D/VND & WATER 
March 22, kjij 
The Enemy Retirement 
By Hilaire Belloc 
THKICE lhiii;,'S arc cloar in cuiinectiuii witli the 
fiK-iiiy retircnienl, although it is still in prugifss 
and its limits still unct^tain. First, it is a re- 
tirement with the object primarily of -straighten- 
ing and not of shortening a line : that is, it is a con- 
tinuation of the battle of the Somme. the evaluation 
of a salient which had been rendered dangerous by the 
Allied success on the Sommc, and which would become 
impossible when or if the attack was renewed. 
Secondly it is a retirement in which there was certainly 
an intention of holding for a greater or lesser period 
J5apaunie l-Jidge, and only after some defence of that 
jjusition falling back further. 
Thirdly, the retirement has been hitherto thoroughly 
successful, although it has not procectled according to 
the plan originally established, but has been compelled 
to a modification of that plan. * 
(i) As to the first point, the enemy was concernold not so 
much with shortening as with straightening hisHine : 
To straighten a line which has hitherto included a 
salient, to flatten out the salient is, of course, and 
necessarily, to shorten the line somewhat, but the question 
of motive is easily decided by the proportionate ad- 
vantage gained. If the advantage is all in favourof the 
abandonment of the salient and the ad\antage gained by 
the shortening of the line slight, then the motive is clearly 
the straightening of the line and not the shortening of it. 
Now it is a point which does not seem to have been 
fully appreciated that the eilemy retiring (as he is belie\'ed 
to be retiring) to a prepared Une which runs fairly straight 
fom near Arras past Cambrai and St. Ouentin and 
Laon to Khcims, does not save in actual length of line 
nnich more than twentj' miles. He does not sa^•e any- 
thing like live per cent, of the front that he lias to hold in 
IVance, and it is ridiculous to suppose that an operation 
which, however successful it may prove, W'as necessarily 
IK-rilousand in many ways costly — (that is, in destruction 
of material, let alone the political effect at home — and 
iil>on the army, for that matter) would have been under- 
taken with the mere object of saving such an insignificant 
proportion of the front. , --'' . 
But if wc look at tlie salient which the enemy occupied 
over the north of France, generally called the N'oyon 
salient, observe how it had already been threatened 
by the Allied success upon the Somme, and how \ery much 
more it was threatened by the pursuit of that success the 
moment weather permitted, we shall see that the abandon- 
ment of this salient was of a very clear and great advantage 
to the enemy : it had even become a necessity. 
So long as the salient existed serious dislocation of the 
line upon either of its two containing sides (" successful 
action upon a transversal " as the French call it) would 
. ha\'e involved a complete breakdown of the whole defensive 
organisation. The whole German front between Peronne 
and Berry-au-Bac would have been ruined if an Allied 
olfensi\'c working behind it, already deeply bitten in 
last summer, had succeeded in advancing even by a 
few miles this spring.- It would ha\e been impossible 
to have retired in order from the Noyon saUent. There- 
lore, the whole line would have broken. 
That is why the retirement was planned before the 
main shock of this season should develop. 
(2) But though the enemy had certainly determined 
upon such a retirement wc can infer with a fair degree 
of certitude that he intended in his original plan first to 
hold the Bapamnc Ridge, then, behind that as a sort of 
flank guard, later to withdraw from the point of the 
Noyon salient. And our reasons for making tliis in- 
ference are sufticient to warrant it. 
In the first place, the retirement was not deliberately 
begun upon that sector, nor was it begun voluntarily 
and at a chosen moment. In other words, the enemy 
was compelled to fall back somewhat earlier than he 
lud intended upon the best defensi\e position he could 
get in front ol the Biitish tro()|)s, and that best dcfcnsi\'C 
j)usition was the Bapauhie Ridge. 
How do wc know this ? 
W'e know it from two conxxTging pieces of evidence. 
The first is that the British attacks upon the Anac 
proceeded from a British initiative, Vere met for a full 
six xi'ceks with all available powers of resistance by tlie 
enemy, and were followed by very violent and extensive 
counter-attacks 0^1 his part which failed. There was 
no sort of retirement in progress during all January or 
even the first fortnight of I'^ebiiiary when the British 
troops were hammering up the .\ncre valley upon cither 
side of the stream. .\nd yet this season, the lirst si.\ 
weeks of the year ; when the ground was most diflicult 
to the advance, w^ere the best moments for secretly with- 
drawing the mass of the enemy forces. 
Until the middle of the month (the 14th or 15th of 
February) when Hill 127 was captured abo\c Bailies- 
court, there was not the shadow or the indication of a 
retirement. The value of this point will escape no one, 
and it has, I think, been generally appreciated. 
But the second point is less m'cH known, and is, I thinl', 
of equal importance. Combined with the first it is 
decisive. 
The German Government issues to its Press instruc- 
tions designed to prepare public opinion for coming 
events. The importance of preparing German public 
opinion in particular for a retirc#t'nt of any sort is, 
especially at this moment, very gn-at indeed. It is an 
absolute necessity, and the political business has to be 
co-ordinated as carefully as the military movements arc 
co-ordinated by a staff. We have a fl(jod of light thrown 
upon this matter when we note the date on which the 
Prussian (iovernment unexpectedly issued an order to 
its press which fell as a conijjlctc siu-prise and changeil 
the tone of all--the newspai)ers. 'Ihid order ivas •^iveii 
■oiler the eafturc oj Hill izj — five days after — it was i;ivcii 
upon February 20th. 
I am not saying that an ultimate retirement from the 
Noyon salient was not contemplated. 1 think it was. 
It is clear at any rate that it was an alternative ])lau 
which had been thoroughly studied or it could not have 
been carried out as completely as it has been or as dexter- 
ously. 
But the operating of the trigger and the starting of I he 
machine, the act and the initiative of the act wliicli 
produced the retreat, was British. It was the work 
upon the Ancrc that did it, as the comparison of dates 
shows. 
So true is this that the order unex])ectedly, and some- 
what hurriedly, issued upon Fi'bruary 20th, to the 
Germain Press, was not even then an order for imme- 
diately publishing the intention to retire. It was only 
an order secretly jireparing the Press for w!iat w:i.s to 
come, and bidding them gradually to tune public opinion 
to the necQssities of the situation. By one of those 
accidents, which is inevitable when you organise too 
much and in too great detail, we have had from the 
German Press itself evidence of this order, of its datr 
and of its character. 
The moment the British forces were on the top of 
Hill 127, the gun-positions behind Py^ 'ind north of 
Miraumont were impossible, and an enemy retirement 
was necessary. We all know how the fog whicli came 
inuncdiately afterwards and successive days of dense 
mist enabled that first local movement to be accom- 
plished without serious loss. But we have not only 
evidence of the initiative thus having lain with the 
attack, but also of the fact that Bai)aunie Ridge was 
th'J defensive position the .enemy intended tu take 
up. Here again points of x'arying value, but converging, 
warrant the inference. In the first place, the retirement 
was e\erywhere towards the ridge and without any 
abandonment of the iroints which could jeopardise it. 
