LAND & WATER 
March 22, 1917 
Grcvilleri?, just behind it, was not muiulid to be held. 
Irles, tlio \iUage, formed a small salient of tiio general 
German line in front of the ridge. It lay upon the slopes 
of a ravine and the tnie defensive ywsition was abo\ e 
il. Bnt when Hill I-'m, above Irles, was in Hritisii haiuis 
(it will be remembered that the importance of the point 
was emphasised in these colnnins at the time), a ver\- 
serious threat had at onre appeared against the whole 
(ierman defensive position hen-. Mill ik) above Irles, 
half a mile above the cemetery of that village, is not quite 
as high as the Loupart \\ood, which is the true key of all 
that end of the ridge, but it turns the Loupart Wood and 
threatens it front one side. , Therefore, when' it had 
fallen into British hands Loupart Wood, in spite of its 
elaborate organisation and extremely important position, 
was evacuated. And from this circumstance alone I 
should argue that the e\acuation was premature and 
imposed upon the enemy. But this conclusion seems to 
be confirmed very strongly by the press notices of which 
I have spoken. If we do not admit it, we have to decide 
that these press notices were put in as a blind, and that 
the enemy really intending to give up the Bapaume Ridge 
without further ctfort and not yielding to the Allied 
pressure, spread falsehoods through his newspapers in 
order to deceive us upon the point. AgaJnst -mli a 
contention there are two valid arguments. 
The first is that the deceit which was to ha\e been 
imposed upon us could not have had its effect in time, 
for before the German papers in which these things were 
being printed reached us, the event had come about. 
The second- is, that it would be playing an extretnely 
dangerous game to tell the German public at this time 
of day and in the midst of so delicate and humiliating 
an operation as a general retirement, that a term had 
been fixed for that retirement, that it was only a local 
movement to the Bapaume Ridge — for the moment at 
least — and that that ridge would be held after a move- 
7Tient of retreat which the German public were asked to 
admire for its complete success — and then to disappoint 
...that public and admit a general retreat. It would be 
as though the . French authorities had told the pubUc 
of their intention to fall back on to the Chauny Ridge 
in front of Verdun a year ago and ihen' had proceeded to 
evacuate Verdun itself and all the Verdun salient. I 
cannot believe that the German newspapers would have 
been instructed to, encourage their readers to believe 
that a halt was to be made upon the Bapaume Ridge 
unless that halt has really been intended. Especially 
as the sheets in which the information was to appear 
could not reach us in time to mislead us. 
Everj^hing then would seem to point to an original 
determination of holding the Bapaume Ridge, and of not 
abandoning it without the undertaking of an offensive 
mo\-ement elsewhere, which should check further retire- 
ment for some appreciable time. I take it that this plan 
was modified against the enemy's will by the uninter- 
mittent pressure of the British artillery. 
Only those on the spot can judge what that pressure 
must have been. The moment the movement of retire- 
ment was apparent the main points upon which the 
holding of the ridge would depend were subjected to 
intense, and, in many places, .converging fire. The 
retirement was not so great as to take these points out 
of the range of the heavy gun emplacements already 
existing, and we know that the rate at which the guns 
were moved up when the emplacements had to be changed 
was unexpectedly rapid, considering the abominable 
nature of the ground. We kno\y also that the key points, 
notably Hill i2() above Irles, were subjected to an in- 
tolerable bombardment, just at the moment when the 
movement of German troops upon it rendered such an 
ordeal most severe. The matter is not certain, it is 
debateable. It is only a suggestion that has been put 
forwaixl here ; but the suggestion is that the epemy 
intended to hold the Bapaume Ridge, and to deliver a 
local offensive elsewhere to relieve the pressure upon it, 
that he intended a general retirement only later, and 
after some delay \\\xm that defensive position, and that 
his plan was distorted or modified by the loss of the 
heights he had originally jjlanncd to hold. 
(3) Being thus compelled, however, to act prematurely 
he has acted with what has hitherto been complete 
success in his general retirement, and it is as foolish to 
deny this as it is to exaggerate the meaning or the value 
of that retirement. 
He has so far lost hardly any material, save what he 
has himself deliberately destroyed, and only an insigni- 
licanl nimiber of prisoners from his rear guards. And 
we may be certain that the mass of his forces arc now 
already established in the position which \ve . know 
him to have prepared in the rear of his original lines. 
'The reports up to the moment of writing account for only 
a few hundrtxl jirisoners at the most, three batteries of 
guns in Noyon and one convoy intercepted by the French 
apparently upon the liigh road leading out of Xoyon 
north-eastward. 
It is generally believed that the enemy is retiring, or 
either that his main force have already retired to the 
lines which he had long ago prepared from the neigh- 
bourhood of Armentieres, right down to the neighbour- 
hood of Rheims. covering Cambrai, St. Ouentin, La 
Fere and Laon. We know at any rate that a line exists, 
and presume it does not exist without its purpose, nor 
is any reason apparent for abandoning that purpose at 
this moment : its purpose to afford a shorter line, 
abandoning the perilous salient of Noypn which has 
been held by the enemy at such an enormous expense 
in men for a year and a half. 
It has already been pointed out that this line, docs not 
save anj' appreciable mmiber of men to the enemy, nor 
correspondingly increase in any appreciable amount 
the preponderance to the Allies. What it does do is to 
get the enemy lines into such a straight shape that no 
" transversal " attack, no cutting of the neck of tlio 
salient can throw it into disorder. It is a line which 
can only be broken by a direct attack at some point. 
Speculation as to the enemy's strength when he reaches 
that line, as to his further intentions or those of our own 
coiumand, even speculations as to his ability to occupy 
this line (if it be that upon which he is determined to 
stand) securely, are idle ; except, perhaps, for the note 
that he has had ample time to estabhsh himself in reason- 
able security. The retirement is but a short one. One 
long day's march or two short marches at its widest 
part between Roye and St. Qucntin, 22 miles only, 
one day's march behind the Bapauipe Ridge, and only 
a few diminishing miles at either end of the big thin 
crescent. The exact shape of that crescent, always 
supj)Qsing the enemy to stand upon the Cambrai St. 
Quentin-La Fere line, is apparent upon the sketch given 
above. It is sufficiently clear from this that the 
modification, though exceedingly important to the enemy 
as securing him from disaster in case the old salient had 
broken, is not one upon so large a scale as to threaten 
him with disruption during his retreat. 
There are not a few puzzling points remaining with 
regard to the line upon which the enemy is believed to 
be retiring. For instance, the main railway junction 
at Terguier has already been abandoned, and though 
there is a light railway joining St. Quentin and Laon 
(by way of La Ferte, marked (i) (i) on Sketch I.), and 
though this light railway has probably been enlarged 
to normal gauge, it is perilously near the Allied advance. 
The whole position, though of the greatest possible 
interest, is still in flux, and until it is decided, does not 
permit of exact analysis, but before leaving it it may 
be well to point out that it is of its nature only a pre- 
liminary to the great shock that is coining. The enemy 
has not drafted into his field force so very large or abnor- 
mal a proportion of his remaining reserve power without 
the intention of striking and, let us repeat for the 
twentieth time, that ivhere he intends to strike we do not 
know, and that any one who know must have it for their 
principal public duty to keep it secret. Neither does he 
know where the .\llies intend to strike. All the 
public knows, or ought to know, is that the present 
mox'ements are no more than a manoeuvring for 
position before the main efforts which will distinguish 
and are intended to decide the war in the season which 
is just opening. 
One ai the most interesting general theories put for- 
ward in the British Press at this moment has appeared 
from the military correspondent of the Morning Post. 
It is to the effect that the German retirement upon the 
West is not only undertaken for the abandonment of a 
salient rendered dangerous from the increasing power 
of the Allies, but is also and especially designed with the 
object of obtaining freedom for manoeuvre. The theory 
