LAND & WATER 
March 15, 1017 
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f^ Turkish IhsitLon 
T^ Turkish TosiUmiy 
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not in what strength — reinforcement from the north. 
As to the second, the British command of the river on 
which we were necessarily kept in ignorance, it was 
bound to determine the whole character of the attack. 
The Diala is an obstacle upon the east of the Tigris 
only. The defensi\-e line is not prolonged by any natural 
feature upon the western bank ; therefore, with a 
superiority of force and witli armed boats skilfully 
navigating the stream, the defensive position of the 
Diala reproduces the defensive position of the Sun-i-Yat 
positions below Kut, when the natural obstade on the 
fiirther bank, the Shatt-el-Hai, had been forced and the 
British were able to operate in flank from the western 
bank above Kut — a manoeuvre which decided that battle 
a fortnight before the battle of the Diala. There is no 
natural obstacle opposite Diala which needs forcing, and 
the obvious tactic, if there were a sufficient superiority of 
strength- in the attack and a command of the river, was 
to turn the Diala obstacle by an attack from the further 
side of the stream above, that obstacle. • 
The tactics pursued were a repetition of those at Kut — 
that is, a double attack on either side of the Tigris made 
possible by the British command of that river ; but with 
this difference in the nature of the operation, that at 
Kut the enemy still hoped to hold, \\hile in front of Bagdad 
the attack vvas clearly dealing with a rearguard only, the 
mass of the eaiemy's forces having already been with- 
drawn. Had this not been the case it would have been 
impossible for the enemy, seeing the rapidity of the whole 
affair, to have got any great body away without disaster. 
The enemy upon the further bank of the Diala, and in 
prepared art'cficial works continuing this line upon the 
further side orf the stream, was fighting an action to delay 
pursuit while his main forces continued to retire beyond 
Bagdad. In other words, the enemy had decided that 
he was not in strength for a main action and could not 
hope to engage it so close to the city. 
We must conclude that his plan was changed between 
the beginning af the retreat from Kut and the Battle of 
Diala. T^e reason of this change was simply the e.xtra- 
ordinary precisii )n and celerity of the British pursuit, to 
which I shall n^tum in a moment, and which was the 
raastor-chaxactej • deciding the whole series of operations 
during the last fortnight, which operations have yielded 
as their fruit, Bagdad. 
As in front of Kut the first demonstration was made 
upon the left or eastern bank against the Diala River, 
which was the main obstacle here just as the Sun-i-Yat 
works were the main obstacle in the former case. But 
the obstacle was only felt, not forced. The first demon- 
stration was apparently sufficient to compel a certain 
concentration of the enemy on this eastern side of the 
Tigris and to reduce him correspondingly on the western 
side. During the course of this Thursday" (the 8th), the 
infantry and guns were being brought up to the Diala. 
During the same day, Thursday, the 8th, the complete 
fashion in which the British gunboats commanded the 
Tigris was proved by the throwing of a bridge across it 
some way below the mouth of the Diala. By this bridge 
a strong detachment was thrown on to the right or 
western bank and came into contact with a line of pre- 
pared artificial works stretching out from this bank 
westward and continuing the defensive line of the Diala 
on the other side. The enemy had prepared yet another 
line 3,000 yards behind nearer the city. By evening 
or night of this Thursday, the 8th (the two official accounts 
of hours are here somewhat contradictory), the British de- 
detachment upon the western side of the stream had thi'own 
the enemy back on to his second line. It was a particularly 
fine piece of work, because as will be seen on Sketch 
Map II., the long bend of the river westward below 
Bagdad compelled this detachment to a long march 
between its starting point on the eastern side and its 
contact with the enemy on the western- bank. This 
magnificent march was accomplished in a blinding 
storm of dust and under very trying heat, and not till 
it was over — after perhaps si.\ hours of continuous 
marching, was the detachrnent able to engage an un- 
wearied enemy and yet to beat him. Meanwliile, a 
crossing of the Diala was being prepared on the other 
side of the Tigris. Presumably at some distance above 
the point where the track and the former bridge of boats 
runs, the guns opened against the northern bank to 
secure a passage. There was no natural advantage. 
The night was the worst one of the whole of the 
oixTations for a surprise, as the full moon rose before 
