10 
LA^U ik WATER 
IManli 15, i()ij 
above Kangawar — which stands at the foot of it a day's 
march away. 
The remaining stages to Hamadan are usually taken in 
two days, thongh that is rapid tra\olling, because they 
inckide'the only really diHicult pass upon the road, the 
jiass over the wall of Ahvan jnst mentioned, 'fhis i>ass, 
lying nearer Hamadan tlian Kangawar, takes its name 
from the hamlet of Said Abad, and after it is passed there 
is a rapid fall of .some 2^) miles on to Hamadan, which 
lies at the east foot of the mountain, that is, upon the 
further side from Kangawar. 
Hamadan is a town rivalling in size Kermanshah, and 
is the principal political centre between the Persian 
Teheran and the Mesopotamian Bagdad. It was the 
great Ecbatana of antiquity, and the ridge of Alwan 
above it was the classical Mount Orontes. 
Such are the details of the only way to the East from 
central Mesopotamia : the road which has from the 
beginning of history,, and before, alone linked the 
Assyrian plain with Persia and India and the Far East. 
The Russians, at the forwardest moment of their 
advance (when all that the Turks had then to spare was 
hard pressed by the first advance of the British 16 months 
ago) had pushed their cavah-y down this gieat road to 
Khanikin, within three cavalry days of Bagdad. 
The fall of Kut, however, changed the whole face of 
this Persian front. Considerable Turkish forces (two 
divisions ?) were free to be diverted up the Persian road, 
and the comparatively small but mobile Russian force 
here employed retired rapidly up through the hills, 
abandoning successively all the points just mentioned 
(including Hamadan). At the same time, smaller 
Turkish bodies took up positions further north beyond 
the frontier hills, between the main road and Lake 
Urmi. They put a garrison at Sihnd^^nA for a time, I 
behevp, but am not certain, at Bijar. They were at any 
rate within four ca^•alry days of the main road by which 
the small Russian forces disposable here communicate 
with Teheran and control Northern Persia. 
The re-advance of the British force, and especially 
Sir Stanley Maude's victory at Kut a week before the 
end of February, reversed all the situation once more. 
The Turks abandoned Hamadan immediately the 
news of the reverse at Kut reached them. They did not 
even try to hold the difficult pass of Said Abad, but fell 
back very rapidly behind a rearguard towards Kerman- 
shah. At the same time, they abandoned Sihna and 
fell back from that place also upon Kermanshah. Their 
retreat was necessarily extremely rapid. Three days 
before Sir Stanley Maude entered Bagdad they were 
already — the rearguard — at Bisitun, abandoning a depot 
of munitions undestroyed, eight or ten miles to the east. 
Since that day (Thursday of last week), we have no news 
of them in London at the time of writing (Tuesday after- 
noon), but it is certain that they are retiring with the 
utmost speed possible to them and clear that news of 
the very great peril in which they stand of being cut off 
reached them tardily, or found them at first imprepared 
for movement. If the Russians could reach Kermanshah 
within three days of the Turkish evacuation of Sihna, 
which is doubtful, the enemy detachment which held 
that point will be cut off from the main road and lost. 
It is equally clear that the fate of the main Turkish 
force in this region, which is retreating down the great 
road, now largely depends, upon the power such an 
army has to cut across the foothills — and perhaps 
even the main ranges, northward and eastward of 
the Upper Tigris after abandoning the road. The 
civilian traveller may reach Khanikin from Kermans- 
hah in four days, but an army cannot hope to cover the 
distance in orderly retirement much under ten days. 
Now with the British and Indian army at Bagdad, a 
detachment from it might conceivably reach Khanikin — 
the gate of the mountains — before the vanguard of the 
retreating Persian army of the Turks arrives there. 
The consequences would be obvious. This Turkish force 
if it is really large, would be in some peril. Nevertheless, 
we cannot estimate the degree of the peril without 
knowing (what we do not) exactly where the 7nain 
Turkish retreating body was when its rear-guard left 
Bisitun on the 8th. 
W'hat the size of this retiring force may be we are not 
told. I have seen it estimated in the Continental Press 
at two divisions. If it is of this size, then, should it fail 
to reach the foothills and the Mesopotamian Plain before 
its retreat is cut off, it will be destroyed. It may be able 
to reach the plains in time by extricating itself over the 
hill country towards the north-west, even thougli the 
British and Indians be barring the road at Khanikin. 
Its power of so escaping'over the mountains would dejjend 
rtot so nuich upon the means of travel (it would necessarily 
ha\'e to destroy a considerable mass of its material) but 
upon the supply it has with it. To answer such questions 
or even to suggest the probable answer, would need a 
knowledge of these high mountains at this time of year 
which I certainly do not possess, and on which I can 
obtain no sufficiently detailed information. 
IRLES AND THE WESTERN FRONT 
On the Western front the chief event of the week up 
to the moment of writing has been the occupation of 
fries, with the capture of nearly 300 prisoners of the 
Prussian (iuard, who were covering the German re- 
tirement from that sahent, and fifteen machine guns. 
The operation was conducted, as the accounts of eye- 
witnesses tell us, with extreme precision and, as the 
despatches tell us, with very low casualties. It has 
straightened out the last anomaly in the new Cicrman 
defensive line, which now runs directly upon the heights 
above us, covering^with only a shallow pro}cction — the 
high Loupart Wood, crossing (above Irles) Hill 129 (as 
it is called upon the civilian map — it is Hill 125 upon 
the French Staff map) and thence running regularly 
along the steep slope of the ravine, which covers Achiet, 
Bucquoi, Les Essarts and so to Monchy. 
It is not quite clear from the accounts received whether 
the summit of Hill 129, which dominates Irles, has been 
reached or no, but the shoulder of the hill is certainly in 
British hands and, of course, the ruins of the village as 
well. The enemy was forced out of this salient by a 
sharp, very intense, and accurate concentration of fire, 
the bombardment being delivered at the end of the night 
between Saturday and Sunday and the mfantry advanc- 
ing from the two sides of the right angle along the 
salient. Coming forward in the new dispositions as 
day broke upon the Sunday morning, they carried the 
whole village, at least to the cemetery : the accounts so 
far given do not tell us how much further up the hill the 
assault was pushed. 
It is particularly gratifying to note that the operation 
forestalled the enemy's own plan for retirement from this 
small salient. Everything was discovered by the victors 
ready for such a retirement. The British attack de- 
livered on Sunday morning anticipated the (ierman plan 
by perhaps a dozen hours, with the consequent com- 
paratively large capture of prisoners and machine guns. 
If the summit of Hill 129 be in the hands of the advance 
a complete view is now obtained right down that ravine 
between Bucquoi and Puisieux which separates the main 
German position on the Bapaume ridge from the present 
British front. Meanwhile, the main strength of all this 
region resides in the Loupart Wood. This wood crowns 
the highest hill from which one overlooks, though at but 
a slight elevation, all the surrounding country. It is not 
30 feet higher than the hill above Irles, nor 20 feet higher 
than Achiet, but it looks well down upon Bapaume and 
the lower country immediately to the east. It still 
forms something of a slight projection in the enemy's 
line, and it is to be presumed that his decision whether 
to maintain it or abandon it will form the main interest 
of the near future in this sector. Loupart M'ood is one, 
and the central one, of the three shghtly dominating 
lumps (over 130 metres), which are the summits of 
the (ierman defensive position. From the north-western 
and northern edge of Loupart Wood — or not far 
beyond — you look down over the Bapaume ridge on to 
the plains beyond. If the enemy gives up the command- 
ing summits here and still falls back eastward, abandon- 
ing Bapaume, it suggests — one can say no more than that 
—a larger retirement. For the salient to the north 
would certainly not be held under such conditions. 
Meanwhile, we must not lose sight of the work before 
Bouchavesnes. If that ridge is carried a direct view is 
obtained on to the depressions behind the Mont St. 
Ouehtin. The enemy batteries there established will not 
he maintained and Peronne will be no longer tenable. 
H. Bbi.i.oc. 
