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LAND & WATER 
February 22, 1917 
Operations on the Ancre 
By Edmund Dane 
TO gain an unobscurcd view of the operations 
on the Ancre it is advisable to clear away two 
misconceptions. Both probably still have a 
certain currency. 
The first is that the battle of the Ancre is distinct 
from the battle of the Somme ;. the second that ihe 
battle of the Somme was only a qualified victory so far 
a!S the British forces were concerned. 
It has been stated that the battle of the Somme ended 
in October, and there was a pause of several weeks 
before, in the middle of November, the'attack was launched 
which resulted in the capture of Bcaucourt and of 
Beaumont Hamel. This pause seems to have given rise 
to the belief that we had started afresh on a new enter- 
prise. 
The concurrent notion that the battle of the Somme 
was in some sense a disappointment — and it is a notion 
which seems to have received countenance in quarters 
where a sounder opinion might have been expected to 
prevail— doubtless^ originated in the assumption that 
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the, object was a " break through." But tlie objective 
qf the battle of the Somme, speaking in the strictly 
, military sense, was to carry our* line forward so that it 
would open up a flank attack on the enemy's fortified front 
and at the same time leave us in a situation of security' 
■, against any outflanking counter-attack. 
Now that military aim was more important than any 
" break through." For if the aim could be attained 
it would give iis a tactical advantage so marked that the 
enemy's jortificd front north of the Somme could hi crushed 
in detail to ivhatever extent might be judged necessary and 
that, too, in spite of any effort of defence the enemy 
might put forward. 
In this great operation, and it has been, looking at it 
from the soldier's standpoint, one of the greatest in the 
war, it was the first steps that were of necessity the most 
».GQStly. The attack, save to the south of the Somme, 
was no surprise. ,The enemy was f,ully prepared for it 
and met it witli his most powerful opposition. In spite 
of that the military aim was completely carried out. To- 
day, north of the Somme, -the old eneniy front is out- 
flanked or " turned," and our own new and outflanking 
line, resting on the Somme, is secure against any save a 
frontal attack for the reason that the French advance 
south of the river was carried as far forward as the 
advance to the north. The aim of that advance south 
of the river was thus to co\-er the flank of the northern 
line. The " gain of territory," the popular and news- 
paper presentment of the thing, was merely incidental. 
It must be evident to anybody who troubles to reflect 
that carrying the French line forward a few miles to 
the south of the Somme does not affect the issue of the 
war even appreciably. That, nevertheless, was sup- 
posed to be the most striking part of the success, and it was 
a success in the true sense, inasmuch as it covered the 
flank of the line north of the river. 
When an operation is so carried out that the aim 
in view is completely realised, and when, as a result, 
a tactical ?.dvantage of the first moment accrues, it seems 
strange that anyone should for a moment hesitate to 
think of the operation as successful. 
The operations on the Ancre are not only the sequel 
of those on the Somme, but an integral part of the same 
movement. 
The effect will be the more readily appreciated by 
looking at the sketch which accpmpanies these notes. 
The old enemy line ran from just outside the Faubourg 
St. Saveur at Arras to the fcast of Albert as shown. The 
present enemy line runs from Arras through the points 
marked .A B and C, to near Peronne. From A through B 
to C this line forms a salient, 25 kilometres across the base 
from A to C, 15 kilometres in depth from A to I). The 
distance from A to B is 18 kilometres : from B to C, 
following sinuosities, 20 kilometres. The effect of this 
salient, that is its depth in relation to its base, will be 
best grasped by looking at it from within, say, from 
the point D. It will then be seen how serious is the 
problem presented by its defence. 
Now, what is the tactical advantage that accrues to 
the attack upon it ? Ihe advantage primarily is that of 
bringing to biar an overwhelming iveight of gunfire. In 
the sketch possible gun positions, of course purely 
hypothetical and for the purpost of illustrating the 
point, are indicated by the dotted line XX. A position 
like Serre, for example, is exposed to a concentration of 
gunfire ranging through a full half circle ; positions 
like Gommecourt, Miraumont and Pusieux to a con- 
centration of gunfire ranging through five-si.xths of a 
half circle, or 150 degrees of arc. Such concentrations 
are crushing. 
The attack can select any one of these points for the 
purpose of smashing it at will. And it will bi cbserved, 
looking at the salient from within, that no correspondingly 
effective artillery reply is possible. 
The overwhelming play thus afforded to the attacking 
guns means a number of things. It means (a) destruction 
f)f defences [b) serious casualties [c) guns of the defence 
put out of action ((/) communications barred or broken 
up. It also means that the attack under the cover 
of such concentrations can launch assaults with 
relatively slight loss, and with the assurance of success, 
and that successful counter-attack is out of the question 
because the drtillery concentration must inevitably crush it. 
These are the broad features of the situation dis- 
entangled from details of local topography. The battle 
of the Somme was fought to gain this vast advantage. 
Who in the face of it will say that the battle of the Somme 
was not wArth while ? 
For it should be noted that the tactical advantage is 
neither accidental nor transient. Though we have the 
enemy on the hip he cannot help himself. Now that 
liis front has been opened the concentration is fastened 
upon him for as long as he clings to that front. 
Consider • how recent events have borne out these 
