8 
1.AND 6c WATER 
March 22, 1917 
Freedom and the Seas 
By Arthur Pollen 
IX the furtnight tliat lias passed since the course of 
tlic naval side of the war was dealt with in these 
culuinns, some very extraordinary developments 
have become manifest throughout the world — 
all of them arising directly out of the war and most of 
them out of the war at sea. The outstanding sensation 
is, of course, the revolution in Russia — with its corollary, 
the German Emperor's promise, through his Chancellor, 
that when the war is over the people of Germany too shall 
enjoy something that more resembles political liberty 
than the constitution under which they have lived so 
long — the polity, that is, that has made this war possible, 
ft is to the last degree improbable that Russia can.'^at a 
single stroke, attain endming liberal institutions. Unless 
the teaching of history goes for nothing, there must be 
many stages between' the recent cou/^ d'etat and a con- 
stitution in which all Russian parties can loyally and 
checrfullj' co-operate — a constitution, that is to say. to 
\\hich everyone in Russia will, as of course, pay liabitual 
and willing obedience, because in it he feels the respon- 
.sibility of his own participation. But it is still more 
imi)robable that the autocratic and entirely military 
Government of German}' will honestly surrender that 
country's political destinies to the control of the Socialist 
representatives of the working classes. No doubt in 
both countries the struggle for a final form of govern- 
ment will be postponed till the war is over. And the 
difference between the two cases is just this — that I^ussia 
starts with the autocracy already at an end. and (iermany 
has to await the issue of the war before knowing the 
degree of the autocracy's voluntary self-effacement. 
The Free Nations 
1 (l(j not think it is a far fetched idea to see in these 
astonishing developments less of the results of land war 
than of sea war, and if we look beyond Russia and (ier- 
man\', we shall perhaps find reasons for this belief. For 
it is the sea war that is slowly but inevitably uniting the 
two lar,gest and, perhaps because the largest, the two 
mo.st pacific countries in the world against the militarism 
that is the common enemy of civili.sation. The United 
States, it is true, arc not yet formallj' at war, iior indeed 
is China. But the decision of the latter is taken, and 
it is clear, as far as Washington is concerned, that 
America's neutrality continues in name only. The 
sinkings of the Algonquin and other ships, with an 
absence of warning and the resulting minders of American 
citiy.ens, add to the acts which, under President Wilson's 
definition, must be considered overt operations of war. 
No matter how frequent or definite such acts may be. 
President Wilson cannot go through the form of himself 
declaring war till Congress meets in April. And when 
Congress does change the legal aspect of the situation, 
America will not be able immediate!}' to take any more 
direct war action than she is taking already. For 
not only are all merchant ships now to be armed, but all 
are receiving instructions to sink submarines on sight. 
What other military measures 'can President Wilson 
take off hand ? 
The inevitable, then, has already happened. As we 
liave often seen in these columns, the submarine cam- 
paign, as threatened by Germany in December 1914, 
and put into effect in the following February, was an 
open declaration of war against all the sea-faring nations. 
For two years thc.^c submitted to a succession of outrages 
that no sane observer could liave presumed to have been 
tolerable. But one by one their patience has been 
exhausted and, as the indices that Germany's strength 
is decaying multiply, so is it certain that first one and 
then anotiier nmitral will join, not in protest but in open 
action, to defend its maritime interest against the 
German attack. Thus, the frightfulncss which militarism 
lias transferred from land to sea, will carry its own 
punishment with it. 
And that the signs of increasing German weakness 
arc nuiltiplying is uiKpier^tioncd. The German armies 
in I'" ranee may have impro\ed their tactical condition 
by the recent great retreat, but this is not to say that 
Ciermany is strong in the West where she was weak, 
but that being everywhere dangerously weak, she may 
for a brief period have averted the immediate ruin ivhich 
that weakness threatened. Nor is it to be doubted 
that it is not a purelj' military weakness — insufiicient 
men and insufiicient material for war — that oppresses 
om- chief enemy. A still greater and more serious 
weakness threatens him at home. .And this, it need 
hardly be added, is the direct result of our belated and 
still none too strict blockade. It is, of course, this 
]>arti(ular evidence of ebbing strength that has driven 
the rulers of Germany to seek a final conclusion with 
this country by the starvation blockade now being 
attempted. There is no other lioj)e of enheartt-ning their 
subjects for longer endurance. No other method of 
shakiaig. the confidence and resources of their chief 
opponents. And as it is the same blockade that has 
driven America and China into war, so must! Germany's 
desperation under the advance of justice bring other - 
vindicators of the right into the field. 
Militarism at Sea 
For it is sea )>ower that has thwarted the mili- 
tarism of Germany. It is sea j)o\\er that has made 
it imi)ossible for her inhabitants to maintain the 
country's strength and su})plics for a long war ; it is 
sea power, therefore, that stands out te-day as the chief 
obstacle to the success of the conspiracy of the ("entral 
Powers of 1<)I4. The effective element in that wicked 
pact. Me. in tJiis country, dubbed " milita.rism." meaning 
thereby the doctrine that the creation and the employ- 
ment of armies was an end in itself : bec-;iuse once 
organised, everything that these armies coiUd seize and 
hold by force was k-gitimately the property of the States 
that raised them. Power, armed for robbery and oppres- 
sion, is the essential and central fact of militarism. It is 
no wonder that when tliis hideous veligicm was scotch'^d 
its confessors denounced the " navalism " that threatened 
it with defeat. It was a meaningless retort. For there 
is this great difference between sea power and land 
power. If a country is to maintain the strongest possible 
army the whole nation must be made part of a fighting 
niaciiine, must be brought under strict and ruthless 
discipline, "must cultivate the habit and practice of un- 
critical obedience, must look on its army chiefs almost 
as God-given rulers who.se authority it is treason to the 
State to weaken, whose wisdom therefore it is criminal to 
doubt. Under the threat of a nei.ghbour's armies, a free 
country such as I-'rance may contrive such military ]ire- 
parations without sacrifice of demoratic principle. But not 
without grave risk to its political institutions. 
But if a naiion converts itself into one vast army, not for 
self-defence, but unscrupulous conquest, the case is worse, 
for all must join in the shameless faith that inspires tlie 
leaders. And -a large part of national life in peace time 
must consist of drill and training and military exercises, 
manceuvres, and parades, all for no object except to 
have the perfectly organised machine when the hour of 
conquest strikes, and meantime to accustom the mind 
of the nation to the dazzling spectacle of force intended 
to be irresistible when the moment of action comes. 
For military power, if it suffices in force and speed, 
strikes at the heart and wins at a blow. How diff(>rent 
is the case of sea power ! First sea power can seldom, 
if ever, win a war by a single stroke. Next Xhv. greatest 
of na\ies subtracts but a tiny ])ercentagc of the nation 
to maintain itself at the highest ]5oint of strength. Its 
drill and discipline and training arc all. no doubt, as 
strenuous and exacting as any army's can be, but they 
• are dignified by the variety of skill and accomphshment 
at which they aim, and are magnified by the association 
with the mighty and exquisite engines of war that sea 
