March 8, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
shortest line between the Bukovina and the Danube ; 
the analogy of all his past action — would convince us ; 
apart from ample other evidence which cannot, of its 
nature, be discussed. The Prussian never invents; 
he first copies others and then himself ; and this attach- 
ment to routine has not served him so badly in the 
last two hundred years that we can afford to ridicule 
it. It has very grave disadvantages, but it goes with 
the mass of highly detailed but slow preparation which 
is in his case synonymous with organisation. The enemy 
has certainly concentrated for a last offensive, but where 
it may be delivered, even a conjecture as to its theatre, 
is obviously no matter of discussion. 
The point for us to notice in connection with this pro- 
blem of the Bapaume Ridge is that if upon that very 
important sector- he finds himself embarrassed he will 
trust to the effect of his offensive elsewhere to deliver 
him. He has held these lines in the Artois strongly 
since the weather stopped the main battle, but not more 
strongly than was needed for mere defence, and if he has 
pared down his strength here to the limit of safety and 
has been compelled to successive losses of ground up to 
what is now obviously a danger point, he is the more 
obviously determining a chief blow elsewhere. It goes 
without saying that his power to deliver such a blow and 
to continue it is not untrammelled. He has a superior 
enemy before him who can forestall such a blow if he 
chooses, or allow it to be delivered first if he chooses, and 
the superiority of that initiative upon the part of the 
Alhes will be clear enough in due time. Only panic- 
mongers here and politicians at Berlin can make some- 
thing out of nothing : the end of his reserves is in sight 
this j^ear and the effort on which he is now about to 
stake the same is a final one. But the point I am 
insisting upon is that the Bapaume Ridge,- the chief 
object of our present study, is not an isolated object ; 
and that upon the outbreak di great activity elsewhere 
it will no longer be our main consideration. 
Meanwhile, the talk about the enemy's retirement 
here involving us in some insuperable difficulties of 
advance with impossibility of transport, is exaggerated. 
The ground is drying rapidly and the operations are 
already reaching the limit of the zone most intensively 
shelled during the past few months. 
ON THE OT^ER FRONTS 
The rest of the news from the various fronts is still, 
at the moment of writing, exceedingly meagre. We 
know that the British front has been extended as far as 
the neighbourhood of Roye ; the successful trench 
raids in the neighbourhood of Arras have been 
continued ; a violent local German attack on a two- 
mile front on the north-eastern angle of the Verdim 
salient, delivered with perhaps four divisions, was 
broken with very heavy loss upon the two wings, 
but in the centre occupied the advanced French trenches 
last Sunday ; the greater part of these front trenches 
were recovered on the Monday morning ; some pieces 
and rather more than 500 prisoners remained in the 
enemy's hands. The cost of the operation was out of all 
proportion to its results ; and like the precisely similar 
effort two months ago, it is difficult to see what object the 
enemy had in view. The best conjecture to make is 
that he was exercising an imitation of the new French 
tactics in this region and that he has not succeeded in 
copying the model. 
From Mesopotamia there has been, at the moment of 
writing, no news for several days. The last despatch 
earned the pursuit of the enemy to a point rather more 
than half way between Kut and Bagdad. There was 
e\ddently a rally, and an attempted defence of the position 
at Sheik Jaad, 15 to 17 miles above Kut, on the second 
day of the pursuit, in the defile between the marsh and 
the river, which was described here last week as the only 
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possible defensive position for a long way up the stream. 
This defence broke down so rapidly as hardly to check 
the pursuit. It is clear from the pace at which the pursuit 
has proceeded that it has been largely the work of cavalry. 
What motor transport may have been able to do in the 
neighbourhood we cannot tell until we receive a more 
detailed account of the local conditioitis. But a move- 
ment so rapid must already have got far ahead of the 
opportunities for full supply ; and presumably the next 
phase of these operations will be the advancing of the 
means of communication as quickly as possible further 
up the valley. 
We have not information upon the strength with 
which the enemy is able to receive us between the last 
points reached by the advance and Bagdad. It is there- 
fore useless to speculate upon his powef to defend the 
town. The last really good defensive pc>sition in front 
of Bagdad is at Dalia, where a ivatercourse comes in from 
the east and joins the Tigris. It is pertiaps 12 miles 
from the last houses of the city, and gives not very 
much room for a successful retirement in casv'^ it has to be 
rapidly abandoned : for a large town is a ba»l obstacle. 
Meanwhile, the pressure ( exercised by the British 
advance in this neighbourhood has already .reUeved the 
corresponding pressure against the Russians in the Median 
mountains to the east and Hamadan has been reoccupied 
by our Allies. 
A capital point in the Turkish power of defence, but 
unfortunately a point upon which public iniormation is 
also lacking, is the present extension of the ra ilway 
which suppHes the Turkish front in Mesopotamia. .Some 
months ago the main railway from the west, by w\^ich 
all supply must reach the en^my, extended no further 
than Nisibin ; supply from that point across tl*e 
plain to Mosul upon the Tigris (near the site of thtf 
ancient Nineveh) was carried l»y motor traffic and on the 
backs of animals for a distance of about 130 rniles. It 
then proceeded partly by way of the river and partly by 
land for another abo'ut equal distance to Tekrit. At this 
point it foimd the railhead of the railway which was being 
built up the Tigris north vra.rd from Bagdad. There 
was thus a breach of about 2 5o miles in the railway com- 
munication a little more th.xn a year ago and also the 
necessity for two transhipm( ;nts of material. It would 
be of importance to our jud gment if we had information 
upon the extent to which this gap had been bridged in 
the interval, but such information is lacldng. 
A Simple Military Problem 
There never was a moment in the war when it was 
more necessary for us to grasp the essentials of what is 
after all a very simple military problem. The difficulty 
of grasping it resides in nothing more than the interf ereftce 
of emotion with reason. It may be that there are people 
who cannot follow quite rample propositions — bvit I doubt 
it. I think nearly everybody can follow them, and that 
the only reason they are. forgotten or misapprehended is 
