February 22, 19 17 
LAND & WATER 
deductions. Three activities during the past week may 
be referred to. The iirst was the attack in which the 
British seized a length of enemy's defences just to the 
south of the Serre. Serre is at the Western end of a 
small plateau, which extends eastward until it dips 
down into the valley of the Ancre. At the bottomof this 
dip lies Miraumont. The distance between Miraumont «. 
and Serre is 4 kilometres. South of the plateau there is 
a west and east depression. 
To cross this depression and seize enemy defences 
on the farther side would, not very long ago, have ap- 
peared next to impossible. But the attack south of Serre 
was carried out with comparatively slight 'loss. The 
guns, focussed on the defence, overpowered it. 
The assault opened the way for that on the ppsitions 
covering Miraumont. The main point here was Hill 
127 north of Baillescourt farm. Hill 127 is a sort of 
hump on the plateau just before it begins to dip towards . 
the Ancre \-alley. At the same time an assault was 
launched on the positions covering Petit Miraumont 
on the opposite side of the Ancre. That hainlet lies 
in a bay of the hills, sho\\n last week in Mr. Belloc's 
sketch of the terrain. The Grandcourt salient, which 
before it was flattened out was two kilometres long on 
its western, face, served among other purposes to stiffen 
the defcnc^ of Serre and Miraumont by covering the 
ieprcssion with a cross-fire. That advantage snatched 
from the enemy\ the positions dominating Miraumont 
ind Petit Miraumont could be and were seized. ' 
Cost and Results 
Miraumont is the meeting place of six secondary roads 
which to the enemy must have been of considerable 
value. It is far from surprising therefore that he this 
time attempted a counter-attack, and with a strong 
force. But now happened what apparently was one of 
the most unlooked-for incidents of the war. The counter- 
attack was crushed ivithotd the British suffering ■ any 
casualties : the enemy loss must have been heavy, other- 
wise the attac'k ^vould assuredly have been 'pushed home. 
The assaulting colimms, however, were swept away. 
Of course, it is not the destruction of the enemy 
defences which signifies, but the destruction of the enemy 
forces and the cripphng of the enemy equipment. The 
seizure of positions is the means to those ends. 
Events prove that the losses both of men and of material 
inflicted on the defence in these operations continues 
to be out of comparison heavier than those incurred _ 
by the attack. 
This is due to the ability to give the guns full play, 
but it is not due to that alone. It is also due in part to 
an infantry whose ascendancy is unquestionable. A 
bombardment, whatever its weight, and however 
marked its skill, would not shift the enemy from his 
positions. Such blows have to be followed up and 
finished off, and it is the power to follow them up 
■M\(\ finish them off which enables the guns to go forward 
taking target after target. The guns support and cover 
the infantry and pave the way ; the infantry open new 
doors for the guns. Each arm plays into the hands of 
the other. As regards skilful co-operation the present 
British Army has learnt much. 
It may be asked how long this sort of thing is to go on, 
and what is tojbe the effect of it ? 
The effect, or rather the effects, are two, and in this 
connection it is sufficient to speak in the present tense , 
and leave future events to take care of themselves. 
The first effect is the actual reduction of the enemy's 1 
strength ; the second the obligation imposed upon him j 
of cmj)loying larger numbers of men to hold his front. 
It is a ruinous thing to fight a prolonged offensive 
battle and at the same time to incur markedly heavier ^, 
losses in men and in material ; and it is a ruinous thing .,, 
at any time to fight at a notable military disadvantage. ^, 
What may be called the wounded part of the enemy 
line, let the labour bestowed upon fresh defences be 
what it may, cannot be so hard a crust as that which 
has been and is being broken through. That wounded 
part is extending. How is it to liold should there be 
thrown upon it an assault like that which has sufficed to 
break the harder crust ? Evidently only by adding to the 
weight of the defending forces. 
Now if there is one thing reasonably probable in the 
war it is that the enemy will go to any lengths rather 
than see his front pierced by the British. In my opinion 
— I may of course be wrong, though I think I have in 
this matter something like the correct measure of 
German psychology — the enemy to pre\'ent that will 
take elsewhere very extreme risks. But if he should do 
that it will (i) inflame his casualties on the British 
front, and (2) handicap him elsewhere to a corresponding 
extent. It may \'ery well handicap him elsewhere to an 
extent that will be fatal. '' »;> 
There is a danger here of another misconception 
and it is as well perhaps to meet it by anticipation. %_ 
Suppose by taking such risks, and at an inflamed cost 
in men and in materials, the enemy should prevent the 
British from " breaking through " in the popular sense 
of the phrase. Would it be said that the British arniy 
had incurred defeat } It might be, and yet nothing would 
be more palpably and even preposterously untrue. 
Perhaps the best way to clarify the point is to fall 
back upon an analogy. Not one Englishman in ten 
living at the time of Welhngton's operations in the 
Peninsula saw the purpose or utility of^ them. Yet 
what was the outcome ? They compelled Napoleon 
to employ in the Peninsula troops which but for these 
operations he would have employed in other parts of 
Europe, and they engulfed half-a-mi!lion of his best 
men. That is to say they had precisely the effects that 
the present British operations in France are having— r- 
they reduced his strength and they imposed extra and 
heavy obligations. And what was the consequence? 
They made his Moscow disaster irreparable. 
It is precisely the British operations in France which 
have made the enemy's indecisive, we may say for all 
military purposes sterile, offensives in Russia, at Verdun 
and in Koumania, disasters which he cannot repair ; 
and have hung the consequences round his neck like 
so many millstones. 
The function of the British army in France is duaj. 
It is to wear the enemy down and to pin down an 
increasing total of his forces. It is not primarily to break 
through his front. It is to bring him to military ruin and 
hasten his economic and political collapse. That dual 
function the British army has been and' is discharging 
with unexampled efiiciency, and it is not in the least 
doubtful that the function will be discharged with 
higher efficiency yet. This may very justly be considered 
the crux of the war. 
German Attack in Champagne 
This event does not call for any very extended comment. 
It was a surprise attack. In that connection it resembled 
various enemy offensives, similarly local and similarly 
brief, which have been taking place lately at various 
points on the East front. Perhaps the most important of 
these surprise attacks within the last week or two, was 
the attempt against Gorizia. The motive appears on 
the whole to be political rather than military. One 
military purpose, howe^'er, can without much difficulty 
be assigned —that of keeping up the moral of the enemy 
troops by activity. The effect of the Ancre operations 
on the moral of thp German forces in France may very 
easily be exaggerated, but not even the most cautious 
judgment can exclude the serious impression that the 
continued and rising British ascendancy is bound to 
produce, and none but unreasonable pessimism would 
dehy it. The very brevity of the Champagne affair lends 
itself to this suggestion as to moral. A German victory of 
some sort was desirable, and to make sure that the attack 
would not lead to a repulse great care appears to have 
been taken that it should be wholly unexpected. That 
opinion is decidedly strengthened again by the contrast 
between the passing character of this surprise and the 
sustained character of our own operations. The contrast 
can hardly have failed to strike any close observer. In 
Germany the West front has notoriously earned an evil 
name, and in view of what appear to be the sinister 
rumours which have lately sprung up, it may very well 
have been considered imperative to " bill " a success. 
The inevitable suggestion that the attack was the be- 
ginning of the great German offensive on the West, 
duly put in an appearance, and perished of — shall we 
say ?— prematurity ? The loss of first line positions 
between the Butte de Mesnil and Maisojis de Champagne 
