LAND & WATER 
March 8, 1917 
these it is only xaluable 731 proportion to the extent to 
which the observation post dominates the object of 
attack. But in this case intensive fire upon the trenches 
north and south of Monchy can now be under direct 
observation at less than 2, ,000 yards, and Monchy itself 
hes in an angle upon whii'Ji heavily converging fire can 
be directed. If Monchy were no more than a name or a 
geographical expression this, while meaning that the 
enemy might have to evac:uatc the ruined \illage, would 
mean no more. But MorLchy is much more than this. 
It is the key to the ridg?. It is the high extreme point 
of the ridge, and if the enemy is compelled to evacuate 
it, the ridge as a defensive system is in jeopardy. 
Beyond Monchy the land falls away northward and east- 
ward continually, and every successive retirement is 
overlooked by the advancin.-c; pursuit. 
We must not forget in this connection that though the 
enemy has had time to construct strong defensive lines 
behind his original position, he has not anything like 
the strength which the lal)>Tinth of trenches two years 
in construction gave him upon his old front, and at the 
same time he has in front of him an increasing weight of 
fire. Upon the whole, therefore, the chances are in 
favour of his not being able to hold continually this 
capital point, and consequently again, his permanent 
mastery of the Bapaume Ridge. More than that one 
cannot say. 
There has been some misunderstanding in the best 
recent WTiting upon this portion of the line with regard 
to the importance of Gommecourt, and some students 
of the war have spoken as though the enemy retirement 
from Gommecourt of itself put the key of the Bapaume 
ridge into British hands. This is not the case. Gomme- 
court and the spur running south from it towards Nightin- 
gale Wood is high ground, but it does not overlook 
Monchy. It is lower than Monchy. Monchy is the true 
key to the Bapaume Ridge so far as elevation is concerned, 
and though elevation in this siege war means very little 
more than power of direct observation in the immediate 
neighbourhood, that is of capital importance when one 
has a superiority of lire. 
Should the enemy be compelled to abandon the 
Bapaume Ridge (that he intends to do so at the present 
moment may be confidently denied ; that he may be 
compelled to do so is another matter), he immediately 
descends to ground which is increasingly unfavourable, 
and the reason of this is obvious from the nature of all 
this countryside. 
When you pass over the watershed di^^ding two' river 
systems, you naturally descend from higher to lower 
ground, but it by no means follows universalh* that 
a watershed is the best defensix'e position, in this 
district. If beyond the watershed upon the further 
side you have a number of exceptions to the 
general contours and a number of heights rising 
individually from the spurs, though as a whole 
the level is falling to the plain upon the further 
side, a defensive position taken up upon a chain of these 
subsidiary heights may be better than that upon the 
watershed itself. Indeed, there are very many cases in 
military geography of a watershed which is considerably 
lower than these secondary heights beyond it. The 
summits of nearly all our chalk ranges in England, for 
instance, are higher than the watersheds of the rivers in 
their districts. But in the case of the Bapaume Ridge 
the enemy would find no such advantage as he fell 
back northward and eastward. No matter where we 
suppose his line to be drawn it will be continuously 
overlooked, and he will hardly have a single observation 
post from which to counteract this domination of his line. 
Let us take two such hypothetical lines of retirement 
and see how they work out, referring the shading to the 
contours on Map I. 
Supposing he finds the salient of Monchy untenable 
and flattens out that salient to the line Ficheux-Ayette 
and so joins up with the original ridge at the Wood of 
Logeast, abandoning Blau-exdlle, Ronsart, Monchy, 
Bucquoi and Achiet. He has a trace here which is 
perfectly tenable as a mere trace, the salient being gradual 
and not exposed to any exceptional convergence of fire. 
But he has lost his olaservation. He is directly over- 
looked in front of Fichcux from Blaire\-ille Wood ; he 
has only one small isolated height (A) south of Ficheux, 
and half-way bet\veen that village and Boiry, to depend 
on ; a height directly seen by a similar height only a 
thousand yards away (which would be in his opponent's 
hands) at Hendcncourt. If, to avoid this nuisance he 
were to cover Hendencourt, he would have rising ground 
in front of him right up to Adinfer. If he tries to hold on 
to Adinfer and the Wood of Monchy he has not reduced 
his salient by anything worth while. It is the same a 
httle lower down at Ayette. He has an observation 
point on Hill 122 (B) where the windmill stands (or stood). 
But it is countered by a still higher point less than a mile 
away across the \alky, and there is a continual succession 
of rising ground beyond which dominates him until you 
get to Monchy itself. There is in this sector no line behind 
the present lintr which does not sacrifice his power of 
observation to the British. 
Take a second hypothesis which has been put forward 
by very competent students of this sector, and imagine 
him failing back to what is roughly the line of the Arras- 
Bapaume Road. Here again, if we neglect contours, 
the retirement will establish an excellent line ; indeed 
the best hne of all. The enemy dug in from his present 
trenches in the suburb of St. Saviour just outside Arras 
straight on to Bapaume and so on to Peronne, would have 
thoroughly straightened his line ; as is apparent in 
Sketch IV. 
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He would be suffering from no dangerous saUent any- 
where even of the slightest or flattest sort. But he would 
have sacrificed every single point of good observation 
on the whole 13 miles. He would be overlooked every- 
where. It is true that the country here is much flatter 
than it is a little more to the west ; posts do not dominate 
him as thoroughly as they do further to the west. But 
the trenches lie immediately opposite each other in a 
modern siege system, and though the domination Mould 
be slight it would be sufficient to put him everywhere in 
peril from an enemy possessing our present superiority 
of fire. 
It is for these reasons that one may conclude (within 
the Hmits of uncertainty attaching to all war), that the 
Bapaume Ridge is of serious and even vital importance 
to the enemy as he is now .situated, and that if he is 
compelled to abandon it, it will be the signal for an attack 
by him elsewhere. 
For this sector — upon which, without 'the least doubt, 
he is suffering the initiative of his opponent and is being 
compelled against his will to a rather perilous retirement 
--though it is the sector covering his main communica- 
tions and therefore one of high importance to him, is, 
after all, only one fragment of the long line between sea 
and the mountains which he has to defend, and upon 
any point of which he can concentrate for his last offen- 
sive. 
We know that such an offensive is contemplated, for the 
whole purport of every measure he has undertaken 
during the last two months must be its delivery — his 
refusal to come south in the Balkans, so far ; the halt — 
imposed upon him. indeed, but accepted— upon the 
