March 15, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
II 
The Dardanelles Report 
By Arthur Pollen 
THE publication of the first report of the Darda- 
nelles Commission dealing "exclusively with the 
origin and inception of the attack on the Darda- 
nelles," raises two obvious questions. A comment 
in the Temps suggests them both. The French observer 
defends publicity for, he §ays : 
" There is no better school for the peoples than the 
truth, and it is never too late to give it to them. Even 
allowing for contingencies and the desire the new Govern- 
ment may have to emphasise the faults of its predecessors, 
it is well and salutary to speak of things as they are and 
not to make fools of public opinion, for this is' the reservoir 
of national resistance." 
The argument for pubhcity is that truth is the best 
educator. The argument against it is that the publication 
may appear— however unjustly — to be inspired by 
political animosities. That this is a grave objection can 
hardly be disputed, and its ill effects in stirring up bitter 
and rancorous attacks, both on Mr. Asquith and Lord 
Kitchener; are already lamentably apparent. It is not 
as if those responsible for the inception of this enterprise 
were still in power and capable of repeating their mistakes. 
Of the War Council of January, 1915, Mr. Balfour and 
Mr. Lloyd George alone remain in office. Lord Kitchener 
who. after the transformation of the enterprise from a 
purely naval into a purelj' military undertaking, was, of 
all, the most deeply involved in responsibility, was killed 
nine months ago in the service of his country. The 
system of Higher Command under which the enterprise 
originated, vanished long before the end of 1915. It is 
no wonder that an impartial observer like the writer 
in the Temps should see a political motive in the pub- 
lication. Whether he is right or wrong, the political 
consequences, both in this country and abroad, must 
certainly be unfortunate. 
But I agree with the French writer that truth is the best 
educator and, had it been possible to publish this — the 
whole of it and nothing but it — the political disadvan- 
tages might have been counterbalanced. The objections 
to publishing the whole truth are insuperable — diplomatic, 
military ancl naval reasons all forbid. We are driven then 
to ask : does the publication of part of the truth balance 
the loss of prestige which this detailed statement of 
failure must inflict ? It seems doubtful ; but still more 
doubtful when we pass to the third point and ask if the 
report contains nothing but the truth ? Are the con- 
clusions, that is to say which the Commissioners set out, 
those which should derive inevitably from such facts as 
the}' give us in the forty pages of introductory matter ? 
A Dubious Verdict 
Like everyone else, I suppose, I read the conclusions 
first and the introduction afterwards. They seem to me 
to stand in amazing contrast. What, in a paragraph is 
the subject matter, as set out by the Commissioners, 
of their enquiry ? A naval operation, as novel in char- 
acter as it was stupendous in difficulty and risk, was 
resolved upon in January, 1915, was begun on February 
19th, and was acknowledgecl on March 26th by every- 
one — except Mr. Churchill — to have been a complete 
failure. If we take this simple fact by itself, it is obvious 
that there can be two possible explanations. Eithc^ 
it was undertaken by naval men who cHd not anticipate 
its difficulties, or it was undertaken by politicians in 
ignorance or in defiance of expert judgment. There could 
be no third explanation at all. In either case, the enquiry 
should have been directed first into the character of the 
operation, next into the means employed, and thus the 
failure would have been made intelligible. It was a vast 
experiment in war^ — a thing in which everything turns 
upon the kind of force employed, the kind of force it had 
to overcome, the method by which the opposition was to 
ho beaten down, the defensive that was to protect the 
force employed while its offensive was being made effective. 
Broadly speaking, tlie report is absolutely silent upon 
this — the only thing that matters. It tells us something of 
the force employed — but nothing of the means proposed 
for using it. The merits, that is to say, of the proposal 
to force the Dardanelles by ships, are simply not disctissed. 
The subject matter is a military undertaking ; the report 
is almost silent on its military character. The first 
explanation of failure is then not examined. 
Instead, the Commissioners seem to have taken the 
alternative explanation for granted. And it is this that 
in my opinion, robs the publication of the report of the 
excuses the Temps puts forward. The gravamen of the 
report is contained in paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) of the 
Commissioners' conclusions. They imply that the naval 
experts held such views on the impracticability of the 
project of .forcing the Dardanelles by ships alone that, 
had they been expressed, a disastrous blunder would have 
been averted. That it was committed arose solely 
from the fact that Mr. Churchill advocated the' attack 
by ships alone "on a certain amount of hesitating 
and half-hearted expert opinion." And this, the 
Commissioners continue, is a thing that Mr. Asquith 
and his colleagues of the War Council should have sus- 
pected. They were, therefore, under an obligation to 
compel Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson to express their 
opinions frankly. And these officers in turn should have 
pronounced the opii^ion that woiild automatically have 
stopped the whole undertaking. The Commissioners, 
that is to say, not having examined into the military merits 
of the undertaking, assume it as obvious that the failure 
could only have arisen from neglect of right adminis- 
trative principle, the right principle, of course, being 
that no great operation of this sort should be under- 
taken except on a complete statement by experts that it 
is feasible. But is it not obvious that the whole of this 
criticism falls if the project was, in point of fact, endorsed- 
by Mr. Churchill's responsible advisers ? If it was so 
supported, Mr. Churchill could not have deceived the 
Council by advocating a jilan which, had the experts 
been vocal, the Council must have rejected. Nor could 
Lord Kitchener, Mr. Asquith and the other members of 
the Council be blamed for not suspecting that the support 
was non-existent, if in fact it did exist. Nor could the 
experts be blamed for not expressing adverse views, if 
their actual views were as favourable and as sanguine as 
•Mr. Churchill's. The real question then is : who was 
responsible for advising Mr. Churchill and what was the 
advice that was given to him ? 
Strategy and Technique 
Here it is necessary to distinguish between different 
kinds of advice: Of alternative warlike plans, all equally 
feasible, one may be preferred to another on general 
groimds of strategy. For instance, had it been possible 
in January, 1915, to despatch 150,000 men with their 
proper equipment and supplies, it was arguable how such a 
force could be employed in the Eastern theatre of war. 
Five corps thrown into Serbia might have compelled the 
Central Powers to fight on the new front, have brought 
Greece, Roumania arnd Bulgaria into an alliance with us, 
might, at the worst, have secured Bulgarian neutrality 
only. If directed against Alexandretta, . the Turkish 
army, prepared for the invasion of Egypt, might have been 
cut off and destroy-ed ; and the whole of Mesopotamia 
brought iYistantly under Allied domination. Used for an 
attack on the GallipoK Peninsula, Turkey might have been 
struck to the heart and communications opened with 
Russia. If all were equally feasible, the choice could have 
been made on that combination of military and political 
considerations summed up in the word " strategy." But 
supposing the force had been strong enough .say, to seize 
Alexandretta and operate in Syria, but not strong enough 
to take Gallipoli and open a way for the Fleet to the Sea 
of Marmora, then the objection to the latter coursri would 
have been tactical and not strate,gical. The two thint's 
naturally merge at times. Evcrvbodv m.-iy be agreed 
