12 
LAND & WATER 
March 8, 1917 
Will Switzerland be Invaded ?— II 
By Colonel Feyler 
Two weeks ago Colonel Feyler, the eminent Swiss 
military writer, began the consideration of the possibility 
of Germany trying to strike France and Italy through 
Switzerland. The point he made was that Germany , 
to succeed would have to solve the problem of success 
twice over — on the Rhine and behind the Jura. 
IT is interesting to examine this point more narrowly. 
People who believe in a German offensive in 
Switzerland like to suppose that it would be con- 
fined to the region bounding Belfort on the south. 
It would be a question of turning Belfort and so the 
fortified rampart of Eastern France. 
In order to confine the operations within those limits, 
the Swiss Army must be eliminated, and I think I know 
what I am saying when I declare that it is a complete 
delusion that this can be done. 
I shall refrain from all patriotic futilities, and shall 
deal with the Swiss army like any other. I shall 
therefore estimate the Swiss army as I should estimate 
any other, but I admit that it is diflicult to judge from 
times of peace what an army is capable of doing in war. 
In the lowest possible terms of appreciation, if it is simply 
a question of asking the Swiss army to see it through, 
it w-ould do so thoroughly. I do not mean that the 
Swiss are more patriotic orheroic than any other nation ; 
it is always absurd to pretend to have a monopoly of the 
greatest patriotism, and one cannot see who could surpass 
the present European belligerents in that respect. So 
I will say no more than that the Swiss soldiers would have 
the desire and I believe the wUl to do equally well. 
So it cannot be merely a question for the Germans of 
turning Belfort from the south. The army .detached for 
the purpose of that operation would have the Swiss army 
on its left flank and in its rear ; and although that army 
might not be a very powerful one, a quarter of a million 
men in the first line none the less represent a factor 
which a general cannot disregard. Thus an invasion 
would be necessary embracing the entire front of the 
Swiss Rhine, that is to say the area from Lake Constance 
to Basle, and the occupation of the Swiss plateau between 
the Rhine and the Alps in order to seize the passes of 
the southern Jura in case of a march on France, or the 
passes of the Alps, in case of a march against Italy. 
Let us suppose that this operation were successful at 
the outset, and that before a massed attack like that of 
which Belgium was the victim, the Swiss army, left at 
first to its own resources, were obliged to execute a fighting 
retreat, what would happen then ? Switzerland becom- 
ing a theatre of war, her territory would inevitably enter 
into the combinations of strategy. A German army 
aiming at the Jura passes- would not only have to fight 
upon dix extremely inconvenient terrain, defended' by 
troops who know every inch of it thoroughly, but it 
would have Italy upon its left flank ; or if it preferred 
to aim at the passes of the Alps and the south, it would 
have the French and British on its right flank. In both 
alternatives the communications between the Italians 
and the Franco-British forces would be easily maintained 
through the Rhone valley and the Simplon. 
One sees how the operation would gradually inci'ease 
in magnitude. It would no longer be merely a question 
of crumpling up the army of a secondary Power in a few 
days, but bringing an immense strategical enterprise 
to a successful conclusion, with the conflit't extended 
along a new front of some 150 miles, following the T square 
ridge of the Jura and of the Alps from Basle to Tyrol, 
and with a reinforcement from the Allies of an army of 
250,000 men with reserves behind it. The Germans 
would require to have an offenive army on one branch of 
the ridge and a detachment of an army of defence on the 
other : altogether a respectable number of divisions. 
To conclude, from a military' point of \iew the opera- 
tion would mean for the Germans an extremely problem- 
atical advantage purchased by absolutely certain risks. 
The exclusively military point of \iew is not the only 
one from which it is well to estimate the probability of 
this plan. It can be maintained that politically and 
morally it would be still more disastrous to Germany. 
People cite the case of the invasion of Belgium 'to 
justify their expectation of an invasion of Switzerland. 
It seems to me that it would be more accurate to main- 
tain the contrary theory. It is easy to gather from 
the German notes and from the speeches of von Beth- 
mann-HoUweg, that the \'iolation of Belgium is felt to-day 
to be a thorn in the flesh of Germany. The enormity of 
the offence is clearly recognised. That is proved by 
the infinite pains taken by the Imperial. Government to 
excuse it by insisting in the face of everything tjiiit 
Belgium began the quarrel, and that the lamb wanted 
to dev'our the wolf. 
Last year L.\nd & Watek published my articles on 
" The German Blunder." The conclusion I arrived at 
was that the invasion of Belgium was probably a strategic 
blunder and certainly a political one, and that the 
seriousness of the moral blunder would be declared on 
the day when the guns became powerless to conceal it 
by success. It looks very much as if that day had 
arrived, and it has no glory about it. The last German 
Notes admit as much. After three years of all manner of 
tergiversation folldwing the fluctuating chances of war, 
the Imperial Government reverts to its vague promise 
to evacuate Belgium subject to precautions for her own 
safeguarding against her. 
But her obstinacy in accusing Belgium of being the 
cause of her own misfortunes is also an undeniable proof 
of her uneasy conscience. And it is a highly instructive 
psychological fact to find so many people in Ciermany 
to-day who believe absolutely firmly — because their 
government has dex'oted so much attention to the 
interesting legend — that it was the Belgian army that 
attacked. To such a pass can men of brains come who, 
intelligent enough in other respects, feel the reprobation 
of honest men lie heavy on their nation. 
A blunder such as this a powerful and ambitious Empire 
that scorns justice only commits when it believ'cs itself 
sure of victory. History has no lack of instances of 
shameful things ratified by the event and by the kind 
oblivion of Time. But the Empire whose only guide is 
self-interest thinks twice before repeating the blunder 
when there is a chance of its being brought to 
account for it. The German Notes . to-day proclaim 
the theory of the rights of nations ! German soldiers 
protest their desire to protect them ! Apparently the 
Imperial Government think this new attitude is good 
for its own interests. Is it likely to contradict it by 
repeating in Switzerland the mistake committed in 
Belgium, with greater risk and less profit ? 
And why should it ? Have the Central Empires 
any need to add Switzerland to the number of their 
enemies and by military occupation gain hegemony 
over her when their victory over the AlHes would give 
them that without further fighting ? To take possession 
of Belgium— yes ; because she possesses a sea-coast 
which it is desirable to wrest from her in anticipation of 
the war of to-morrow, which would be the war for the 
crushing of Gi-eat Britain as the war of to-day was to 
have been for the crushing of France. But in the case 
of Switzerland, military occupation could only result 
in losses, wheteas Germany has everything to gain by 
making no addition to the losses in store for her after 
the war, to which she has moreo\'er added by her maladroit 
provocation of the United States. 
A German offensi\c through Switzerland, imdertaken 
deliberately, is unlikely ; it could only be brought about 
by accident. In this respect there has been no essential 
change since August, 1914. The neutrality of the Swiss 
territory will continue to cover the eastern flank of the 
battle in the West, and the Allies, who are winning the 
supremacy there, will have nothing to lose thereby. 
Indeed, it cannot be a matter of indifference to them 
not to have to di\ert to a new front any of the ^ 
resources which they arc preparing with a view to iheir j 
efforts in 1917. .•...' 
