March T22, 1917 
jl^A^U &: WATER 
' force employs. But more than all, sea force, just because 
it is sea force, exists and has its being on an element that 
i> outside the nation. The vast universe of the ocean is 
a neutral world, where all nations meet and consort in 
((|uality and i)eace, where the tradition of mutual help 
in the ex])osure to connnon danger has bred a certain 
chi\alry unknown and strange to land warfare. 
It is curious that na\ies, whose power of secret move- 
ment had made them so often capable of effecting the 
strategic surprise denied to armies, must nevertheless 
do their work in peace and war under a surveillance so 
public as to keep them constantly at the bar of the 
])ublic opinion of the world. It is this that explains 
how it is that sea war, from the earliest times, has been 
strictly subject to law. Long befpre any usages were 
agreccl upon by~ civilised nations for the conduct of 
armies in the field, anyone injured by an armed ship, in 
]ieace or war, had, by the common consent of all nations 
a remedy in the courts of the nation responsible for 
that ship's action. Thus was formed the traditional 
association of the two ideas, sea-power and justice. 
Now justice is the first step towards, and is insepar- 
able from,^ personal and political freedom. And this 
is why it seems not far fetched to connect a revolt 
from an autocracy maintained by military power 
alone, with the association of Russia with such a covmtry 
as (ireat Britain, whose world i)osition was derived from 
her sea power, which stands primarily for freedom, 
becau.se r>f its long identity with, and long control by. 
the ])rinciples of justice as enforced by law. 
In the light of these obvious ])rinciples it is all the 
more difficult to understand the effort which is being 
ma(U' in certain quarters in America to advocate the 
(icrman theory of the " Freedom of the Seas." 
'fhis cry, in the mouths of (iermans, is but the whine 
of the trapped crimina.1. To the American, it is part 
of the tradition of that country's aloofness from the 
tilings that concern the rest of tlie world. It is intelligible 
ciioiigh tluit America should have had no interest in 
Ivuropean (piarrels where they seemed merely scltish or 
dynastic and, to protest against war taking any, toll of 
her harmless comniercc in such a ca.sc, was an obviows 
thing to do. But now that America is forced into war 
tlirougli the a:buse of sea power, by a nation that pre- 
tending the freedom of the sea is its object, is in reality 
at war against all freedom. I venture to think that the 
unreality of this shibboleth will become evident, and 
without arguinent. For the true freedom of tlie seas 
depends upon the reign of justice, and the last three 
.years have shown, that but for sea power, justice must 
lui\'e perished off the earth. 
Bagdad and the Submarines 
If we turn from these general considerations to the 
course of the war at sea, or as directly affected by sea 
force, w:e have to note first liow happy and effective 
lias been the co-operation on the Tigris of the transport 
under naval control with the amazingly efticient army 
led by General Sir Starjley Maude. It' is a subject on 
which wi? lack detailed information, but the results 
are eloquent. The First Lord warned us in his Aldwych 
sjK'Ccli of the far-flung activities of German minelayers. 
l->iit how limited, not only tiiis form of attack, but all 
submarine a.ttack on military communications must 
be, is clear enough from the fact that in no theatre of 
war is there the slightest evidence of any straitening 
of our military means through loss of transports or of 
military supplies. 
This,' of course, is not to say that the' loss of shipping 
may not, indirectly be a cause of lessening militarv 
capacity overseas and, unfortunately, there is little in 
such news as we have of the progress of the submarine 
campaign to lead us to suppose that we are approaching 
the extinction of the menace. Not that the submarine 
news is bad ; it is, on the contrary, and as far as it goes, 
not unsatisfactory. The facts of the submarine cam- 
paign since the ist February, as officially communicated 
to us are as follows. In the first 18 days, 56 British 
ships of all sizes were sunk, which gives "an average of 
21.7 per week. In this period we do not know how many 
were attacked and therefore how many escaped. In the 
succeeding three weeks. 36, 30 and "25 were attacked 
and 20, 25 and 15 were sunk, 'j'he weekly average of 
ships sunk then was 20, compared with 21.7 of the first 
period. The reduction, it will be observed, is apparently 
insignificant, about 8 per cent. only. If we look at the last 
three wterikV returns only, there is an increase of the 
second week over the lirst and a great decrease in the 
;third week. But it would be deceiving ourselves (o 
lay too much emphasis on this reduction, for the third 
week was marked by rough and stormy weather which 
adds materially to the difficulties of the submarine's 
task. On the other hand, we must remember that tl^ere 
is now nearly 30 pqr cent, more daylight than at the 
beginning of last month, so that in this very important 
respect conditions are steadily improving for the sub- 
marine. Had the efficiency of the lirst three weeks of 
February been maintained the weekly loss of the next 
period, instead of averaging 20 ships, should have run 
to 23 or 24. But here again we must guard ourselves 
against premature conclusions. There are, after all, a 
very large number of factors at work of which but little 
can possibly be known. Obviously when submarines 
hunt merchantmen and warcraft hunt submarines, there 
is a grim sport going forward in which, luck must enter 
enormously into the game. It might turn either way 
from week to week.' Our losses might double without 
there being any increase in the submarines or any 
diminution in the craft attacking them. Conversely the 
luck niight go our way and many more submarines 
succumb to our attack and many more merchant ships 
drive off attack than, on strict average, we should have 
any right to expect. For the moment it seems im- 
possible to say more than this that' when allowance is 
2nade for increasing daylight, there seems to be a clear, 
though not perhaps a very large falling off in the effi- 
ciency Qf the German campaign. It will, of course, 
have to be something far more marked before the 
position can be considered at all satisfactory. And so 
long as present conditions continue, it is impossible to 
over-nite the importance of every form of effort to 
counteract the los.ses which the .campaign intlicls. 
Food and the Blockade 
So . far as Government pronouncements go, ■ these 
efforts seem to be taking principally three forms. The 
Shi])ping Controller is making every effort to increase 
the available tonnage. The Food . Controller is urging 
.economy in consiunption. The Prime Minister "and 
his colleagues who look after agriculture and national 
service, are insisting on the need of increasing the 
home supply of food. But we hear nothing of im- 
proved methods of clearing docks and wharves so 
as to quicken the process of tufning ships round. This 
does not mean that no efforts have been made, nor is 
ther<^ any reason to suppose that they have not been 
maclc. But many are asking if in the transference of 
available labour from unnecessary trades or mere iin- 
einployment, to gardening and agriculture, the best is 
being made of the human power available ? The labour 
in question is, of course, unskilled. Has the question been 
faced of putting this to its most economical use ? One 
hears of cases that raise doubts. A piano-tuner, for 
instance, is sent to a farm from wlrich the only agri- 
culturist has been taken for military duties. It sounds 
a hopeless kind of substitution. A man like this, even 
if he had the physique, would take years to master the 
manifold duties of a farmer's single-handed help. Yet 
he could learn to work an automatic machine in a week. 
And it is of the essence of the matter that these un- 
trained volunteers should be put to the best use. How 
would the product of their labour produce the most 
food ? They have not the strength to cultivate very 
much land, and their work, already limited, must still 
further suffer from their ignorance. 
The Sixth Raid 
Of the latest night raid on the Thames and approaches, 
the sixth since the end of October, and the foiuth since 
the new Government took over, it will be time to speak 
when we are told more of the system of command in the 
area in which it has occurred. The loss of destroyers is 
serious; the impunity of the raiders still more so. 
Arthur Pollen. 
