion at that, and where the sense of reality, 
especially in international affairs, is lacking. 
It is a due appreciation of this political factor which 
has made everyone of good judgment incline to the belief 
that the enemy would not dare shorten his line in the 
West, however much he may have desired to do so 
for military reasons. He cannot politically afford to do 
so, and he has hung on until it is too late. 
The same, in a different fashion, is true in the East. 
A retirement of any kind would have such disastrous 
consequences upon German opinion at home that he is 
bound to hold his fronts. That is the military reaction, 
to his disadvantage, of the political advantage just 
mentioned. Is there any political disadvantage attach- 
ing to such a state of affairs ? 
It may sound a little paradoxical to say so, but I 
believe it to be true that some disadvantage attaches to 
the occupation of enemy soil in the last stages of a war, 
especially if that occupation is subject to blunders and 
meets with a very strong opposition. It is true to say 
that Carthage was weaker for her Italian position before 
the Metaurus, and it is true to say that Napoleon was 
weaker for his Spanish position. 
What the feeling among the Allies would be, and 
particularly among the French, after 2| years of terribly 
expensive war if the siege had been conducted upon 
German soil, it is impossible to say, though all my 
personal judgment would inclfiie to the tenacity of the 
Allies even in that case. But what it is with one whole 
Department occupied and portions of several others 
occupied, with slave raids and executions and robberies 
and worse going on upon French soil, we all know. It 
makes any thought of compromise impossible. Such 
a situation might not be to the disadvantage of a military 
power the relative strength of which was increasing with 
time and which was on the road to victory, but Germany 
is in the exactly opposite position. She has admitted wh|it 
is after all obvious enough, that victory has failed h#. 
And under these circumstances to be under the necessiw, 
as it were, to exasperate your opponent, is not an advan- 
tage, it is a disadvantage. Napoleon, trying to hold 
the Pyrenees in 1812, would have been in a very different 
position in 1813. Trying to hold Spain or portions of 
Spain weighed in the balance against his military position 
as a whole. One of the subsidiary points which the 
enemy is always making is that the zone of destruction 
being entirely upon alien soil, is entirely to his advantag'e. 
He is perpetually hammering in this point, especially 
with regard to the French front, and repeating it over and 
over again in his domestic press and that of neutrals. 
Rheims is half destroyed. Arras has gone, the beauty of 
Soissons is wasted ; innumerable villages from the Yscr 
to the Jura mountains are nothing now but ruins, and 
none of those villages are German, but nearly all are 
French. There is no doubt that the German authorities 
regard this as a point entirely in their favour. St, 
Vaast, one of the most beautiful things in Europe, has 
disappeared ; the glass of Rheims has gone, and its roof 
and even the fabric is in peril. On the other hand, the 
stained glass of the new German railway station in Metz 
is still there in all its beauty, and so is that of the new 
German railway station at Aix. The new west front, of 
Metz Cathedral, which it would be a charity to destroy, 
and which contains a startlingly life-like statue of ihe 
German Emperor, is intact. So is the big new Beer Hall 
near the "Cathedral at Strassburg. 
Whether this is a political asset or no only the future 
can determine. It is obvious that if the war were to end 
in a peace which still left Germany unoccupied and 
Prussia in the saddle, it would be a very great political 
asset. Future generations would see clearly that Prussia 
had been able to inflict a terrible wound upon the 
physical nature of an opponent, and had suffered no 
retribution. 
There is something of the same sort on the Italian 
front. It is conceivable that by bombardment from the 
air or from the sea the Austrians could destroy things 
of immeasurable value to mankind and glorious to Italy. 
There is nothing of the sort on the other side within 
reach of the Italians upon their present line. 
But it is with this as with the question of invasion 
just discussed ; the effect of such things upon ' your 
opponent is that of a spur. He may not win, but his 
determination to win is vastly increased, and if you are 
upon the whole on the losing side it is a disadvantage 
for you to have applied that spur, for it will make hira 
the more ruthless when he can act in his turn. 
II. — Political Constitution of the Two Parties 
The second political consideration is the nature of the 
populations at war. 
'The popular phrases used up and down Europe are very 
misleading here, although they come from the recognition 
of what is perfectly true — the preponderance of the 
German Empire in the Alliance against us. The F'rench, 
the British and the Russian publicist always speak 
of defeating " Germany," and even the Itahans, though 
the troops opposed to them are entirely Austro-Hungarian, 
fill a great part of their descriptions with the " (jerman " 
menace. This is because, but for North German}', or to be 
acfurate, but for Prussia, which is the master of North Ger- 
many, neither would the war have broken out nor would it 
have taken the character it has. The conception of a 
sudden spring .upon Europe was Prussian. The dis- 
regard of treaties was Prussian. The puerile confusion o) 
brutality with strength is uniquely Prussian. The 
very blunders have hgen Prussian. The three deci- 
sive blunders of the Marne, Verdun and the Trentino; in 
particular the latter, which, though carried out by 
