.March 
1917 
LAND & WATER 
is that a weir ot iuo\liuciiI i^ It) be iLsturcd 011 the 
initiative of tlic enemy, and that he is giving liimself 
elbow room. Whether that tlieory is sound or not only 
events ean show. The argument in its favour is that the 
retiring force has all its dispositions ready, while the 
advancing force pursuing it is necessarily tentative in 
its action, and delayed by the bringing up of its men or 
its material. The argument against it is that anything 
like a war of movement would liave to be undertaken in 
spite of recent accessions to the German force in the 
tield by inferior forces against superior, and against an 
unbroken line which offers no opportunities of manceiivre, 
but only of hammering with the same siege tactics as 
those which were necessary at Verdun and on the Somme. 
The Mesopotamian Front 
On tlie Mesopotamian front the last news at the moment 
of writing shows us the British patrols following by 
the main road and railway north of Bagdad, up the Tigris 
\alley and reaching, by last Svmday, some point near 
Sumaiakcheh. We are also given in this despatch a very 
interesting hint as to the strength with which the enemy 
is fighting these rearguard actions. We are told that he is 
acting with " the remnants of three divisions." 
There is another very notable point, though it is only 
a detail in connection with the general operations. It 
concerns the movement of the Turkish troops, estimated, 
I believe, at about t^o divisions, which had hitherto 
been operating beyond the Persian frontier and which have 
now, for something hke a month, been retiring rapidly 
westward followed by a comparativelj' small Russian 
force, which is also operating in these regions. 
It will be remembered that the main Turkisli body 
w as falling back along the great caravan road througli 
fvermanshah towards Khanikin. The Russian forces 
in pursuit had at a moment not dated in the despatch, 
but i^resumably Friday or vSaturday last, reached Haruna- 
bad. The British' were in occupation of Bakuba, the 
first long day's stage north out of Bagdad. 
It will be clear from the accompanying map that the 
main Turkish force, bound to this road avenue, having 
lost its base at Bagdad would be in peril unless it coukl 
escape to the plain of the Upper Tigris. 
At what point would such an attempt leave the main 
caravan road, and what chance would it have of effecting 
an orderly retreat without loss ? 
The mass of the Turkish forces has almost certainly 
been able to reach Kasr-i-shirin, some days ago. Were 
it to retire further down towards Khanikin and the Bagdad 
road it would be in a hopeless trap, for the British are 
holding that road. At least as high up as Bakuba,' and 
probably by this time beyond. But from Kasr-i-shirin 
there is a track leading north-west by which an army 
could at any point attempt to escape. There would be 
no point in lea\'ing the road before Kasr-i-shirin, as one is 
still in the mountains and there is no avenue of issue from 
Kasr-i-shirin. Some sort of way passes from Merkez over 
an interxening low range of foothills, crosses the Diala 
at Kalashirwan, and, at Kifri, strikes the telegraph and 
road which leads up under the mountains parallel to 
the Tigris, making for Karkuk and the north. 
It is possible, of course, that Kifri itself will be 
occupied by a British detachment in time to -cut this avenue 
of retirement. Kifri is a good 60 or 70 niilf;s from Bakuba 
by road and 100 from Bagdad, where the track from 
Kasr-i-shirin to Kifri is sufficiently good to permit of an 
orderly retirement. 
Meanw'hile there Ixas happened to the force at Sihna 
what was suggested in these columns <is probable. It 
will be remembered that w'c pointed out how the Turkish 
detachment, which had been garrisoned at Sdhna could only, 
fall back upon Kcrmanshah, to which the road and 
telega^aph lead, that if the Russians were in Kermanshah 
before the retirement was fully effected this force would 
be cut off. 
We now have the mention in the last Russian despatch 
of the fact that the Russians have got to Kermanshah 
before this Turkish retirement was .fully effected, and the 
Turkish detachment formerly garrisoned at Senna has 
consequently been thrown off the road westward into the 
mountains ; whether it will be entirely lost, or whether 
any remnants will be able to get down into the plain we 
shall know in the next month. But the chances are that 
it is for military purposes destroyed. H. Bhlloc 
11 
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