10 
LAND & WATER 
February 22, 1917 
is not, for the present, very material, and the 
attack is quite unUkcly to have liad any effect on the 
disposition of thu French forces. 
Operations at Kut 
Tllerc is a biisinessHke air about Gcrncal Claude's 
investment of Kut which augurs well. As no operations 
can be brilliant that are not sound, so very often those 
which may seem to the ordinary public prosaic are those 
which receive and most deserve professional admiration. 
Tlie Tigris campaign has been considered until lately 
unfortunate. It is not certain, however, that later and 
more detached judgment will altogether accept that ver- 
dict. General Townshend was seemingly sent up to 
occupy Bagdad with one division. Even if he had 
reached Bagdad with such a force he could never have 
got away from it. (ieneral Townshend's obvious course 
was to fall back on Kut and hold the place as he did. In 
short he did the right thing all the way through. The 
mistake lay in not being prepared from the outset to 
support him there. Time and questions of shipping 
perhaps entered into the matter. The really imhappy 
feature of the business was the despatch of a force 
inadequate to effect his relief. It was worse than sending 
no force at all. Evidently that proceeding was the result 
of hurry. 
Whoever was responsible for the Turkish defences of 
Kut after its captun; had a good eye for essentials. 
Standing as the town does on a sharp bend of the river, 
it is little better than a tra]> unless the road to Bagdad 
be kept open. Conunand of the Dahra bend is command 
in effect of the road to Bagdad, which runs roughly 
parallel to the north-eastern reach of the bend, and is 
near enough to the ri\er to come within the range of- 
artillery,. This was the vital spot, and it had been 
covered by well-prepared defences. Feinting merely 
against the enemy works on the left or north bank, 
General JIaude threw the mass of his force in the first 
instance upon the defences between the Es Sinn position 
and the Shatt-el-Hai. It was a good mo\e, just because 
tlie enemy could not leave the Dahra bend denuded, and 
ne.xt, because the main attack east of the Shatt-cl-Hai 
was supported by an attack to the west of it. In a word 
the British commander skilfully dispersed the enemy 
strength while he concentrated his own. Having broken 
through east of the Shatt-el-Hai he was able to cross it 
and take the Dahra bend defences in flank. The seizure 
of the liquorice factory, an indispensable point d'appui, 
to all intents decided "matters, for that loss cut off the 
Turkish troops in the bend from their easiest and most 
direct access to Kut. Most of the survivors seem to 
ha\e been taken prisoners. 
On Tuesday the news wvas published that the British 
had made an assault on the Sanna-i-Yat position on the 
north bank, and had been repulsed by a Turkish counter- 
attack. It was apparent, however, from the enemy 
communique that the British attacking force was only 
one brigade. There is another part of the story yet to 
be told. 
German Preparations for 1917 
Germany is now and has been since October last*, in 
view of the campaign of iqxj; engaged on a gi-eat effort 
to increase her forces in the field. The increase aimed 
at— whether or not it will be fuUv realised is another 
matter — is believed to be .^15 divisions, on the new 
footing 675,000 men. An opinion with a claim to respect, 
supports if not the probability, at any rate, the possibility 
of the effort on the grounds (i) of the Universal Levy for 
War Service ; (2) of the labour recruited from Belgian 
drives ; and (3) of the effects of the recruiting in Poland. 
The last-named clement is not likely to account for much. , 
If such an additional force is raised it will, we may infer, 
consist of first the iQiq class of recruits ; secondly, of 
physically fit men between forty-five and fifty ; and 
tliirdly, of a final " comb out " of men of military ag(' 
hitherto kept back on work classed as indispensable. 
Having regard to the severity of preceding combings 
this element also is not likely to be considerable. The 
very young recruits and the elderly men will, there is 
little doubt, form the bulk of the embodiment. 
We must not, however, e.xpect the additional divisions to 
be formed wholly or mainly of these indifferent materials. 
On the contrary there will be, and there is doubtless now 
going on, a great deal of mi.xing up, a dilution of the 
forces on a large scale, so that the new and old divisions 
may as far as possible resemble one another. The active 
troop movements reported from Germany may be put 
down in great jjart to this process. 
It has been assumed that this embodiment will prolong 
the war, and it has also been assumed that it portends a 
general enemy offensive— " a great final effort for 
victory." , 
There are, however, some reasons for not accepting 
either of these assumptions, at all events too readily. 
To conclude thar the length of the war depends simply 
upon the enemy numbers in the field is to detach this 
factor of numbers from the political and economic back- 
ground, and the question of staying power, which amount 
m effect to the power of keeping the forces in the field 
afoot. The factor of numbers cannot be put into a 
watertight compartment in that way. If increase of 
numbers in the field trenches upon the ability to keep 
those forces going, it is evident that a measure which 
might tend to prolong the war in one direction may 
tend to shorten it in another. The support of an 
additional 675,000 men is a heavy extra strain, even if 
substitutes have been found for the labour of all of them. 
And the labour of Germany, weighted besides by the 
conditions of the blockade, has been drained more 
severely than that of any of the .\llied countries. Whether 
or not this embodiment will prolong the war, ought 
therefore for the present to be ti'eated as an open question. 
The assumption beforehand of an enemy offensive 
on a scale beyond anything yet known, rests on grounds 
extremely slender. We may presume quite safely that 
whenever the enemy thinks it to his advantage to attack, 
he will do it as he has always done. But to suppose 
that he will attack whether it be to "his advantage or 
disadvantage, is a phantasy. 
To this assumption, further, two rather serious dis- 
counts have to be applied. The first is that the burden 
of the war now borne by Germany is much larger than 
that cast upon any one of the countries of the Entente. 
Financially, Germany has, on her side, to meet the whole 
cost. She has to find also and to support four-fifths at 
least of the total enemy troops, and therefore to bear 
and to make up four-fifths of the wastage. More than 
that, and this is a point of capital importance, the obliga- 
tions of a defensive war have bzen proved by the operations 
on the Somme and by those in Volhynia to bs immensely 
more onerous than had been imagined before the theory 
of impregnate fronts broke down. It has been proved 
that no front is impregnable unless there is a mass of first 
class infantry at the back of it. The enemy weakness 
as compared with the Allies is in infantry. The need 
then for additional numbers on the part of Germany is 
an urgent need. It is so urgent indeed that we may well 
believe that staying power has had to be dealt with as 
wholly secondary. 
These considerations of the great proportionate weight 
of the war which Germany has to carry, audits unantici- 
pated obligations, hardly point to any squandering 
" general offensive." The offensive operations undertaken 
will most likely be inspired to no small extent by the 
motive of keeping the Germanic confederacy together. 
, Owing to the accommodation of tlie Royal Flying Corps 
Hospital for sick and wounded pilots and observers, at 37, 
Bryanston Square, which lias been wholly maintained by 
private contributions, being no longer adequate on account of 
the growth of the Corps, the development of aerial fighting, 
and the physical effects of constant tlyiiig at great altitude, 
it has become necessary to extend tlie existing accommoda- 
tion by acquiring additional premises, involving expenditure 
which it would not be possible to meet by further demands 
upon private generosity. It has been decided to make a 
public appeal for funds to carry on tlie work of the hospital, 
for it is felt, and we belit'vc rigiitly fflt, tiiat tlie public have 
nnly to be made aware of tlie liecd for the response to be 
unhesitating and immediate. The nation owes no deeper 
gratitude to any body of men than to the Royal Flying Corps, 
who, from the very beginning, have accepted every danger 
gladly and have done so much and at no light cost "to estab- 
lish British predominance over the Hun. 
